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ABSTRACT
TOWARD A SCIENCE OF MORALS
BY
ROSS COLEBROOK
ADVISOR: JESSE PRINZ
Morality is not merely a social construction or a convenient fiction. Nor is it supernatural or nonnatural. Rather, ethics could eventually be studied as a branch of the social sciences, concerned with
empirically discovering the many and diverse best ways of living. There are moral facts (like “murder is
wrong”), and these facts are natural, objective, and universal. In other words, moral realism is true.
Philosophers often assume that moral realism matters because it is a commitment of common
sense. Drawing on new work in the psychology of metaethics, I argue that ordinary people are not in fact
moral realists. Instead, in the absence of principled philosophical education, or religious indoctrination,
the folk have highly variable metaethical attitudes. I explain this folk metaethical pluralism by arguing that
metaethical attitudes are seldom caused by rational processes, but instead are typically the result of a
variety of developmental, social, personality, and judgment factors, all rationally irrelevant to the truth of
moral realism.
If moral realism is not a commitment of common sense, then some may doubt that moral realism
matters at all. I argue for a new reason to think that this thesis matters: when we believe it, it can make us
more moral. New empirical findings show that people who have objectivist and universalist attitudes
toward their own morality are more likely to act in accordance with that morality. Though this may not
be good from an outside, objective perspective, it is good from the perspective of virtually every person’s
subjective system of moral beliefs. This gives us a strong moral reason to be moral realists.
Moral realism has more than moral goodness to recommend it, however. We can epistemically
secure objectivity in ethics by understanding moral facts from a metaphysical perspective that is
iv

simultaneously reductionist and realist. I formulate a metaphysical relation that I call thin reductionism,
which is a minimal metaphysical relation between facts. I argue that every fact must have this relation
with some other set of facts if that fact is to be even minimally scientifically respectable. I then argue that
we have reason to believe that moral facts are no special case, and that we ought to therefore reject nonnaturalist interpretations of ethics. If moral facts exist at all, they must be identical to some subset of
natural facts. I also respond to conceptual objections to ethical reductionism, including Hume’s is/ought
gap, Moore’s open question argument, and Moral Twin Earth. All of these, I claim, rely on false
assumptions about how we can come to know the meaning of moral concepts. Though philosophers
often think we can, no one can simply intuit the meaning of our moral concepts. As a result, proper
account of moral semantics cannot be determined without a normative ethical theory that answers to
global epistemic considerations.
If there is a naturalistic account of the metaphysics of morals, this provides a powerful way to
respond to classic arguments against the possibility of objectivity in ethics. Because many of the
metaphysical and epistemic arguments against the objectivity of morality are premised on the idea that
moral facts must be somehow metaphysically or epistemically special, these arguments fail if it turns out
that moral facts aren’t special at all. I respond to the major arguments in this vein, including supervenience,
explanation, and evolutionary skepticism.
Even if morality is natural and objective, this does not imply that it is universal. Nevertheless, I
argue that a portion of folk morality really is universal, and that metaethics and psychology can define the
outer limits of a naturalistic, objective, and universal morality. I draw on the empirical literature on moral
judgment to show that the foundational content of moral judgments is produced by innate cognitive
modules and is shared cross-culturally. I then show how this innateness and universality can bolster a
traditional response to the argument from disagreement. We can eliminate fundamental moral
disagreements by using a targeted argument from disagreement, which undermines the more controversial
v

and unnaturalizable binding foundations of moral judgment, while sparing the universally shared and
more readily naturalizable individualizing foundations. This gives us reason to believe that a portion of
folk morality is innate, and tracks natural facts that are objective and universal, while another portion of
folk morality is innate, but fails to track anything real. This conclusion has implications for normative
ethics, since the portion of morality that tracks these natural, objective, and universal moral facts broadly
corresponds with liberal, enlightenment values concerning harm reduction and justice.
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CHAPTER I
RECONCEPTUALIZING FOLK METAETHICS
Our sense of right and wrong defines our identities, our motivations, and our actions.
Aimed at ourselves, moral judgments can produce either satisfaction or guilt. In our social lives,
moral judgments lead to both friendships and hatreds. In our professional lives, moral judgments
cement agreements, or shatter them.

And in our politics, moral judgments unite and divide

movements, and can produce both peace and war. Despite the central importance of moral
judgments to our lives, we seldom stop to think what our moral judgments are, and most of us have
no settled opinions about what we’re doing when we make moral judgments. Though this may
appear to be a truism, it is by no means obvious to philosophers and psychologists.
In this chapter I will argue that folk metaethics is just as I described it: unsettled, uncertain,
and unclear.

This chapter will focus on a feature of folk metaethics that has most vexed

philosophers and psychologists: whether ordinary people are moral realists. In §1.1 I will specify
what constitutes realist attitudes and lay out the major positions in the recent debate over the proper
conception of folk metaethics. Then in §1.2 I will examine what until recently was the dominant
research paradigm in studying metaethical attitudes, and explain why this paradigm’s flawed
methodology cannot support the belief that the folk are moral realists. In §1.3 I will explore
research that defines a new paradigm for studying folk metaethics, and argue that this work supports
Folk Metaethical Pluralism. To the extent that ordinary people have standing metaethical attitudes at
all, some moral judgments thought to be objective, while others are thought to be subjective.
Finally, in §1.4 I bolster the case for Folk Metaethical Pluralism by providing an explanation of it: Folk
Metaethical Confusionism. This hypothesis claims that, absent philosophical or religious indoctrination,
folk metaethical attitudes are always caused by factors that are rationally irrelevant to the truth of
1

objectivism or subjectivism.
§1.1 CLARIFICATION OF POSITIONS
Any time a person forms a judgment about her own moral judgments, or expresses a
standing attitude toward those judgments, she is engaged in metaethics. This dissertation is focused
on a species of metaethical judgment that animates quite a lot of philosophical and psychological
work: realist and anti-realist attitudes.

Moral realism, as I will use the term, refers to the

combination of the following claims:
Moral Realism:
(a) Objectivity: moral facts exist, and do not depend for their existence on any person’s
attitudes.
(b) Universalism: many of the same moral facts obtain in every society.
A note about terminology: moral realism typically prioritizes the claim that moral facts are objective,
but most moral realists are in fact universalists as well (exceptions exist—e.g. Wong, 2006). This
chapter will stipulate that “realist” metaethical attitudes include both objectivist attitudes and
universalist attitudes. These two aspects of moral realism are often conflated, but it is worth being
clear on the difference between them.
If morality is objective, this means that moral facts exist, and that their existence is
independent of our beliefs, theories, evidence, desires, or perceptions of them. So, for example, on
this conception of the objectivity of morality, if the Iraq War was wrong, there exists a moral fact
(that it was wrong), and this fact would obtain regardless of anyone’s attitudes toward it (e.g. if Sam
believes it was right, his belief would be false). This contrasts both with metaethical views that claim
that moral facts do not exist (e.g. error theories or fictionalism) (e.g. (Joyce, 2001; Mackie,
1977/1990) and metaethical views that claim that moral facts depend for their existence on facts
about the person or her culture (e.g. constructivism or subjectivism) (e.g. (Korsgaard & O’Neill,
2

1996); Harman, 1977; Prinz, 2007).
If morality is universal, this means that at least some of the same moral facts exist in every
culture. For instance, if an individual is a universalist about the moral fact that murder is wrong, she
will believe that this fact obtains both in her society and in every other society. Though universality
and objectivity often go together, they are in fact separate considerations. Some moral facts may be
objective without being universal (because they exist independent of anyone’s attitude, though they
only obtain in one or a few societies). For example, some authors interpret Jewish dietary laws as
applying to Jews whether they believe in the law or not (i.e. they are objective), but hold that these
laws only apply to Jews (i.e. they are relative to a culture) (Grunfeld, 1975). Conversely, some moral
facts might be universal without being objective (because they only exist in virtue of someone
having an attitude about them, though everyone happens to share the same attitude). For instance,
Korsgaard’s (1996) view implies that moral facts depend on our attitudes for their existence, but she
holds that some moral rules nonetheless apply to all of us in virtue of the fact that we are rational
beings, concerned with maintaining our identities.
Most of the studies I will introduce in this chapter concern objectivism exclusively, rather than
both objectivism and universalism. This is partially due to a conflation of these concepts in much of
the extant psychological literature.1 Because of this conflation, we cannot draw the conclusion that
ordinary people have consistent (or inconsistent) universalist or relativist metaethical attitudes. As I
will argue, though, this is not the case for objectivist attitudes.
The study of metaethical attitudes has for quite some time been dominated by a certain
conceptual and experimental paradigm. In what follows I will refer to this as the “old paradigm” in
experimental moral psychology.2 Regarding metaethical attitudes, this paradigm implied a position

1 Some psychologists are very aware of this distinction, and explicitly test for objectivist attitudes. Goodwin & Darley
(2008, 2010, 2012) are particularly good examples.
2 To be clear, this is not intended as a term of art in the same way it is used in the philosophy of science literature.
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much like the following:
Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Objectivism: In virtue of the conceptual requirements of
first-order moral judgments, ordinary people must have objectivist attitudes toward their
own moral judgments.
Though much excellent work was done within the old paradigm, it has lost favor in recent
years. As a result, the same can be said for Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Objectivism. Yet, despite
the paradigm shift, not all researchers have rejected the notion that ordinary people are objectivists. A
more restricted program is available:
Folk Metaethical Objectivism: ceteris paribus, ordinary people have objectivist attitudes toward
their own moral judgments.
As I will argue, there are good reasons to doubt this thesis. Instead, work within the new paradigm of
experimental metaethics give us a new interpretation of folk metaethical attitudes:
Folk Metaethical Pluralism: Absent philosophical or religious indoctrination, ordinary people
have an unprincipled hodgepodge of objectivist and subjectivist attitudes toward their own
moral judgments, or no standing attitudes at all.
The argument in favor of this thesis rests on descriptive study of the metaethical judgments of
ordinary people under experimental conditions. But I think this case is significantly bolstered by
another hypothesis that itself has much support:
Folk Metaethical Confusionism: Absent philosophical or religious indoctrination, folk metaethical
attitudes (both objectivist and subjectivist) are caused by factors that are rationally irrelevant to
the truth of objectivism or subjectivism.
The argument in this chapter will address each of these hypotheses in turn. In §1.2 I will
explain why the old paradigm for experimental work in moral psychology is methodologically flawed,
and why this implies that Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Objectivism must be abandoned. In §1.3 I
4

will advance the case against Folk Metaethical Objectivism, and argue in favor of Folk Metaethical Pluralism.
In §1.4 I will offer Folk Metaethical Confusionism as an explanation of Folk Metaethical Pluralism, and show
that this hypothesis has much to recommend it, both in terms of its consistency with current findings
in the literature on metaethical attitudes, and in terms of its potential to generate theoretically
interesting empirical work in the future. I will conclude that there is no default folk metaethical
attitude, and that Folk Metaethical Confusionism is currently our best explanation of that fact.
§1.2 A FLAWED PARADIGM
Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally been divided about whether ordinary people
are moral realists. Many have thought that realism, or at least objectivism, is common sense (see, e.g.
Blackburn, 1993; Mackie, 1977/1990; Shafer-Landau, 2003; Darwall, 1998; M. Smith, 1994).3 At one
point, cutting edge research in moral psychology seemed to indicate that these philosophers were right,
and that Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Realism was the best account of folk metaethics.
However, as I will endeavor to show, work in this paradigm suffers from serious methodological
problems. This paradigm was useful for elucidating many of the common features of moral judgment,
but it unjustifiably treats objectivist attitudes as though they are conceptually necessary features of
moral judgment.
Some of the first systematic investigation of moral judgment began with Lawrence Kohlberg’s
work on moral development (Kohlberg, 1973, 1981; Rest, 1989). On Kohlberg’s view, children’s
moral development consists of a series of stages, from early, largely self-interest-driven stages which
are concerned with avoiding punishment and securing praise, on to more universal and abstract ethical
principles which go beyond the self (631-2).4 Kohlberg considered these stages of development to be
culturally universal, but thought that some individuals progress further or faster than others, depending

Others, however, have had their doubts (e.g. Brandt 1954; Ladd 1957; Prinz 2007; Wong 2006).
Notably, Kohlberg did not think moral judgment is innate, but rather that it occurs due to children “developing the
sequential results of processing moral experience” (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 634).
3
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on their opportunities for processing moral experience. Because he thought that the ability to appeal
to universal and abstract rules constituted the pinnacle of moral development, his view implied that
moral judgments which did not exhibit these features were less well developed.
Though Kohlberg’s work has been criticized in many ways, it proved inspiring for a significant
research program on the nature and source of moral judgment. 5 Work done by Elliot Turiel and his
collaborators focused on children’s understanding of the distinction between moral and conventional
rules. According to this literature, moral rules are (1) more serious, (2) more punishable, (3) authority
independent, and (4) universal (E. Turiel, 1983). There is quite good evidence that ordinary people
treat moral rules as conceptually distinct from conventional rules.

Children are capable of

distinguishing moral from conventional rules as early as three years of age (Smetana & Braeges, 1990).
This distinction is quite robust and has been established in many studies (Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986;
L. P. Nucci, 2001; L. P. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; L. P. Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; L.
Nucci & Turiel, 1993; E. Turiel, 1979; Elliot Turiel, 1983).

Moreover, appreciation of the distinction

seems to explain why psychopaths have characteristic defects in moral decision-making (Blair, 1995,
though see Prinz, 2008). Nichols & Folds-Bennett (2003) also showed that children are more likely to
treat properties like “fun” and “icky” as attitude-dependent, as compared with properties like “good”
or “bad.” Similar results were found in Wainryb et al. (2004).
Since this distinction arises so early and appears to be so widespread, this body of work
seemed at first to provide good evidence that these features are essential to the content of moral
judgments.6 If this was the case, it would be good evidence for Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical
Objectivism. Insofar as ordinary people are capable of developed moral judgment at all, this literature
seems to indicate that they must be objectivists. After all, the evidence seemed to indicate that ordinary
Famously, Gilligan (1993) also criticized Kohlberg’s paradigm of moral development for being unjustifiably maleoriented.
6 Note that the “essential features of moral judgment” are not necessarily innate. The architecture of moral judgment
ought to be distinguished from the epistemic source of moral judgment.
5
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people treat authority independence and universality as constitutive of moral rules. Some researchers
even infer that these features of moral judgment are innate (Dwyer, 1999, 2006). However, there are
two problems which ought to preclude us from drawing any of these inferences.
The first problem with the research paradigm that derives from the moral-conventional
distinction is that if we consider (1) through (4) above to be conceptually constitutive of moral
judgments, it is easy to generate troubling counterexamples that show that none of these features is in
fact necessary or sufficient for moral judgment (Prinz, 2008). Starting with (1), there are good reasons
to doubt that moral judgments are more serious than other kinds of judgments (prudential, aesthetic,
legal, etc.). After all, many people judge that it is morally wrong to litter, but this judgment is obviously
far less serious than the prudential judgment that if I invest in Bernie Madoff’s company, my life
savings will be lost. Regarding (2), not all moral violations are considered more punishable than other
kinds of rule violations. Lying to your significant other about the quality of his or her outfit is not
more punishable than a child shouting obscenities at the dinner table. And for (3), there are certainly
moral judgments that derive from the demands of an authority. For instance, a recent Pew poll found
that 42% of Americans believe that a belief in God is necessary to have good moral values (G. A.
Smith, 2017). Finally, for (4), there are moral rules that ordinary people regard as applying only to their
own group, such as Islamic or Jewish dietary restrictions (Grunfeld, 1975).
None of these features, then, seem to be obviously necessary or sufficient for distinguishing
moral from conventional rules. But there is an even more serious problem inherent in the paradigm
exemplified by Kohlberg and Turiel’s work. Kohlberg takes universalizability as the hallmark of a fully
developed capacity for moral judgment. Turiel and his collaborators take recognition of the moralconventional distinction as definitive of moral judgment. In both cases, what is taken to be definitive
of moral judgment is driven from what researchers believe is constitutive of moral judgments, and
experimental tasks are created to test this hypothesis. But this means that other conceptions of moral
7

judgment are left untested. Quintelier & Fessler (2012) make the point well:
If the researcher does not conceptualize a certain rule as universalizable, it will not be studied
as a moral rule, even if subjects would categorize the rule as moral, if asked. … Kohlberg-inspired
methods are biased towards finding people to be moral non-relativists (p. 101).
Indeed, Quintelier & Fessler point out that this move defines subjectivist and relativist
morality out of existence:
Morality is defined [by Kohlberg, Turiel, and others operating in this paradigm] as ‘analytically
independent of systems of social organization that coordinate interactions,’ … Moral right and
wrong are determined by, and justified by, universal values of justice, rights, and ‘do no harm.’
As a consequence, what is morally wrong is morally wrong everywhere and its wrongness is
justified by these universal values—wrongness is not determined by consensus (p. 102,
emphasis original).
What this means is that this research paradigm cannot be used to tell in favor of or against the
existence of subjectivist and relativist folk conceptions of morality. We have gone looking for
objectivist and universalist attitudes and found some. But because of the dominant research paradigm,
we have not looked for subjectivist and relativist attitudes and found none. It would be a mistake,
then, to conclude that ordinary people do not have these attitudes.
The methodological problem with these studies is also well elucidated by Meindl, & Graham
(2014), who point out that moral judgment is often problematically operationalized from the thirdperson perspective. From this perspective, the researcher assumes that a construct is either fully or
partially constitutive of moral judgment, regardless of whether study participants themselves would
endorse that construct. This can often lead to poor construct validity, since folk attitudes about what
constitutes the moral domain are highly variable (2014). The alternative, a first-person perspective,
would allow a study participant herself to choose between moral and other types of rules (p. 235).
8

Meindl & Graham do not advocate that we simply accept whatever participants say counts as moral,
since participants are sometimes influenced by considerations of social desirability or self-deception (p.
243). Instead, they advocate a mixed approach, where researchers first operationalize morality by
using assessments that previous research indicates are morally relevant, but then test whether
participants themselves think these assessments are morally relevant. This keeps research grounded in
morality as an empirical phenomenon, but also helps researchers avoid relying entirely on the say-so of
(sometimes self-interested) participants.
When researchers allow participants the chance to identify morally relevant assessments for
themselves, what previously appeared conceptually constitutive of morality is no longer so obvious.
Kelly et al. (2007) presented online participants with scenarios and asked to (1) judge whether the
behavior was OK or not, and (2) judge on a ten-point Likert scale how bad the behavior in the
scenario was (from ‘not at all bad’ to ‘very bad’). Participants were then asked to suppose that an
authority figure had previously stated that the behavior in the scenario was not acceptable and asked
the same two questions again (Kelly et al., 2007, pp. 122–123).7 In each of the six scenarios that Kelly
et al. tested involving harm norms, a substantial subset of participants judged that the harm violation
in question was dependent on the authority’s say-so (p. 129). In another two scenarios designed to test
whether participants viewed these judgments as universal, Kelly et al. found that a substantial subset of
participants judged that their judgment would not apply to other times or places. This runs directly
contrary to the hypothesis implied by Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Objectivism. If it were a
matter of conceptual necessity that moral judgments are both authority independent and universal, this
would imply that all participants would either fail to judge behavior in a scenario wrong, or would be
willing to universalize the judgment, and claim that it applies across time and space.8

The authority figure varied depending on the scenario described.
To their credit, Kelly et al. (2007) do not suppose that the old paradigm is committed to authority independence and
universality being conceptually necessary for moral judgments, but aim their critique at a less ambitious position. Their
7
8
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In a vein similar to Kelly et al. (2007), Huebner et al. (2010) provide a nuanced insight into the
nature of the moral-conventional distinction, without assuming at the outset that moral and
conventional violations must be conceptually distinct. Participants in this study were given paired
vignettes about a person’s action in a social situation. One part of the vignette described a person
engaged in a conventional violation in that social situation, and this was paired with a moral violation
in that same social situation. For example, participants received the following paired vignette:
Conventional (restaurant/food): “One night Michael goes to a fancy restaurant. He orders a Tbone steak and when it arrives he picks it up and eats it with his hands rather than using his
silverware.”
Moral (restaurant/food): “One night Joshua goes to a fancy restaurant and orders a T-bone
steak. When it arrives he throws it as hard as he can into the face of a man sitting nearby.”
Participants were then asked to judge the badness and punishability of each act on a 7-point Likert
scale, and asked to judge the universality and authority-independence on a binary (yes-no) scale.
Analysis of the responses revealed that moral judgments formed two defined clusters, with
moral judgments generally in one cluster and conventional judgments in another. Yet Huebner et al.
caution us:
[T]he space of social transgressions is vast, and this space must be systematically sampled, and
examined on the basis of a set of clear parameters, if we are to come to a complete
understanding of how the mind determines which sorts of transgressions are conventional and
which are moral (2010, p. 15).
Moreover, though the two clusters are well defined, the data exhibits a clear continuum of responses,
with responses to a few questions falling in between the two clusters (pp. 9 – 10).

article argues that moral judgment does not consist of a nomological cluster defined by the four features Turiel and his
collaborators identify (p. 120). In line with (Quintelier & Fessler, 2012), my critique of the old paradigm supposes it is
committed to the conceptual necessity of at least authority-independence and universalism.
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What all this means is that we have good reason to doubt the old paradigm of research into the
nature of moral judgments. Conceptually Necessary Folk Metaethical Objectivism, which claims that ordinary
people must be objectivists in virtue of the conceptual requirements of moral judgments, is false.
However, even if ordinary people need not be objectivists as a matter of conceptual necessity, they
may still be objectivists as a matter of fact. This leaves at least two hypotheses to be examined: Folk
Metaethical Objectivism, and Folk Metaethical Pluralism.
A new paradigm for investigating moral and metaethical judgments and attitudes has been
developed by several different researchers, and provides us with reasons which tell in favor of the
latter. As we have seen, Meindl & Graham (2014) recommend a mixed first and third-person
approach, where researchers measure what participants consider to be essential features of moral
judgments, and then theorize and test these features. Similarly, Haidt & Kesebir (2010) argue that the
study of morality should begin with a functional definition, rather than conceptual analysis:
Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions,
technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or
regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life possible (p. 800).
This new paradigm in the psychological and philosophical investigation of moral judgment, which
involves (1) empirically-guided theorizing, and (2) a functionalist guiding definition has proven quite
productive and revealed that folk moral judgment (and metaethical attitudes) are much more complex
than we might have thought. In the next section I will explore some of the work in this new paradigm
and argue that much of it constitutes evidence for Folk Metaethical Pluralism.
§1.3 EVIDENCE FOR FOLK METAETHICAL PLURALISM
Before I relate the results of experiments in this paradigm, it is important to be clear about the
cognitive architecture that we are postulating when we talk about metaethical attitudes. In the old
paradigm, metaethical attitudes were thought to be a conceptually necessary feature of first-order
11

moral judgments. This meant that the content of moral judgments was necessarily objectivist. Once
we reject this, there are at least two possibilities for conceptualizing metaethical attitudes. First, we
might follow work in the old paradigm and presume that metaethical attitudes consist in content that a
moral judgment contains, even while we recognize that objectivist content is not constitutive of moral
judgments.

Second, and alternatively, we might conceptualize metaethical attitudes as separate,

metacognitive mental states that have first-order moral judgments as their target. At this point, there is
no definitive evidence that supports one interpretation over the other. In what follows I will default to
the second conceptualization of metaethical attitudes, though I cannot determine whether much rides
on this question.
In either case, this new research paradigm provides a wealth of new evidence for Folk
Metaethical Pluralism, which, to reiterate, is the following:
Absent philosophical or religious indoctrination, ordinary people have a hodgepodge of
objectivist and subjectivist attitudes toward their own moral judgments, or no standing
attitudes at all.
When we examine these studies, we find that substantial numbers of participants (though seldom
majorities) express subjectivist attitudes about their first-order judgments. As I will argue, this means
that proponents of Folk Metaethical Objectivism must find defusing explanations that show why ordinary
people stray from the default metaethical attitude. To date, many factors have been shown to affect
metaethical attitudes.

While the proponent of folk objectivism may point to these factors as

explanations for variation in folk metaethical attitudes, as I will point out in §1.4, there is another
explanation.
Some of the earliest evidence for this thesis comes from Nichols (2004). Nichols provided
participants with four scenarios where two people (John and Fred) from different cultures have a
disagreement, involving a moral scenario, a factual scenario, a disgust scenario, and a conventional
12

scenario (pp. 9 – 10).9 Participants were given the option of responding to disagreements in one of
three ways:
1. It is okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so John is right and Fred is wrong.
2. It is not okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so Fred is right and John is wrong.
3. There is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like “It’s okay to hit people just
because you feel like it.” Different cultures believe different things, and it is not absolutely
true or false that it’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it (pp. 9 – 10).
Analogous response options were given for the disagreement about the other scenarios (mutatis
mutandis). Nichols found that six of the participants (13%) gave the last, non-objectivist answer to the
factual statement, and, to control for global subjectivism, excluded them from analysis.10 Even after
removing these participants from consideration, Nichols found that seventeen participants (42%) gave
non-objectivist responses to the moral scenario (Nichols, 2004, p. 10).11 In a subsequent experiment, a
significant portion of participants once again expressed non-objectivist responses (excluding the twelve
(!) global subjectivists, 26% of participants chose a subjectivist answer to the ethical question)(p. 18).
This experiment added another scenario where a human and an alien disagree about the permissibility
of torturing puppies, and includes the same response options. Despite the emotionally charged nature
of the scenario, participants were actually more likely to choose the non-objectivist answer (38%) (p.
18).
In the moral scenario, the disagreement is about whether it is okay to hit other people just because you feel like it. In
the factual scenario, the disagreement is about whether the Earth is flat. The disgust scenario involves a disagreement
about whether it is okay to drink your own vomit if you have microwaved it first, and the conventional scenario
10 This is by no means an atypical move in the literature, but one might wonder whether researchers ought to exclude
global subjectivists from analysis. After all, they may actually be global subjectivists. One of the motivations for Folk
Metaethical Pluralism is that ordinary people seldom bother to think about metaethics at all, so they often have no standing
opinions about whether objectivism is true for any given first-order judgment. It is possible that ordinary people may
not bother to think about whether external world realism is true, and an analogous thesis obtains here. If that were the
case, it is easy to see how subjectivist indoctrination might cause global subjectivism. If a person takes many
postmodernist English classes and involves herself in New Age religious movements, it is plausible that they may be
indoctrinated to doubt external world realism.
11 Nichols goes on to argue that, despite this, we ought not reject the claim that ordinary people metaethical objectivists,
but cites studies in the old paradigm, which, I have argued, we have reason to doubt.
9
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Because it developed out of the old paradigm for investigating these questions, this study is not
without criticism. As Beebe (2015) points out, the responses offered to participants leave something
to be desired. The first and second responses do not test metaethical judgments at all, and the third
possible response forces participants to suspend judgment if they want to say there is no fact of the
matter about the action being right or wrong. This excludes the possibility of alternative reactions
participants might have had. Notably, some participants may have wanted to both express a firstorder moral judgment and a subjectivist second-order judgment (pp. 17-18). Nevertheless, if our
purpose is to argue for Folk Metaethical Pluralism, Nichols (2004) still counts as a good piece of
evidence. After all, participants intending to express objectivist attitudes were not prevented from
doing so; if anything, the flawed nature of the response options excluded more subjectivist responses.
Yet more evidence in favor of Folk Metaethical Pluralism comes from a study that purports to
support Folk Metaethical Objectivism—Goodwin & Darley (2008). The reasons why this study ought to
count in support of Folk Metaethical Pluralism are quite nuanced, and will require some elaboration.
Goodwin & Darley (2008) gave participants a series of factual, ethical, and conventional statements.12
In the first phase of the experiment, the researchers asked whether the participants agreed with the
statement (on a six-point scale), and asked them to judge whether the statement the statement was (1)
true, (2) false, or (3) an opinion or attitude (p. 1344). Participants were then told that no statement on
the list produced 100% agreement, and were asked to interpret their apparent disagreement with other
participants in the study. They were given four options: (1) the other party is surely mistaken, (2) it is
possible that neither you nor the other person is mistaken, (3) it could be that you are mistaken, and
the other person is correct, and (4) other (p. 1344). Notably, participants refused to say that their
judgments on the ethical statements were true in cases where the statement was controversial, despite
12 For example, their factual statements included “Boston (Massachusetts) is further north than Los Angeles
(California).” Ethical statements included “Before the 3rd month of pregnancy, abortion for any reason (of the
mother’s) is morally permissible. Their conventional statements included “Calling teachers by their first name, without
being given permission to do so, in a school that calls them ‘‘Mr.’’ or ‘‘Mrs.’’ is wrong behavior.”
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agreeing with those statements. So, for example, only between 2% and 8% of participants rated
statements on abortion, euthanasia, stem cell research to be true, despite agreeing with these
statements.

Instead, participants preferred to describe their judgments as opinions.

For less

controversial items, participants were more comfortable describing their own judgments as true, (for
example, 61% of participants rated a statement condemning robbery as true).
Judged on its own, participants’ answers to these questions seem to be yet more evidence for
metaethical pluralism. After all, this is a case where ordinary people’s metaethical intuitions appear to
vary dramatically. Yet Goodwin & Darley (2008) do not draw that conclusion. In fact, their
conclusion is that ethical statements were treated by participants as more objective than both
conventional and taste or preference statements, and only treated less objectively than factual
statements (p. 1348). This is because Goodwin & Darley operationalize a participants’ objectivity
about a judgment with an objectivity scale that combines results from the first phase of the experiment
with the results from the second phase. If participants view their own judgments as true, and view
those who disagree with them as surely mistaken, this counts as a ‘fully objective’ answer, and is given
a score of ‘3’ on the objectivity scale. Participants who interpret their judgment as a matter of opinion,
and then say that it is possible that neither they nor the other person is mistaken are treated as ‘least
objective,’ and this counts as a score of 1 on the objectivity scale. This leaves two more possibilities
(shown in table 1 below).13 When scores are combined in this scale, Goodwin & Darley do in fact get
the result that judgments on ethical statements rank somewhat below factual statements in objectivity
(M = 2.91 vs. M = 2.56), and somewhat above judgments on conventional statements (M = 2.56 vs. M
= 2.00). See Table 1 for a breakdown of Goodwin & Darley’s operationalization of metaethical
attitudes for this experiment.

Excluding, of course, the very small number of participants who judged that a statement is true, and then judged that
it is possible that they themselves were mistaken, rather than the disagreeing other.
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15

Participants’ Metaethical

Response in Phase 1

Response in Phase 2

Attitude
Fully Objective

Objectivity
Scale Score

Statement is true.

The other party (who

3

disagrees) is surely
mistaken.
Intermediately Objective1

Statement is true.

It is possible that

2

neither you nor the
other person is
mistaken.
Intermediately Objective2

Least Objective

Statement is an opinion

The other party is

or attitude.

surely mistaken

Statement is an opinion

It is possible that

or attitude.

neither you nor the

2

1

other person is
mistaken.
Table 1: Operationalization of objectivist attitudes in experiment 1, Goodwin & Darley (2008). Subscripts added.

The major problem with this scale derives from its treatment of the two ‘intermediately
objective’ categories. If a participant gives answers which fall into either of these categories, her level
of objectivity for a given statement is treated the same, whether she gave one or the other combination
of answers. Yet these two positions are in fact quite distinct, and are not properly treated as positions
between full objectivism and full subjectivism. Of course, Goodwin & Darley are not blind to the fact
that these positions are conceptually separable: they point out that intermediately objective1 is consistent
with philosophical subjectivism, and that intermediately objective2 might involve an “oscillation (or possibly
confusion) regarding a statement’s objectivity” (p. 1345). But this analysis is insufficient. Intermediately
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objective1 would be endorsed by virtually any subjectivist who is also a cognitivist. Yet they do not draw
the conclusion that one might expect: that participants whose answers fall into this category really are
antirealists about their judgments, just as much as those who fall into the least objective category.
Conversely, Goodwin & Darley leave out an alternative interpretation of intermediately objective2 which
the participants may have had in mind when making their judgments: they were not confused about
the judgment’s objectivity, but rather saw little difference between “true” (for statements they agreed
with) and “opinion.” Goodwin & Darley clearly intended the word to imply that there was no right or
wrong answer to the question, but this is not necessarily how participants saw it. After all, using the
word “opinion” to signify a belief that might be true or false is a common usage.14 If this is how
participants interpreted the word, then intermediately objective2 is in fact a realist position. The experiment
thus fails to adequately operationalize objectivity about the statements in question, since it treats as
identical two positions which have very different cognitive and metaethical significance.15
Treating intermediately objective2 as equivalent to fully objective and intermediately objective2 as least
subjective leads to a somewhat different interpretation of Goodwin & Darley’s data.16 For the first
experiment, if we interpret the data on a binary, rather than three-pointed scale, 67% of responses to
ethical questions count as fully objective, and 22% are least objective, with the remainder excluded due to
answering ‘other’ in the second phase of the experiment. For the factual statement, in the second
phase, a full 20% of participants chose “it could be that you are mistaken, and the other person is
correct.” Just one participant chose this answer in response to the two ethical statements, and
Goodwin & Darley treated this response as fully objective (2008, p. 1348). If we treat this type of
response as fully objective when applied to factual statements, this means that 92% of responses count
Beebe (2012) makes a similar point, p. 13.
Goodwin & Darley’s third reported experiment employs a similar methodology, although it changes the second phase
of the experiment to employ a six-point Likert scale that ranges from “neither of us need be mistaken” to “the other
person is clearly mistaken” (2008, p. 1356).
16 Goodwin & Darley (2008), as published, does not come with descriptive data about how many participants fell into
each intermediately objective category for factual statements. Dr. Goodwin kindly shared this data with me in personal
correspondence.
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as fully objective, and 6% count as least objective. 17,18
The second experiment in Goodwin & Darley (2008) is much the same as the first, with one
notable exception: in the first phase, rather than asking whether a statement is true, false, or an
opinion, they asked participants whether there can be a correct answer as to whether the statement is
true (pp. 1351-2). As such, the objectivism scores were slightly different. See Table 2 for a breakdown
of Goodwin & Darley’s operationalization of metaethical attitudes for this experiment.
This second experiment is an improvement over the first, as it excludes the possibility that
participants interpreted “opinion” as an expression of a belief. Yet again, though, we have reason to
doubt that intermediately objective3 and intermediately objective4 constitute theoretically grounded intermediate
positions. Intermediate3 could be accepted by any subjectivist, since, for a subjectivist, a statement is true
“for her” despite the fact that, speaking objectively, neither she nor a disagreeing party need be wrong.
(Each has her own truth, indexed to her own mind). And any emotivist, expressivist, or prescriptivist
could accept intermediately objective4. For any of these positions, moral statements are not true or false
(because moral judgments are purely emotive, expressive, or prescriptive), yet a disagreeing party could
be “mistaken” in the second phase, insofar as her moral judgment emotes, expresses, or prescribes
differently. These non-cognitivist options have to be considered, because, as I covered previously,
there is evidence that some ordinary people have non-cognitivist interpretations of their own moral
judgments (J. R. Beebe, 2015, pp. 25–28).

Participants’ Metaethical

Response in Phase 1

Attitude

Response in Phase 2

Objectivity
Scale Score

17 Most participants (92%) were given the statement “Boston (Massachusetts) is further north than Los Angeles
(California)” (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1363).
18 One participant chose “opinion,” for the first phase, and “it could be that you are mistaken, and the other person is
correct” in the second phase. If my point about the “opinion” response is correct, this ought to be added to the
percentage of participants in the fully objective category, making it 94%.
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Fully Objective

Yes, there can be a

The other party (who

correct answer to

disagrees) is surely

whether this statement

mistaken.

3

is true.
Intermediately Objective3

Intermediately Objective4

Yes, there can be a

It is possible that

correct answer to

neither you nor the

whether this statement

other person is

is true.

mistaken.

No, there cannot be a

The other party is

correct answer to

surely mistaken

2

2

whether this statement
is true.
Least Objective

No, there cannot be a

It is possible that

correct answer to

neither you nor the

whether this statement

other person is

is true.

mistaken.

1

Table 2: Operationalization of objectivist attitudes in experiment 2, Goodwin & Darley (2008). Subscripts added.

When we reconceptualize the data along the lines just suggested, we again get a different
picture of folk metaethics from Goodwin & Darley’s data. For ethical statements, 70% of responses
fell into the fully objective category (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1353). If each of the intermediately
objective categories in this experiment is treated as least objective, 25% of participants would be classified
as least objective, and another 5% cannot be classified. By comparison, for factual statements, 71% of
responses were fully objective and 23% were least objective. The most striking fact about this result
(compared with the first experiment) is that participants expressed far less objectivism about factual
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statements. The explanation is that the researchers (to test the effect of controversial statements)
substituted a factual question about geography with a factual question about evolution for some
respondents in the second phase of the experiment. In the first experiment 92% received a statement
claiming that Boston is further north than Los Angeles. By contrast, in the second experiment, only
20% received this question, and 67% received the statement that “Homo sapiens evolved from more
primitive primate species” (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1368). Despite agreeing to the statement,
those who received this more controversial statement were significantly less objectivist.19
As I will cover in the next section, the level of controversy surrounding a statement often
drives down mean objectivism about that statement (Goodwin & Darley, 2012). It is problematic,
then, that this experiment does not match like with like, since most subjects were offered
uncontroversial ethical statements in the second phase of the experiment.20 This means that Goodwin
& Darley’s hypothesis cannot be confirmed by this experiment. Though the level of objectivism for
factual statements was close to the same as the level of objectivism for ethical statements, this does not
imply that ordinary people are treating these two statements the same way. An alternative hypothesis,
that the level of controversy in the factual statements drove down participants’ objectivity judgments,
is still viable. In fact, it may be the preferred interpretation, since mean subjectivism about ethical
statements in the first experiment is similar to mean subjectivism about ethical statements in the
second (22% and 25% respectively).
In a later study, Goodwin & Darley employ somewhat different methodology (2012). Rather
than measuring objectivity by combining responses from two categorical variables (as in experiment 1
and 2), these experiments measure objectivity by combining two interval variables (both on a scale of
Goodwin & Darley (2008) report that participants who received the more controversial statement about evolution
were marginally less objectivist (M = 2.64 vs M = 2.87, t(31.57, unequal variances) = 1.99, p < .06).) (p. 1352). When we
analyze the data with the new conceptualization I proposed above (where 1 = fully objective and 0 = least objective), this
pattern repeats, and is somewhat more robust (M = .93 vs M = .72, t(43.01, unequal variances) = 2.28, p < .03).
20 Most respondents (97% and 89% respectively) received uncontroversial ethical statements: (1) “Robbing a bank in
order to pay for an expensive holiday is a morally bad action” and (2) “Cheating on a knowledge section of a lifeguard
exam, to obtain a job for which one is not qualified is morally wrong” (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1361).
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1-6). The first variable measures the extent to which participants believe there is a correct answer
about whether a statement is true. Goodwin & Darley then tell participants that another participant
has disagreed with them, and the second variable measures the extent to which participants think a
disagreeing other needs to be mistaken (1 = neither of us need to be mistaken, 6 = the other person is
clearly mistaken) (2012, p. 251). They then average these two measures to derive a combined six-point
objectivity scale. They again find that factual statements are treated as more objective (M = 5.23) than
moral statements (M = 4.25), but more objective than conventional statements (M = 3.16) and matters
of taste (M = 1.60) (p. 252).
As Beebe (2012) points out, this measure of objectivity suffers from some of the same
methodological problems as the first. Most importantly, it does not clearly distinguish between
metaethical and first-order judgments. Moreover, given that one of the anchors for the first variable
(“the other person is clearly mistaken”) includes the word “clearly,” this might have caused
respondents to express their level of confidence, rather than their assessment of the item’s objectivity
(p. 16). Thus it is hard to believe that we are getting a clear measure of participants’ objectivity.
Quite aside from these objections, treating objectivity as an interval rather than categorical
value comes with its own problems. First, it is unclear whether this move is theoretically warranted.
Unlike attitude strength or certainty, which are not plausibly binary mental states, metaethical attitudes
may in fact be binary. That is, we may either have them or not have them, not have them to some
extent. Second, in terms of measurement, treating objectivity as an interval value introduces the
possibility that a distinct minority of participants gave largely subjectivist answers, but that these
answers are being obscured by the mean measurement of objectivity. Goodwin & Darley (2012) do
not report standard deviations for these measures, and without this data, we cannot tell whether this
alternate hypothesis is correct.
To briefly reiterate, Goodwin & Darley’s hypothesis is that, overall, ethical statements are
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treated as more objective than conventional and aesthetic statements, but somewhat less objective than
factual statements. But supporting this hypothesis is complicated by their first operationalization of
metaethical attitudes, which unjustifiably treats some anti-realist positions (subjectivism, emotivism,
expressivism, prescriptivism, etc.) as intermediate between objectivism and subjectivism. Yet even if
an improved methodology could reveal that, on average, people treat moral statements as more
objective than conventional or taste statements, this would not be enough to support Folk Metaethical
Objectivism. There remains the troubling fact that a substantial minority of respondents treat factual
statements as more objective than ethical statements. If Goodwin & Darley’s work is to support Folk
Metaethical Objectivism, it needs to be supplemented with an explanation of why this minority exists.
Folk Metaethical Objectivism also needs to contend with an intriguing finding by Sarkissian et al.
(2011), who showed that ordinary people implicitly assume their own cultural context when making
moral judgments. As they put it:
As long as [the folk] are thinking only about individuals who are fairly similar to themselves—
say, individuals from their own cultural groups—[folk metaethical] intuitions might look more
or less objectivist. But … people’s intuitions undergo a systematic shift as they begin
considering different sorts of individuals … who are deeply dissimilar—individuals with
radically different cultures, values, or ways of life (Sarkissian et al., 2011, p. 486).
Thus it is possible that when people are expressing objectivist judgments, this isn’t because Folk
Metaethical Objectivism is true, it is because they are implicit relativists, and are taking their own cultural
background for granted. Sarkissian et al. test this hypothesis by comparing levels of objectivism across
moral judgments made in intercultural (and, as we’ll see, intergalactic) contexts.
Sarkissian et al.’s method was to provide participants with two vignettes that included an agent
performing an action and two evaluators that disagreed about whether the action is permissible.
Participants in the same-culture condition were told that both the evaluators were Americans like
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themselves. Those in the other-culture condition were told that one of the evaluators was from a very
different culture and a different way of life. Finally, those in the extraterrestrial condition were told
that one of the disagreeing evaluators was from an extraterrestrial culture (p. 486-7). In the first moral
vignette, the behavior was the following: “Horace finds his youngest child extremely unattractive and
therefore kills him.” The second was similar: “Dylan buys an expensive new knife and tests its
sharpness by randomly stabbing a passerby on the street” (Sarkissian et al., 2011, p. 487). Participants
were then told that one of the evaluators thought the action was permissible, and the other thought it
was impermissible. Finally, they were told:
Given that these individuals [evaluators] have different judgments about this case, we would
like to know whether you think at least one of them must be wrong, or whether you think
both of them could actually be correct. In other words, to what extent would you agree or
disagree with the following statement concerning such a case: Since your classmate and Sam have
different judgments about this case, at least one of them must be wrong (p. 487).
Participants then indicated their level of agreement to the statement on a seven-point Likert scale.21
The instructions were the same for participants in the other-culture and extraterrestrial condition,
except for the description of one of the evaluators. In the other-culture condition, rather than
describing the both the evaluators as Americans much like themselves, one of the evaluators was
described as a member of an isolated Amazonian warrior tribe called the Mamilons.

In the

extraterrestrial condition, one of the disagreeing evaluators was an extraterrestrial from a race of beings
called the Pentars, who are not interested in friendship or love, and only care about increasing the total
number of pentagons in the universe (Sarkissian et al., 2011, pp. 489–490).
The results of this experiment constitute a significant objection to Folk Metaethical Objectivism.
Participants in the same-culture condition largely expressed objectivist judgments (M = 5.4, SD =
21

Instructions were the same for the other moral vignette.
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2.15). Those in the other-culture condition centered on the mid-point of the scale (M = 4.4, SD =
2.05). And participants in the extraterrestrial condition were the least objectivist (M = 3.2, SD = 2.28).
The difference in responses between the conditions were significant (P < .05 between the same-culture
and other-culture conditions and P < .01 between other-culture and extraterrestrial conditions). Later
experiments reported in the same study demonstrated that these results could be replicated crossculturally, when all three conditions were presented to participants at once, and when the actor in the
vignette (e.g. Horace) was presented as a member of the participants’ own culture (pp. 490-4). Like
Nichols (2004), the study also presented an experiment which demonstrated that participants were not
simply expressing global subjectivism (pp. 496-7).
Perhaps most importantly, then, what Sarkissian et al. (2011) showed was “that people can
have different reactions to judgments about the very same act, performed by the very same agent, so
long as we vary the identity of the judge” (p. 494). This runs counter to Folk Metaethical Objectivism,
which ought to imply that, ceteris paribus, ordinary people would continue to express objectivist
judgments, independent of who happens to be judging an action. And importantly, it undermines a
more general argumentative strategy in favor of Folk Metaethical Objectivism. Researchers looking show
that objectivism is the default folk outlook might find it easy to take for granted that when participants
express objectivist attitudes, they really have objectivist attitudes.

But if some participants are

implicitly assuming their own cultural background, their underlying metaethical attitudes may be
subjectivist after all. Those who intend to defend Folk Metaethical Objectivism will have to account for
why the ostensible default, objectivism, systematically varies according to who is perceived to be
judging an action.
Given the impact of this experiment (and new, well-founded concerns about replication in the
social sciences (e.g. Open Science Collaboration, 2015)), it is important to ensure that its results were
not a statistical fluke. To that end, I undertook to replicate this experiment, using a sample of
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participants recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for $0.15 (N = 103, 46 female).22 Aside from
minor formatting changes (both evaluators were given names, rather than leaving one of the
evaluators’ names unspecified), the experiment remained the same. The results partially replicated the
main effect from the first experiment in Sarkissian et al. (2011). See figures 1 and 2 below for results.
While participants in the same-culture condition treated disagreements about both transgressions
objectively (M = 5.71, SD = 1.65 and M = 5.97, SD = 1.65), their judgments about these
transgressions in the other-culture and extraterrestrial conditions were lower (M = 4.43, SD = 2.13 and
M = 4.65, SD 2.25 for the other-culture condition, and M = 4.55, SD = 1.78 and M = 5.0, SD = 1.79
for the extraterrestrial condition).

In a post hoc Tukey’s test, the difference in condition was

significant for comparisons between the same-culture condition and the other-culture condition (p <
.02) and between the same-culture and extraterrestrial condition (p < .05). The results of this
experiment failed to replicate a significant difference between the other-culture and extraterrestrial
conditions (p > .87). This failure of replication is puzzling, and will have to be examined in future
research.

Nevertheless, this partial main effect replication still supports the doubts about Folk

Metaethical Objectivism expressed above.
As is becoming clear, studies in the new paradigm of research on metaethical attitudes have
produced many reasons to doubt Folk Metaethical Objectivism, and many reasons to accept Folk
Metaethical Pluralism. In short, many studies demonstrate that ordinary people express subjectivist or
relativist attitudes across many different conditions. This finding is quite robust, and puts the defender
of Folk Metaethical Objectivism on the backfoot. In order to maintain the thesis, they must propose and
test hypotheses which explain away these findings, and show how objectivism can be the default folk
metaethical view. But as I will argue in the next section, there is good reason to think that these
factors are not extraneous at all. Instead, I will propose that they constitute the source of most
Possibly due to the low level of remuneration, 22 participants failed a basic comprehension check and were eliminated
from the study.
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metaethical attitudes, and this accounts for the fact that folk metaethical attitudes are so variable.
Fig. 1: Mean agreement to “Since your classmate and Sam have different judgments about this case, at least one of them
must be wrong” by condition (Horace transgression). Error bars show SE mean.

Fig. 2: Mean agreement to “Since your classmate and Sam have different judgments about this case, at least one of them
must be wrong” by condition (Dylan transgression). Error bars show SE mean.

1.4 EVIDENCE FOR FOLK METAETHICAL CONFUSIONISM
If ordinary people have a hodgepodge of metaethical attitudes rather than a default objectivist
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attitude, it is worth asking why this is would be. In this section I will argue for Folk Metaethical
Confusionism, a thesis which constitutes an explanation of, and supports, Folk Metaethical Pluralism.
Restated, the thesis is the following:
Folk Metaethical Confusionism: Absent philosophical or religious indoctrination, folk metaethical
attitudes (both objectivist and subjectivist) are caused by factors that are rationally irrelevant to
the truth of objectivism or subjectivism.
If this thesis is true, it ought to be unsurprising that folk metaethical attitudes are variable,
unprincipled, and often subjectivist. Moreover, as I will endeavor to show, this thesis has the potential
to be quite theoretically productive, as it has many implications for future research on metaethical
attitudes.
The factors that influence objectivist or subjectivist attitudes have been demonstrated in a
growing body of research over the past few years. Though more work will be needed to isolate the
extent to which each of these factors causally influence metaethical judgments, we are already able to
use these factors as evidence for Folk Metaethical Confusionism, and, in turn Folk Metaethical Pluralism. In
overview, these studies have found the effects detailed in Table 3:
Factor

Effect on Metaethical
Judgments or Attitudes

Judgment Factors

Perceived controversy about a

More subjectivist (J. Beebe,

judgment.

Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara,
2015; J. R. Beebe, 2014, 2016;
Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010,
2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017).

Judgment strength.

More objectivist (J. Beebe et al.,
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2015; J. R. Beebe, 2014;
Goodwin & Darley, 2010, 2012;
Heiphetz & Young, 2017);
though see (Wright, Grandjean,
& McWhite, 2013).
Non-harmful first-order

More subjectivist (Feltz &

judgments.

Cokely, 2008, p. 1773; Goodwin
& Darley, 2010, p. 172).

Negative judgment valence.

More objectivist (J. R. Beebe,
2014, pp. 180–182; Goodwin &
Darley, 2010, p. 172, 2012, p.
254).

Development Factors

Judgments of imperfect duties.

More subjectivist (Beebe 2012).

More years spent in college.

More subjectivist (Nichols 2004).

Age.

Varies (J. Beebe et al., 2015; J. R.
Beebe, 2016; Heiphetz & Young,
2017; Nichols & Folds-Bennett,
2003; Schmidt, GonzalezCabrera, & Tomasello, 2017;
Wainryb et al., 2004).

Personality Factors

Tendency toward disjunctive

More subjectivist (Goodwin &

thinking.

Darley, 2010).

Openness to experience.

More subjectivist (Feltz &
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Cokely, 2008).
Social Factors

Deriving morality from religion.

More objectivist (Goodwin &
Darley 2008, 2010, 2012).

Table 3: Factors that influence metaethical judgments and their apparent effects on these judgments.

Factors that influence metaethical judgments can be grouped into at least four categories: judgment
factors, developmental factors, personality factors, and social factors. Each of these has their own
contribution, and doubtless, we will discover far more as research progresses.
I will start with judgment factors, which are features of first-order moral judgments that appear
to influence metaethical judgments. The most widely documented type of judgment factor is the
perceived controversy of a first-order judgment. This was demonstrated in Goodwin & Darley (2008),
which showed that participants exposed to controversial moral statements were far less likely to judge
that there is a correct answer as to whether the statements are true. In their second experiment,
Goodwin & Darley (2008) showed that, for example, only 24% of participants were willing to say there
was a correct answer about whether “scientific research on embryonic human stem cells that are the
product of in vitro fertilization is morally permissible” (p. 1362). This was the case despite the
statement enjoying relatively high levels of agreement (M = 4.84 on a scale of 1-6). Other, less
controversial moral statements enjoyed both high mean agreement and high percentages participants
willing to say there was a correct answer as to whether the statements were true (p. 1362).
Similar results were found in Goodwin & Darley’s later study, where they explicitly tested the
hypothesis that differences in perceived consensus predict objectivism (2012, p. 252). To measure
perceived consensus, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of US citizens that agreed with
any given statement. This perceived consensus was highly correlated with participants’ strength of
agreement. Even combining strength of agreement and perceived consensus, though, perceived
consensus uniquely (if marginally) predicted participants’ level of objectivity (p. 252). These findings
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are by no means the only ones supporting the claim that perceived controversy affects folk
objectivism. Similar results are found in (J. Beebe et al., 2015; J. R. Beebe, 2016; Goodwin & Darley,
2010; Heiphetz & Young, 2017).
One explanation for this effect on metaethical attitudes claims that participants view
controversy as a proxy for objectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2012). However, I would like to suggest a
different hypothesis, in line with Folk Metaethical Confusionism. Participants are not using controversy as
a short-cut to determine whether they ought to be subjectivists about a judgment. Instead, participants
have learned that issuing demonstrative objectivist interpretations of controversial moral issues is likely
to cause interpersonal strife. This strife is uncomfortable, so people learn to conform their metaethical
judgments to avoid producing it. To be clear, it is not that people are really objectivists but tend to
avoid expressing this judgment in the case of controversial moral judgments. Instead, this social
pressure really causes subjectivist attitudes about these controversial statements. This is so, even though
subjectivism does not rationally imply greater tolerance of one’s moral opponents.

Subjectivist

attitudes in this case (as in most cases) are not caused by a rational process whereby controversy
reliably signals reasonable subjectivism. Instead, these attitudes develop as part of a learned, affective
process.
There are already some reasons to believe this hypothesis. If participants have a learned
tendency to develop subjectivist attitudes about controversial issues, we ought to see the same pattern
across controversial issues in every domain, moral or not. This is what Goodwin & Darley (2008)
found. For the factual statement, “homo sapiens evolved from more primitive primate species,” only
83% of participants judged that there was a correct answer, despite the fact that this statement had
relatively high mean levels of agreement (M = 5.43). This is lower than for other, less controversial
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factual statements (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1351).23, 24
Other judgment factors that influence metaethical attitudes also appear quite rationally
problematic, and thus support Folk Metaethical Confusionism. Strength of agreement with a judgment is
highly correlated with objectivism (J. Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; J. R. Beebe, 2014;
Heiphetz & Young, 2017, though see Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013). This pattern repeats for
other judgments as well (factual, conventional, and taste judgments). When a participant feels strongly
about a judgment of nearly any kind, she is more likely to judge it objectively (though see Wright,
Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013 for conflicting evidence on this point). This is rationally problematic
because, intuitively, there is no reason why a strongly held judgment ought to be considered more
objective. As such, it is another piece of evidence for Folk Metaethical Confusionism. Moreover, if this
thesis is true, it implies a hypothesis which may explain why this judgment factor influences
metaethical attitudes. When people are exposed to indoctrination that causes them to adopt more
objectivist attitudes about a moral issue, this same indoctrination causes them to adopt more strident
attitudes about the issue. If this is the case, we ought to expect that ordinary people who undergo
thorough religious indoctrination in objectivist traditions to become more strident about the firstorder judgments espoused in these traditions.
The correlation between strength of agreement and objectivism occurs for non-moral
statements as well, though, interestingly, objectivism is not correlated with judgments of taste
(Goodwin & Darley, 2008, p. 1358). Goodwin & Darley propose that this is a result of more general
content effects on reasoning. If Folk Metaethical Confusionism is correct, though, there is another
possible answer. Compared with other judgments, there is a more developed folk theory about

23 Note that this analysis has an implication one might think is somewhat strange: a minority of participants really are
subjectivists about whether evolution is true.
24 Goodwin & Darley (2008) does not include any particularly controversial conventional statements. Though some of
the taste statements are certainly controversial, their content is political (e.g. “CNN provides better news coverage than
does [Fox News]”) and no conclusions can be drawn without knowing the political orientation of the sample.
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judgments of taste. Though ordinary people likely spend little time thinking about their metaethical
judgments (and other metacognitive judgments), they do have a ready default when it comes to
judgments of taste: “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” This mild indoctrination may explain the
fact that the folk make strong taste judgments, but refrain from forming objectivist judgments about
them. Future research will have to explore this hypothesis.
Yet another judgment factor that influences metaethical judgments is the harmfulness of the
action that a person is issuing a judgment about. Though I will consider personality effects on
metaethical judgments in a moment, Feltz & Cokely (2008) found an interesting interaction between
extroversion, harm judgments, and levels of objectivism: extroversion predicted the extent to which
ordinary people would be objectivists about non-harmful moral scenarios (Feltz & Cokely, 2008, p.
1773). This effect is less than certain, however, because Goodwin & Darley (2010) found that when
controlling for strength of agreement, participants did not treat harmful actions as more objective than
“symbolically harmful” actions.
Whether or not a first-order judgments involving harm are treated more objectively, there is
good evidence that, in general, negatively-valenced judgments are associated with greater objectivism,
and positively-valenced judgments are associated with greater subjectivism. Goodwin & Darley (2010)
found that judgments that involve wrongness are associated with greater levels of objectivity than
judgments of goodness (p. 172). This was confirmed by later experiments as well (J. R. Beebe, 2014,
pp. 180–182; Goodwin & Darley, 2012, p. 254). Given that there is no rational connection between
objectivity and the valence of a judgment, this is yet another systematic effect on metaethical
judgments that seems to have little to do with their truth, and as such, supports Folk Metaethical
Confusionism.
One final judgment factor that appears to influence metaethical judgments and attitudes is the
type of duty that the judgment involves. Beebe (2015) showed that participants view judgments about
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imperfect duties as less objective than judgments about perfect duties (p. 23). To date, no other extant
experiments have been designed to test this effect, and it will have to be examined in future studies.
In addition to judgment factors, there are several developmental factors that produce changes in
metaethical attitudes. Most work to date has focused on age, which appears to have variable effects on
metaethical attitudes.

Broadly speaking, younger children are more likely to express objectivist

attitudes, adolescents, college students, and young adults tend to express more subjectivist judgments,
and older people tend to make more objectivist judgments (J. Beebe et al., 2015; J. R. Beebe, 2016;
Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2017; Wainryb et al., 2004).
We do not yet have a systematic explanation of this pattern of metaethical development, but, given
that age has no rational connection with the truth of objectivism or subjectivism, this constitutes more
evidence for Folk Metaethical Confusionism.
It is possible that the explanation for this pattern of metaethical development will follow
whatever explanation is correct in the case of first-order moral judgments. Metaethical development,
like moral judgment, may proceed in a series of innately defined stages, like those argued for by
proponents of a universal moral grammar (Dwyer, 1999, 2006; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007, 2011).
Alternatively, we might explain the development of metaethical attitudes by learning (Prinz, 2008). If
Folk Metaethical Confusionism is true, though, there is good reason to think that such attitudes are
developed by learning.25 Such learning may explain the characteristic dip in objectivist judgments for
college-age participants (Nichols, 2004, p. 18).
Metaethical attitudes are also influenced by personality factors.

Feltz & Cokely (2008)

conducted a series of experiments which showed that metaethical attitudes are “associated with stable
individual differences such as personality traits and reflective cognitive styles” (pp. 1771). They
Even if learning (or, less charitably, indoctrination) accounts for the characteristic developmental stages in metaethical
attitudes, this would still be in principle compatible with any account of the development of first-order moral judgments,
including various nativist proposals. Importantly, this means this account of the development of metaethical attitudes is
not incompatible with the moderate nativist program I take on in Chapter V of this dissertation.
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conducted experiments similar to those conducted by Nichols (2004), but added a short version of the
Big Five personality test (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003).26 As in Nichols (2004), participants
were asked to adjudicate a disagreement between two people over moral and non-moral issues. The
study replicated Nichols’ finding: 69% of participants gave the subjectivist answer, and only 31% gave
the objectivist answer. In addition, participants who were high in openness to new experience were
significantly more likely to give the subjectivist answer (Feltz & Cokely, 2008). And as mentioned
previously, in a second experiment, Feltz & Cokely found that those that were higher in extraversion
were more likely to judge a non-harmful action wrong (p. 1773). Moreover, there is some evidence
that one’s thinking style has an influence on objectivism. Goodwin & Darley (2010) demonstrated the
effects of one thinking style in particular, disjunctive thinking, which is “the tendency to actively
unpack alternative possibilities when reasoning” (p. 176).

Participants who engaged in a more

disjunctive thinking style were more likely to give subjectivist judgments in response to ethical
statements, but not statements of taste. Each of these factors are rationally irrelevant to the truth of
subjectivism or objectivism about any topic, and supports Folk Metaethical Confusionism.
Social factors that affect metaethical attitudes are currently one of the least developed in the
literature. But if Folk Metaethical Confusionism is true, we are likely to find many such factors. One of
the implications of the thesis is that differing forms of indoctrination ought to have different effects
on metaethical attitudes, regardless of their truth. Though no study has directly assessed this question,
we can draw some inferences by returning once again to Goodwin & Darley (2008). In this study,
Goodwin & Darley were not just interested in demonstrating that ordinary people are objectivists.
They were also interested in how participants grounded their moral beliefs. They investigated three
possible groundings: religious grounding (God says we ought to act a certain way), intrinsic rightness
grounding (some acts are self-evidently right or wrong), and instrumental grounding (some behavior is
This test assesses participants on their openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and
neuroticism.
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34

necessary for any society to function) (p. 1342). Their results for participants with a religious
grounding are particularly instructive, since they predict that religious individuals would make more
objectivist judgments. Goodwin & Darley reason that “[g]rounding one’s ethics in religious belief is
the most obvious way that one could be an objectivist about ethics” (2008, p. 1354). Their way of
assessing this involved asking participants the question, “According to you, is it possible for there to
be right and wrong acts, without the existence of God?’’ (p. 1354). In line with their hypothesis, those
that gave a “no” answer to this question expressed remarkably objectivist attitudes (M = 2.95).27
Though it may seem intuitive that highly religious people are objectivists, this is actually quite
puzzling if we think that ordinary people are objectivists by default, or even if we more generally think
that people tend to have principled metaethical attitudes. This is because this question is perfect for
picking out participants who subscribe (perhaps implicitly) to some version of the divine command
theory. Divine command theory (which makes right and wrong metaphysically dependent on the
dictates of God) is a subjectivist theory, not an objectivist theory (David O. Brink, 2007; Huemer,
2005, pp. 54–55). If objectivism is the metaethical default, and objectivist attitudes are reinforced
when participants can point to rational religious justifications for these attitudes, it is bizarre that these
justifications actually depend on a subjectivist position.
Of course, this is only a bizarre result if it we think that highly objectivist divine command
theorists are supporting their objectivist attitudes through some rational process, whereby these
attitudes can be inferred from their belief in divine command theory, combined with their belief in the
truth of their religion and its claims about God’s dictates. An alternative is on offer, in keeping with
Folk Metaethical Confusionism: highly objectivist divine command theorists have these attitudes in virtue
of a non-rational (or, more strongly, irrational) process of indoctrination. Religion provides no

27 Bear in mind that, as mentioned previously, there are methodological problems with this measure of objectivity. Later
research addressing the relationship between a religious grounding and metaethical attitudes ought to change the
operationalization of objectivism.
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metaphysical justification for objectivism, but practitioners of many religious traditions, and many
religious leaders, certainly believe it does.
Once again, Folk Metaethical Confusionism could prove quite productive for future research. If
the thesis is correct, we ought to expect that indoctrination will encourage some populations to
generalize objectivism or subjectivism, depending on the doctrine they are taught. We ought to expect
that we will find higher levels of generalized objectivism among adherents to religious traditions that
emphasize objectivism, compared with the irreligious. Moreover, we ought to expect to find higher
levels of generalized subjectivism among adherents of religious traditions that emphasize subjectivism,
as compared with the irreligious. Detailed investigation of this question will have to wait for future
work, however.
Having surveyed some of the factors that influence metaethical judgments, and some of the
alternative hypotheses that Folk Metaethical Confusionism can provide, it will be useful to take stock. As I
have argued, none of the factors adduced above have anything to do with the rationality of objectivism
or subjectivism about any given moral issue. But we can do more than simply point to folk
metaethical diversity. As I have endeavored to show in this section, we have a viable explanation of
this diversity: Folk Metaethical Confusionism. Future research must demonstrate that the factors I
adduced above are causally responsible for Folk Metaethical Pluralism. But as I have shown, this
hypothesis already has quite a lot to recommend it. Folk Metaethical Confusionism a plausible explanation
of metaethical diversity, it also promises to be very theoretically productive. For each of the factors I
covered above, Folk Metaethical Confusionism provides new hypotheses that are worth testing.
CHAPTER I CONCLUSION
Though philosophers have often held that ordinary people are moral realists, we now have
good reason to doubt that this is the case. At the very least, a distinct and substantial minority of
ordinary people make subjectivist judgments about many of their moral judgments. In the absence of
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defusing explanations that show why these people abnormally produce subjectivist judgments, the fact
of metaethical diversity would be enough to undermine Folk Metaethical Objectivism. Yet it is not clear
that we ought to think of these factors as abnormalities that ought to be explained away. There is
another possibility, Folk Metaethical Confusionism, which holds that metaethical attitudes are typically
caused by these factors, combined with ordinary learning. Thinking of these factors in this way gives
us a good explanation of, and in turn supports, Folk Metaethical Pluralism, while providing a variety of
productive hypotheses.
In the context of this dissertation, I should mention that the fact that ordinary people do not
have a default metaethical attitude does not necessarily have moral, epistemic or metaphysical
implications. Even if ordinary people are not principled objectivists or subjectivists, philosophers
often are. Nevertheless, there is much we can learn from the new research paradigm in metaethics. In
the next chapter I will examine a related literature that concerns the effects of metaethical attitudes on
our moral behavior. As I will argue, these effects do have moral implications.
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CHAPTER II
DOES MORAL REALISM MATTER?
THE MORAL VINDICATION ARGUMENT
Is anything really, objectively, universally, right or wrong? Philosophers have historically taken
questions like this quite seriously. But not enough has been done to address the most serious
contemporary response to it: who cares? Moral realists have largely ignored the possibility of this
response, because most realists take common sense to be deeply committed to moral objectivity and
universalism. If this were the case, the realist project would matter because it would be a vindication of
common sense. But recent studies seem to show that realists’ assumption is mistaken. The folk
apparently have highly variable and sometimes subjectivist or relativist attitudes toward morality. As it
turns out, common sense isn’t so common. As such, moral realists appear to have lost their claim to
being optimistic defenders of the default folk metaethical outlook; many ordinary people aren’t realists
in the first place.
This chapter offers a new reason to care about moral realism. Objectivity and universality in
ethics matter, and not because realism is a part of common sense. I will appeal to recent psychological
evidence that indicates that metaethical attitudes are not inert: they are associated with a host of
behaviors which help us to act in accordance with our moral beliefs. Though these behaviors may not
always seem good from the third-person perspective, they are almost always good from the firstperson perspective. Moral realism matters, because seeing your own morality as objective and universal
will make you more moral.
§2.1 HOW MIGHT MORAL REALISM MATTER?
As a reminder from the previous chapter, moral realism, as I’m using the term here, refers to
the combination of the following claims:
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Moral Realism:
a) Objectivity: moral facts exist, and do not depend for their existence on any person’s
attitudes.
b) Universalism: many of the same moral facts obtain in every society.
The objection I am concerned with in this chapter is not that moral realism might be false, but
that it might not matter whether it is true or false. Perhaps some philosophers think that the truth or
falsity of moral realism is simply an intellectual curiosity, and they have no emotional attachment to the
outcome of the debate. For these philosophers, debate about whether moral facts are real would be
much like any other purely academic debate. Just as a few academic geologists might obsess over the
formation of a mountain range, a few academic philosophers obsess over whether moral realism is
true. Is there any reason, then, for anyone outside of academia to care about the outcome of this
debate?
Many philosophers seem to think so. The outcome of this debate is not purely academic; it
matters. Specifying exactly how, though, is difficult. Some philosophers attempt to demonstrate that
moral realism (or one of its components) is in some sense indispensable. For instance, Enoch (2011)
argues that irreducibly normative (including moral) truths are “deliberatively indispensable.”28
Sturgeon (1986) and Tännsjö (1988) argue that without moral realism, we won’t be able to make sense
of moral fallibility. These accounts could be interpreted as offering reasons to believe that moral
realism is objectively valuable. But I think a more ordinary assumption might be the reason that so
many philosophers and ordinary people seem to think moral realism matters: they think it is common
sense.
Many philosophers have indeed thought realism is common sense (see, e.g. Blackburn, 1984;
Darwall, 1998; Mackie, 1977/1990; Shafer-Landau, 2003; M. Smith, 1994).
28

See also Nagel (1986).
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As a result, these

philosophers often take the primary motivation for moral realism to be that it is a vindication of
common sense against debunking arguments that ordinary people would consider counterintuitive or
outrageous. Take Brink (1989) for example:
We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well
confirmed scientific theories. Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do)
because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face
of compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections. So too, I think, in ethics. (23)29
The reason that moral realism matters, then, might be the same as the reason that externalworld-realism matters. It is disconcerting when we find out our intuitive understanding of the world is
wrong, so conversely, it would be comforting to know our intuitions have it right. I submit, then, that
a common reason to think that moral realism matters invokes something like the following argument:
The Common Sense Vindication Argument:
(A) Moral realism is a commitment of common sense.
(B) If something is a commitment of common sense, then its truth or falsity matters.
(C) Therefore, by (A) and (B), the truth or falsity of moral realism matters.
One might wonder whether being a commitment of common sense is sufficient to make a thesis
matter. I don’t aim to settle this question, though. This is because, whatever the merits of the
conditional, the antecedent is false. As I argued in the previous chapter, there is significant evidence
for Folk Metaethical Pluralism—the thesis that, absent philosophical or religious indoctrination, ordinary
people have an unprincipled hodgepodge of objectivist and subjectivist attitudes toward their own
moral judgments, or no standing attitudes at all. This should be worrying to the moral realist who
thinks that moral realism matters because it is part of common sense. Realists should not assume
Brink also makes the argument that common sense provides epistemic support for realism insofar as realism is the
default position. This argument has its detractors (see e.g. Björnsson, 2012; Yasenchuk, 1997). This is a separate
argument from the one I will consider here. Here I am concerned not with whether common sense provides epistemic
support for realism, but with whether common sense is committed to realism in the first place.
29

40

without argument that anti-realist conceptions of morality are impossible or conceptually confused,
and then use this assumption to vindicate their claim to being defenders of common sense. In fact,
realists’ belief in (and desire for) moral objectivity and universalism could even be a parochial quirk, or
even a product of excess philosophical education. Realists, then, need more reason to think their
thesis matters.
§2.2 WHY INTUITIVE ARGUMENTS DON’T WORK
Before I go on, I want to take a brief detour into two examples of how folk metaethical
pluralism explains philosophers’ lack of success in motivating moral realism for students of
philosophy. In my experience teaching, I often find that a subset of students will respond with
befuddlement and intuitive rejection when presented with common arguments in favor of the
objectivity and universality of ethics. It is not that these students reject the thesis; they simply do not
seem to have a reason to care about the thesis. It seems very plausible that folk metaethical variation is
to blame, because students that lack objectivist or universalist intuitions will see no reason to care
about realism in the first place.30
I have in mind two common arguments in favor of realism, both of which often fail to gain
traction with a significant portion of any class: the argument from moral progress, and the argument
from the wickedness of other cultures’ practices. Let’s start with the argument from moral progress.
This argument claims that if morality is not objective or universal, our moral beliefs cannot transcend
the accidents of evolution, history, culture, and power. This would mean that moral progress in any
robust sense is impossible. If morality is not objective and universal, changes in our moral practices
over time could only be evaluated from our own point of view. The result would be that our moral

Excellent versions of these arguments appear in Rachels & Rachels (2014), though they are framed as arguments
against cultural relativism, not arguments aimed at motivating moral realism.
30
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judgments are no more justified, or no truer, than those of our forebears.31 We would be committed
to thinking that it is a mere matter of opinion that the world is better off now that we have abolished
slavery, or defeated fascism. But surely, the argument goes, these count as examples of moral
progress, no matter what your opinion! So if we are committed to the possibility (if not the reality) of
moral progress, we are committed to the possibility that some moral rules exist independent of us and
apply to all humans universally.
Next, look at the argument from the wickedness of other cultures’ contemporary practices.
This argument says that if the objectivity of morality cannot be salvaged, contemporary differences
between the values of one society and those of another could not be adjudicated from a neutral or
objective point of view. The result, again, is that it would be a mere matter of opinion whether the
complete subordination of women in Saudi Arabia is worse compared to women’s relative freedom in
the West. If moral objectivity and universalism cannot be vindicated, this means that in cases where
shared values cannot be appealed to, the only way to decide the matter is through the exercise of
power.32
When philosophers present introductory classes with arguments like these, a subset of students
simply dig in their heels, happily accepting every conclusion. To those of us with realist intuitions, this
seems bizarre and unpalatable. But that shouldn’t be surprising, because the whole point of these
arguments is to pump realist intuitions. Consider the three important elements invoked by both
arguments. These arguments ask us to make a moral judgment (e.g. that slavery is wrong), then draw
our attention to the conditional that if morality is not objective, then the student’s moral judgment and
its negation are equally justifiable, or equally true. Finally, these arguments ask the student to entertain
the supposed conflict between the two (the judgment itself and the claim that the judgment and its
31 They would be no more justified if subjectivism or relativism about morality is correct, no more true if an error theory
is correct.
32 Of course, relativists could stake their hopes for moral progress on the possibility of deep values that are widely
shared. Crucially, though, this is not a matter of the objectivity of ethics.
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negation are equally true). Notice, though, that only a realist attitude about one’s judgment will secure
any conflict between these two judgments. If a person believes that her judgment is only true as a
result of her own attitudes, or only applies to her society, then she can also accept that the negation of
this judgment is equally true or justifiable, assuming such a negation depends on someone else’s
attitudes, or obtains in someone else’s society. Such a student will experience no cognitive dissonance,
and will not be moved by these arguments at all.
If metaethical intuitions vary widely, we need more than one group’s intuitions to justify the
claim that moral realism matters. Luckily, there is a way to break the intuitional impasse, and it comes
from morally evaluating the psychological effects of metaethical attitudes.
§2.3 A SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT
My strategy in the remainder of this chapter is to show that the objectivity and universality of
ethics matter, and that it would be good (from your perspective) if realism is true. Here is a sketch of
the argument that follows:
The Moral Vindication Argument:
(1) Psychological claim: having realist attitudes about your moral beliefs makes you more likely to
act according to your moral beliefs.
(2) Moral claim: from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better to act according to your
moral beliefs than not.
(3) Conclusion: by (1) and (2), from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better to have
realist attitudes than lack them.
(4) Psychological claim: if we discover that realist attitudes are false, we will no longer be able to
maintain or acquire them.
(5) Conclusion: by (3) and (4), it would be better (from the standpoint of your moral beliefs) if
moral realism were true than if it were false.
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Note the use of second person here. The argument I’ll be advancing is not aimed at proving that
moral realism matters objectively. Instead, this argument is meant to appeal to you, the reader, by
showing that realism is tied to something you antecedently care about – your moral beliefs. As I’ll
endeavor to show, your moral beliefs would be better served if you are able to acquire and maintain
realist attitudes toward them. However, this is not the case generally; it may be better (from your
perspective) for your moral opponents to be subjectivists. In the next section I will argue for (1), and I
will turn to (2) in §2.6, and briefly address (4) in §2.7.
§2.4 REALIST ATTITUDES HAVE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
In this section I will argue that metaethical attitudes have behavioral effects. I will argue that
realist (objectivist and universalist) attitudes make one more likely to act in accordance with one’s
moral beliefs, and that anti-realist (subjectivist and relativist) attitudes make one less likely to act in
accordance with one’s moral beliefs. Though this may seem intuitive to some, many philosophers
doubt that metaethical attitudes have much of an effect on our first-order values or our moral
behavior. An excellent exponent of this doubt comes from Blackburn (1993):
It is not initially so surprising that we can go on valuing the good things of life while knowing
that the valuing is an expression of our own subjective sentiments. … The explanation of what
we are doing when we [express our values] in no way impugns our right to hold them, nor the
passion with which we should do so (p. 156-7).33,34
The thought is that seeing moral valuation as a mere expression of our own subjective sentiments will
not cause us to abandon our values. Of course, there are some individuals that would abandon their
values if they came to see them an anti-realist light:

Similar views can be found in Street (2017) and Tiberius (2009).
Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist’ project is aimed at “earning the right” to ordinary moral discourse without being committed
to the existence of metaphysically problematic moral properties. I won’t endeavor to deal with the success or failure of
that project here. What I’m taking aim at here is Blackburn’s apparently causal claim: if we come to see moral valuation
as an expression of our own subjective sentiments, we will go on valuing all the same things and acting in the same way.
33
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It might be that there are people who cannot 'put up with' the idea that values have a
subjective source … But this will be because such people have a defect elsewhere in their
sensibilities—one that has taught them that things do not matter unless they matter to God, or
throughout infinity, or to a world conceived apart from any particular set of concerns or
desires, or whatever (Blackburn, 1993, p. 157).
Given that many psychologically normal people have subjectivist or relativist attitudes toward their
own values, Blackburn may be right. Interpreting one’s own morality as objective and universal is not a
matter of conceptual necessity, and such an interpretation may be a result of a particular set of
sensibilities, rather than something psychologically universal. However, he is wrong to imply that
realist attitudes are a result of a defect. They may be an epistemic defect—if anti-realism is true—but as
I will argue, they are certainly a moral benefit. Let’s turn, then, to some of the evidence of the effects
of metaethical attitudes on our moral behavior.
Some of the strongest evidence comes from the literature on moral conviction, developed in a
series of studies done by Linda Skitka and others. Research on moral conviction takes its cue from
earlier work on the moral-conventional distinction, in that it distinguishes moral convictions from
other attitudes by the content of the attitude. Moral convictions are not reducible to attitude strength,
attitude certainty or attitude importance; the behavioral implications of moral convictions derive from
their content, rather than from these other features of the attitude (Skitka, 2014, p. 149). Unlike
preferences or conventions, moral convictions (a) appear to subjects to be universally and objectively
true, (b) appear to subjects as matters of fact, rather than opinion or preference, and (c) strongly elicit
subjects’ emotions (Skitka, 2010). Unlike previous work on the moral-conventional distinction,
however, moral convictions are not theorized as exhaustive of the moral domain. Rather, they are a
type of moral attitude, distinguished from moral judgment in that they are “stable, internalized, and
treated much like possessions” (Prentice, 1987; Skitka, 2014, p. 156). This is theoretically superior to
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previous work, in that it leaves open the possibility that some moral judgments are not perceived by
subjects to be universally and objectively true, even though they are legitimately moral. Crucially, this
renders the theory compatible with results adduced in §2.
Moral conviction is associated with many behaviors that make one more likely to implement
one’s moral beliefs. This research shows that if a person has a high level of moral conviction about an
issue, she is more resistant to majority influence. Conformity to majority influence usually results from
a person not being certain about the right way to think or act, or from an appreciation of the social
sanctions for non-conformists (Asch, 1956; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). But
when a subject has high levels of moral conviction about an issue and is faced with being a nonconformist, she becomes more resistant to majority influence. In a fascinating study, Aramovich et al.
(2012) introduced individual student participants to a small group of “other students” via computer,
and were told that they were participating in a study on the effects of technology on group decision
making. The experimenters were interested in whether students would conform to the majority
opinion on torture, and so each student was asked to share his or her opinion on torture after some
sham “other students” had shared their opinions, and the participant was told that he or she would
soon be interacting with these other students face-to-face. In one of the conditions, every sham
student expressed some degree of support for torture. Moral conviction was assessed with two
questions: “To what extent does your attitude about whether stress interrogation techniques should be
allowed reflect your core moral values and convictions?” and ‘‘To what extent is your attitude about
whether stress interrogation techniques should be allowed deeply connected to beliefs about
fundamental questions of ’right’ and ’wrong’?’’ The result was that levels of moral conviction were
negatively correlated with the tendency of a participant to change his or her judgment after being
exposed to social influence. Moreover, participants with high moral conviction persisted in their
judgments both during and after exposure to contrary social influence, whereas participants with low
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moral conviction adjusted their judgments to conform to the group, even when they were no longer
exposed to the group (Aramovich et al., 2012, p. 30).
The effects of moral conviction on our moral behavior do not end there. High moral
conviction about political judgments makes those judgments more predictive of voting behavior
(Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Subjects with high moral conviction about a moral judgment also prefer
greater social and physical space between themselves and those they disagree with (Skitka, Bauman, &
Sargis, 2005). Individuals with high moral conviction about a moral judgment were also more likely to
reject procedural safeguards that get in the way of that judgment being implemented (Mullen & Skitka,
2006), and participants with a high level of moral conviction are less likely to be satisfied with the fact
that an outcome was arrived at through what are normally perceived to be fair decision procedures
(Skitka & Houston, 2001). High moral conviction is also associated with questioning the legitimacy of
courts when they reach verdicts that run contrary to a participant’s judgment (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle,
2009). High levels of moral conviction may also interfere with conflict resolution (Skitka et al., 2005).
Finally, higher levels of moral conviction about social inequality are associated with individuals from
advantaged backgrounds identifying with those that suffer from social inequality, which in turn causes
greater motivation for collective action against social inequality (van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, &
Bettache, 2011).
Another source of evidence for the effects of metaethical attitudes on moral behavior comes
from research on ethical ideologies. Forsyth (1980) distinguishes ethical ideologies as to their degree of
relativism. An individual’s level of relativism is assessed on the basis of a ten-item questionnaire.
Individuals that score high on the measure of relativism “reject the possibility of formulating or relying
on universal moral rules when drawing conclusions about moral questions” (Forsyth, 1980, p. 175).
Some of the items in Forsyth’s questionnaire seem to be getting at subjectivism (“Ethical
considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should be allowed to
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formulate their own individual codes”), whereas others are better seen as measuring relativism (“What
is ethical varies from one situation and society to another”) (1980, p. 178). “Relativism” as it is used by
Forsyth and others appears to be a blended measure, capturing anti-realist attitudes generally.
Early research seemed to show no correlation between ethical ideology and moral behavior
(see (Forsyth & Berger, 1982). However, several more recent studies in this literature seem to show
that “relativism” so-assessed has a number of behavioral effects. For instance, Vitell & Paolillo (2003)
show that individuals who score high on the relativism measure are less likely to disapprove of a range
of ethically questionable consumer practices, such as getting too much change and not saying anything,
or fraudulently reporting a lost item as “stolen” to an insurance company in order to collect a payout
(p. 160). In another study on Chinese business managers, relativism was shown to be well-correlated
with positive attitudes toward bribery (Tian, 2008). Subjects with higher levels of relativism reported a
higher willingness to violate intellectual property rights (Winter, Stylianou, & Giacalone, 2004). Higher
scores of relativism are also well-correlated with lower scores of perceived moral intensity, a mixed
measure of the “moral imperative in a situation,” which has been shown to reduce intentions to act
unethically (Jones, 1991; Singhapakdi, Vitell, & Franke, 1999).
It is important to note that these studies on moral conviction and ethical ideologies do not
definitively prove the direction of causation. It could be, for example, that individuals who exhibit
more recalcitrant moral behavior tend to rationalize that behavior by adopting objectivist and
universalist attitudes toward their moral judgments. The studies I cited above all have one feature in
common: they are only correlational. However, there are indications that support the hypothesis that
realist attitudes are causing these behaviors, rather than the other way around. Proving a direction of
causation requires manipulating a subject’s metaethical attitudes and measuring the effect on behavior,
and there are some studies that do just that.
One way of manipulating a subject’s metaethical attitudes is by inducing study participants to
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have a higher moral conviction about their attitudes as compared with a control. In this vein, a study
by Luttrell et al. (2016) showed that when subjects are primed to think that an issue is a reflection of
their core moral beliefs, their behavioral intentions are more in line with their attitudes. Subjects in this
study were asked to read an essay arguing for the adoption of a senior comprehensive exam policy at
their school, and asked to respond with their thoughts about the policy. Then the experimental group
was asked to describe how their thoughts about the policy relate to their “core moral beliefs and
convictions.” (The control group was asked to describe how their thoughts about the policy relate to
the value of equality).35 Participants were then asked to rate their attitude toward the proposed policy
along various dimensions (positive-negative, good-bad, etc.). The experimenters assessed behavioral
intentions by asking participants how willing they were to sign a petition in favor of the policy, put
their names on a list of students that favored the policy, and whether they would vote in favor of the
policy (2016, p. 86). The result was that the experimental group showed a stronger correlation between
their attitudes about the policy and their behavioral intentions about the policy. In other words, getting
participants to think of their position on the comprehensive exam policy as reflective of their moral
convictions made them more likely to be willing to act on their attitudes. This effect was not mediated
by the strength or certainty of the subjects’ attitudes.
There are also some studies from outside the moral conviction paradigm that show that
metaethical attitudes have an effect on moral behavior. For example, Young & Durwin (2013) showed
that participants primed with objectivist statements in an anonymous survey reported a willingness to
donate more money to a reputable charity than those primed with subjectivist or control statements.
The same study also showed that participants primed with objectivist statements about morality were
twice as likely to donate to charity when interviewed by a researcher in public (2013). In a different
study, Rai & Holyoak (2013) showed that participants who are exposed to a relativist argument in
The same study involved similar experiments invoking tradition and practicality, rather than equality, with similar
results.
35
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support of tolerating female genital mutilation are more likely to cheat in an incentivized raffle. Each
of these studies seems to indicate that it is sometimes possible to manipulate metaethical attitudes (or
perhaps their salience) in an experimental setting, and that these attitudes affect intentions and
behaviors.
One final indication of the causative role of metaethical attitudes comes from a longitudinal
study conducted by Brandt et al. (2015). This study recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and surveyed them four times (twice in the few months before the election, and twice after the
election). The researchers measured participants’ affective reactions to the two main presidential
candidates, and assessed participants’ levels of moral conviction about their judgments in favor or
against each candidate. What they found was a two-way interaction. Affective reactions (positive and
negative) earlier in the study predicted an increase in moral conviction later on, and higher moral
conviction earlier in the study predicted greater affective reactions later in the study. The authors
describe the relationship between affect and moral conviction as “recursive,” with moral conviction
both being increased by, and increasing, affective responses (2015, pp. 227–228).36
All of this psychological evidence indicates that, contra Blackburn and others, metaethical
attitudes are not inert. Realist attitudes are both associated with and cause a host of behavioral effects,
all of which make us more likely to act on our moral beliefs. Moreover, relativist and subjectivist
attitudes are associated with the opposite effect. Now we can evaluate claim (2): from the standpoint
of your moral beliefs, it is better to act according to your moral beliefs than not. As I will argue, the
fact that realist attitudes have the effect getting us to act in accordance with our moral beliefs is all that
is necessary to make us prefer having them over subjectivist and relativist metaethical attitudes.
Importantly, whether affect can have an impact on moral conviction depends on the target of the affect. So-called
“incidental affect,” such as making moral judgments about someone in the presence of a disgusting room or smell, has
been shown not to significantly change moral conviction. “Integral affect,” where the affective reaction is in some way
related to the judgment at hand (such as the level of anger caused by the target of the judgment) has been shown to
impact measures of moral conviction. This study repeats that pattern. For studies on incidental affect, see Eskine, et al.
(2011), Pizarro & Helion (2011), Schnall et al. (2008), and Valdesolo & DeStono (2006). For the difference between
incidental and integral affect as it pertains to moral conviction, see Wisneski & Skitka (2013).
36
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§2.5 THESE EFFECTS ARE GOOD FROM YOUR STANDPOINT
The evidence from the psychology of metaethics suggests the model of metaethical judgment
and its effects mapped out in figure 3 below. In this section I will be arguing for (2), which is the moral
claim that, from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better for you to act on your moral beliefs
than not. This means that you should expect that your first-order moral beliefs will endorse the
behavioral effects of realist attitudes, even though it would be better (from your perspective) if your
moral opponents fail to have these effects. This will lead to the first conclusion of the Moral Vindication
Argument: (3) from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better to have realist attitudes than lack
them.
Fig. 3: An individual with an objectivist attitude toward moral judgment J. (Using the classic “youths burning a cat” example
drawn from Harman (1986).

The moral conviction literature is circumspect about the moral implications of realist
metaethical attitudes. Though some effects appear quite good, others are thought to be “terrifying”
(Skitka 2010, p. 267). One only needs to look at the many examples of morally motivated extremists to
understand why: radical terrorists, white nationalists and communist guerrillas are all responsible for
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moral atrocities. You could be forgiven for thinking that anything that aids morally motivated violence
and terror seems like a pretty awful effect, at least by our lights.
The key phrase, however, is “by our lights.” In this section I won’t be arguing that realist
attitudes are objectively or universally good, though they may be. Rather, I’m arguing that realism is
good from your standpoint because having realist attitudes makes you morally good from your standpoint.
This restriction on the argument rules out many of the obvious examples of morally-motivated evil.
After all, realist attitudes are associated with (and appear to cause) a variety of behaviors that make
your first-order moral belief more likely to be implemented. To argue that these behaviors are bad, you
will have to find examples of moral beliefs that you (the reader) have, but that you would (morally)
value not being implemented. It will not be enough to show that some morally motivated individuals
do morally reprehensible things. To reject (2) in the Moral Vindication Argument, you must point to cases
where having realist attitudes would make you morally worse from your own standpoint.
Finding cases like this is a tall order. To see why, here’s a bit of intuition-pumping. Consider
any issue about which you (the reader) have a strong moral belief. Suppose you are a feminist as per
the following definition: you believe in the principle of equal social, political, and economic
opportunities for the sexes. Now suppose someone gives you advice about how you should (or
shouldn’t) implement your belief in feminism. Suppose he tells you that you shouldn’t let that belief
inform how you vote (Skitka & Bauman, 2008) and tell you that you shouldn’t let that belief come
between you and the misogynists who disagree with you (Skitka et al., 2005). Suppose that he tells you
that you should also accept the results of university committees in campus rape cases as long as those
results came out “fair” as per the university’s rules (Skitka et al., 2009; Skitka & Houston, 2001). And
suppose he tells you that you should engage in conflict resolution with the construction worker that
catcalls you (Skitka et al., 2005). Finally, suppose he told you that when you’re in a room full of
misogynists, you should moderate your belief in feminism, and come out of that meeting with more
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misogynist attitudes (Aramovich et al., 2012). The point should be obvious: if you followed his advice,
you would not be acting in accordance with your moral belief. And if you give up your realist
metaethical attitudes toward your belief in feminism, the evidence above indicates this would result in
an identical outcome to your taking my advice. It seems plausible, at least prima facie, that the majority
of moral beliefs would be like this case. To the extent that you believe in feminism at all, you will
morally value all the actions that lead to feminism’s implementation, and this will lead you morally
value realist metaethical attitudes.
Finding moral beliefs we would morally value not being implemented is difficult, but perhaps
not impossible. One place we may locate moral beliefs in this category has to do with our evaluation of
the effects of moral disputes. Some relativists think that refraining from implementing our moral
beliefs when we are engaged in a deep moral dispute with some other party is good. Prinz (2007)
argues:
[T]here are some positive consequences of discovering that our values are not privileged … In
a word, relativism can promote tolerance. If our values are not privileged, then we should
allow others to live in accordance with different values … That is a value judgment, of course.
We value tolerance, so a theory that promotes tolerance is good (p. 207).
It seems plausible that if implementing one of your moral beliefs would exacerbate conflict with other
people, this might cause them to act in ways that increase the threat to your other values. It might be
better, in such cases, not to escalate the attitudinal arms race. As I will argue, however, there is a strong
a priori argument that gives us reason to believe that this category of moral beliefs is either small or
nonexistent. To preview, this is because the moral value obtained from refraining from implementing
your moral beliefs in order to get the same from your moral opponents is inversely proportional to the
likelihood of getting that moral value.
We can begin by examining the value of two different metaethical stances you can take toward
53

your own moral beliefs in the context of a moral dispute. On one stance, you “objectify” your beliefs,
treating them as though they are about facts that are objective and universal. On another stance, you
“subjectify” your beliefs, treating them as though they are subjective, relative, or not about facts at all.
When faced with a moral dispute, we can represent the potential outcomes of taking up either of these
stances as straightforward Prisoner’s Dilemma.37
For any given dispute over a moral issue, the best and worst outcomes of taking up either of
these stances are clear. Because realist attitudes have so many effects that make you more likely to
implement your moral belief, the best-case scenario (from your point of view) is one where you
objectify your beliefs (and therefore continue to reap the benefits of realist attitudes), but your moral
opponents subjectify their beliefs. You will be that much more likely to get your way, and your
opponents that much less likely. And the worst-case scenario would be one where you subjectify your
moral beliefs (and fail to reap the benefits of having realist attitudes), but your moral opponent
objectifies her moral beliefs. The interesting question, then, is whether both parties objectifying or
subjectifying represents the second-best outcome.
If it is the case that some moral beliefs are worth not objectifying in the context of a moral
dispute, the second-best outcome would be subjectify-subjectify. This would represent a scenario in which
you (and your moral opponent) gain the benefits of refraining from implementing your moral beliefs.
This simple decision space would look like the following, where “1” is the most valued outcome
(according to each agent’s moral system) and “4” the least valued outcome.

Nothing in this argument should be taken to imply that we can voluntarily take up these attitudes; here I am simply
assessing whether it would be better if we had realist attitudes, independent of how realist beliefs are generated.
37
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A Objectifies

A Subjectifies

B Objectifies

3,3

4,1

B Subjectifies

1,4

2,2

Table 4 - Subjectifying is second-best. The value outcomes of either party to a dispute (agent A or B) subjectifying or
objectifying her moral beliefs (from A and B’s point of view).

As I will argue below, however, the second-best outcome is the objectify-objectify outcome, which would
make the decision space look like the following:
A Objectifies

A Subjectifies

B Objectifies

2,2

4,1

B Subjectifies

1,4

3,3

Table 5 - Objectifying is second-best. The value outcomes of either party to a dispute (agent A or B) subjectifying or
objectifying her moral beliefs (from A and B’s point of view).

To establish this, I’ll examine three cases of moral disagreement: one where there is massive
overlap in moral beliefs, one where there is some overlap between the parties’ first-order moral beliefs,
and one where there is almost no overlap in moral beliefs. In each of these, I contend, the second-best
outcome will typically be objectify-objectify.
First, in cases of minor moral disagreement, subjectifying gains us virtually nothing. Suppose
you and I disagree about whether it’s immoral to throw cigarette butts on the ground, but otherwise
have completely overlapping systems of first-order moral beliefs. The negative consequences of an
objectify-objectify outcome would only affect whether this one moral belief gets implemented or not. If I
believe it is wrong for you to throw your cigarette butts on the ground, and you believe they it is not,
then objectifying our respective beliefs will certainly cause us conflict over this belief. But because we
agree on everything else, this conflict would be perfectly contained, and wouldn’t threaten any of our
other values. They could not lead to further division that might threaten our respective values, because,
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ex hypothesi, we agree on everything else.
The pattern remains as we ramp up the level of disagreement. Suppose we have a somewhat
more fundamental dispute: I’m a democratic socialist, and you’re a liberal centrist. We disagree, in
principle, about the moral legitimacy of capitalism, and this leads our respective systems of first-order
moral beliefs to diverge in many areas. Yet there are substantial areas of overlap: we are both
committed to fair, democratic elections, dovish foreign policy, human rights, and a social safety net,
for instance. Even here, it is hard to see how the second-best outcome could be anything other than
objectify-objectify. After all, suppose my party is in power. If we both objectify our beliefs, the most you
can fear is that I will be more likely to implement my moral beliefs, perhaps by raising taxes,
nationalizing industry, beefing up the social safety net, breaking up banks, etc. These may all be
morally bad things from your perspective, but they are not terrible or irreversible. You can expect that,
whatever realist-attitude-caused behaviors I engage in, they will be restricted to these areas of our
disagreement. You do not need to fear arbitrary imprisonment, murder, or the suspension of
democracy, because I believe all these are wrong, too. In this kind of case, the significant moral overlap
means that objectify-objectify is not disastrous, so subjectify-subjectify would not be necessary to prevent the
violation of each side’s deeply held moral beliefs. The general lesson of these first two cases is that
when there is still significant overlap between two systems of moral belief, there is little to be gained
from subjectifying your beliefs, and little to be lost from objectifying them. This would lead both
parties to value objectify-objectify in these cases.
Finally, let’s consider cases of deep moral disagreement. It is no coincidence that when we
think of the value of others refraining from implementing their deeply held moral beliefs, we imagine
the worst of the worst: white nationalists, communist guerillas, etc. The fact that we (egalitarian,
secular Westerners) have so little in common with these groups means that if we could get them to
subjectify their moral beliefs, we would stand to gain quite a lot (from the perspective of our moral
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beliefs). Despite this greater apparent benefit, though, we have to assess the likelihood of actually
getting our moral opponents to subjectify their beliefs. Remember that we are looking at the moral
benefit from the perspective of the moral beliefs of each party to the dispute. Even if it is objectively
better if ISIS subjectifies its beliefs, and as a result they are less compelled to conduct suicide
bombings and beheadings, they certainly will not see it that way. From their perspective, the value of
rooting out Western decadence and blasphemy is so great that forgoing it would constitute an
incredible cost. It is hard to see how they could prefer a subjectify-subjectify outcome, since the
divergence between our respective belief systems is so great. Simply put, if an ISIS militant refrained
from acting according to his deeply held moral beliefs, he can still expect massive violations of those
beliefs, even if you do the same.
Crucially, given that you know this fact about ISIS’s moral system, this gives you a good reason
value objectifying your beliefs. The scenario in which you subjectify your beliefs but the ISIS member
objectifies his belief would be absolutely disastrous, from the standpoint of your own beliefs, and viceversa. In general, I think that the lesson of this last case is that when two systems of moral belief are
vastly divergent, both parties can expect subjectifying their beliefs to deeply threaten those same moral
beliefs. Moreover, this realization ought to cause both sides to value implementing their beliefs even
more strongly, making objectify-objectify the second-best outcome.
I think that these thought experiments give us reason to think that, in general, objectify-objectify
will be the second-best outcome, both from your perspective and from the perspective of any moral
opponent you might have. In cases of deep and serious moral disagreement, the parties will have far
too much to lose from subjectifying their beliefs, and will accordingly value objectify-objectify more than
subjectify-subjectify. Conversely, in cases of minor moral disagreement, the parties will have little to lose
from objectifying their beliefs, and thus will value objectify-objectify more than subjectify-subjectify in this
case, too. This means that there will be very few cases where we value not implementing our moral
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beliefs because of the potential actions of others. I should stress, however, that this a priori argument
does not rule out any scenario where it would be better to reject realist metaethical attitudes. In general,
though, it is hard to see how a system of moral beliefs could place a higher value on refraining from
acting according to itself.
These considerations lend support to what you might have thought to be intuitive claim in the
first place: namely, premise (2), which says that from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better to
act according to your moral beliefs than not. Given (1), that having realist attitudes about your moral
beliefs makes you more likely to act according to your moral beliefs, we get the first conclusion in the
Moral Vindication Argument: (3) from the standpoint of your moral beliefs, it is better to have realist
attitudes than lack them.
§2.6 WHAT IF REALISM IS FALSE?
Even if it turns out to be the case that, from your standpoint, it is better to have realist
attitudes than not, this does not on its own establish the Moral Vindication Argument for why realism
matters. That is, it does not imply that (5) it would be better (from the standpoint of your moral
beliefs) if moral realism were true than if it were false. To get that claim, it must be the case that (4) if
you discover that realist attitudes are false, you will no longer be able to maintain or acquire them.
This is because if realism were false, but we could somehow still acquire and maintain realist attitudes,
then realism itself wouldn’t matter. That is, it wouldn’t matter whether universal, objective facts about
right and wrong exist, it would only matter that we think they exist.
I do not intend to advance any complex argument in favor of the claim that we cannot
maintain realist attitudes after we discover they are false. In this absence of non-rational methods of
inducing these attitudes, I think this claim is plausible. In general, when we discover that a thesis is
false, we can’t help but stop believing it. However, I should admit that it is possible that we might
develop a pill, meditation technique, or brainwashing procedure that induces realist attitudes regardless
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of their truth or our reasons for accepting them. This may be preferable, from the standpoint of our
moral beliefs, to a situation where we simply stop engaging in the behaviors that realist attitudes cause.
It might be just as good, from your perspective, to deceive yourself, as it is to know the truth. I
imagine you (the reader) would prefer philosophy to pharmacology, if at all possible. If you do not
share the moral belief that we ought only believe in realism if it is true, then you will not accept the full
Moral Vindication Argument, and will have to get off the train at (3). However, if you accept that you
ought only believe what you think is true, you will accept (4) as a truth about you – though not, I
should emphasize, a truth about everyone. If this is the case, you ought to believe (5). It would be
better (from the standpoint of your moral beliefs) if realism were true than if it were false.
CHAPTER II CONCLUSION
Moral realists have long clung to the idea that an objective conception of morality is common
sense. As I have argued, this is a mistake. The folk are deeply conflicted about whether morality is
objective and universal or not. As such, ordinary people have no reason to think that moral realism
matters. But this does not mean that caring about moral realism is parochial or irrational. Rather, the
mere presence of realist attitudes toward our moral beliefs has so many benefits that it would be better
(from your perspective) if they are acquired, maintained, and vindicated.
What this means is that if we come to discover that there is no such thing as objective,
universal facts about right and wrong, we have good reason to fear the apathy that might result. This
is so no matter what your moral beliefs, radical or traditional. Some moral philosophers hold that
moral thinking and action is so deeply rooted in the human psyche that explaining its nature could
never explain it away. Indeed, it is a significant irony that those who emphasize human diversity when
it comes to our substantive moral beliefs should be so quick to claim that the urge to act morally is an
unshakeable part of human nature. On the contrary, if moral judgments cannot be grounded in
objective moral facts, we have good reasons to fear the dissolution of quite a bit of moral action. Self59

interested desires, institutional and economic forces exercise a strong and contrary set of influences on
human behavior. If we come to see morality as a fool’s game, we may even stop playing it altogether.
Perhaps it should go without saying that none of the arguments I’ve discussed constitutes a
good argument for moral realism. We may be forced to acknowledge the impossibility of some of the
things that matter to us. There are unfortunate truths that we should believe in. If moral realism is
false, we should accept that fact and find a way to move on. But such a possibility should not be taken
lightly. It would have real consequences for us, no matter what our values.
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CHAPTER III
ETHICAL REDUCTIONISM
In the previous two chapters, I argued, first, that moral realism is not a commitment of
common sense, but that, second, having a commitment to moral realism is nevertheless a good thing –
at least from the standpoint of your own moral values. This gives nearly everyone a moral reason to
adopt realist metaethical attitudes if they can. But it does not give anyone an epistemic reason to
believe that moral realism is true. This chapter, and the next, are aimed at providing that reason, first
by showing that moral facts must be natural facts, and then showing that if moral facts are natural
facts, we can overcome the common objections to realism. In §3.1 I propose a relation between
domains of facts that I call thin reductionism. I argue that current science is implicitly committed to
this relation obtaining between various sciences, assuming a modest philosophical naturalism. In §3.2
I argue that we have good inductive reasons to expect that moral facts, if they exist at all, will be at
least thinly reducible to descriptive facts. Next, in §3.3, I turn to a schematic account of moral
semantics that describes how moral terms are in principle reducible to descriptive terms, giving us a
way of deriving an “ought” from an “is.” Then in §3.4 I raise a dilemma for this account, and in §3.5 I
point to a Quinean approach to resolving the dilemma. Finally, in §3.6 I address major conceptual and
metaphysical objections to ethical reductionism, including Moore’s open question argument and its
contemporary descendants. I argue for a particular view of the epistemology of semantics, claiming
that these arguments rest on an implausible theory about our epistemic access to the meanings of
moral terms. We have good reason to think that a basic commitment to a scientific worldview will
imply that moral facts just are descriptive facts.
§3.1 THIN REDUCTIONISM AND NATURALISM
Philosophical naturalism is a bit like patriotism. Everyone’s a patriot, but few can agree on
what makes one a patriot. As I will be pledging allegiance to one of the “naturalistic” accounts of
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ethics, I think we ought to be clear on what this allegiance consists in. As is often the case in politics,
everyone has their own litmus test that separates the patriots from the traitors. In this section I
propose just such a test. I will point to a relation between sets (or domains) of facts that I call “thin
reductionism.” I argue that this precise but expansive notion will helpfully separate the “naturalists”
from the “non-naturalists” in a way that shows just how unconvincing non-naturalism really is. As I
will argue, current science is committed to this relation obtaining between various scientific domains.
Let’s start with facts. As I use the term, facts are just entities and their properties.38 Consider
philosophers’ favorite piece of example furniture, the table. There are facts about any given table. It’s
made of oak, it’s varnished, it has four legs, etc. To say that it is a fact that the table is made of oak
just is to say that this entity, the table, has this property, namely, being made of oak. This is the case
for everything that exists: the set of all the entities in the world and all their properties is the set of all
the facts about the world.
Thin reductionism, as I am using the term, is the strictly metaphysical claim that, for a given
domain, all the facts in that domain are identical to a proper subset of facts in another domain. There
are several ways for one domain of facts to have this relation with another. The simplest instantiation
of this relation occurs when there is a neat isomorphism between the facts of one domain and a
proper subset of the facts of another.

Suppose that biology is reducible chemistry in a very

straightforward way: all the facts of biology are identical to a subset of facts of chemistry. Suppose
then that theories B and C are the correct theories of biology and chemistry respectively. As such, if B
posits biological facts B1, …, BN, B would be reducible to C if for every fact B1 through BN, B1 = C1,

38 There are of course countless theories of how to understand facts, entities, and properties. I do not aim to settle such
matters. Instead, I will rely on this fairly intuitive idea of what facts are, hoping that the metaphysicians will sort out the
minutiae at their leisure.
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…, BN = CN.39
Thin reductionism makes no claims about the kinds of facts in either the reduced set of facts
or the reduction base. As a result, another more interesting way a domain can be thinly reducible to
another is if all of the facts of the reduced domain are identical to facts constituted by gerrymandered
conjunctions or disjunctions of the entities and properties of another domain. Even if biology and
chemistry are not perfectly isomorphic when it comes to their facts (and of course, they are not),
biology might still be reducible to chemistry in this sense. Take B and C once again, the correct
theories of biology and chemistry. Biology would be thinly reducible to chemistry if for every fact B1
… BN posited by B, there exists some conjunction of facts C1 ^ … ^ CN such that B1 = (C1 ^ … ^ CN),
and so on. Alternatively, biology could be thinly reducible to chemistry if for every fact B1 - BN
posited by B, there exists some disjunction of facts C1 ∨ … ∨ CN such that B1 = (C1 ∨ … ∨ CN).
I am interested in putting forward thin reductionism as a necessary condition on the relation
between domains of putative facts that are scientifically respectable. However, we should note that
this means the relation may not be sufficient to secure some of the important metaphysical
commitments that philosophers have often taken to be theoretically interesting. This is intentional, as
I do not aim to settle or presume any important metaphysical debates with this notion. This relation
will not be sufficient to answer at least four important metaphysical debates. First, it places no
naturalness constraints on the facts of any given domain. So, for example, some philosophers will
want to tighten the notion of reductionism so that it rules out “facts” which consist in bizarre
combinations of entities and properties, and insist that the only facts which are real are the ones
corresponding to natural kinds, or the preexisting joints in nature (Armstrong, 1978; Boyd, 1991;
Devitt, 2008; Ellis, 2001; Hawley & Bird, 2011; Lowe, 1998; Millikan, 1999). So the mereological

39 Strictly speaking, we need to append a statement like “assuming there exists some fact C such that C ≠ (B ∨ … ∨
i
i
1
BN.).” This last clause would of course necessary to ensure that B is a proper subset of C. I’ll omit this complication as
we go on.
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fusion of my pinkie toe and a natural C note might be out. That’s fine, but I am not assuming it in my
notion of reductionism. Secondly, for similar reasons, some metaphysicians will want to rule out
disjunctive properties as included in either domain of facts, as these “facts” cannot serve in law-like
generalizations (Audi, 2013; Clapp, 2001; Walter, 2006). That is well and good as well, but this account
of reductionism does not assume it. Third, this version of reductionism is neutral when it comes to
claims about whether the statements of a theory of any domain constitute genuine laws of nature, and
why, or whether such statements constitute mere Humean generalizations (see e.g. (Goodman, 1947;
Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; van Fraassen, 1989). Finally, this notion of reductionism also neutral as
regards multiple realizability. Recall Fodor’s main criticism of reductionism in “Special Sciences”: “If
reductivism is true, then every natural kind is, or is co-extensive with, a physical natural kind” (J. A.
Fodor, 1974, p. 102). We should indeed acknowledge that there may be natural (functional) kinds only
capturable at one level of description (say, using a psychological theory) which are not identical with
any natural kinds capturable at another level of description (say, using a theory of physics).
Nevertheless, the facts posited by a psychological theory could still be identical to facts (or facts
constituted by gerrymandered disjunctions of facts) at the level of physics, provided those facts are not
natural kinds. Thin reductionism does not make any claim about whether a given domain is suitably
natural or non-disjunctive.
The notion of thin reductionism gives us some traction in defining a litmus test for naturalism.
Typically, naturalism holds that only natural entities and properties exist, and that our only way of
knowing about them is the scientific method. On my view, whether a putative entity or property
counts as natural or not is a matter of whether that putative entity or property is countenanced by our
best scientific theories. So this means that one qualifies as a philosophical naturalist if one’s ontology
only includes those entities which are in-principle compatible with accepted scientific laws or
generalizations, and (in addition) that one accepts the scientific method as the only justifiable way of
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modifying those scientific laws or generalizations.
On the view I’m advancing, naturalists are (at least at present) committed to the claim that all
entities are physical entities, and that all physical effects have fully physical causes.40 This is because
science does not (as of now) countenance non-physical entities or non-physical causes. If this is the
case, then philosophical naturalists are, in general, committed to thinking that something like thin
reductionism applies to all domains of facts with the exception of physics. To see why, consider what
it would mean for a given domain to fail to be thinly reducible to the domain of physics. This would
mean that there exist some facts in that domain which are not identical to any combination of physical
facts, however, conjunctively, disjunctively, or unnaturally specified. Because facts on this view are
simply entities and their properties, this would require that, at a minimum, some entity or property of
the domain is not physical. I mention this not to rule out such theories but rather to indicate that
embracing such an expanded ontology has a cost. Rejecting thin reductionism about any given
domain of facts would require giving some reason for expanding our ontology and epistemology to
include non-physical, non-causal, or special entities or properties not currently accepted by science. In
such a case one must either abandon naturalism or show (using the scientific method) how our current
scientific theories should be expanded to include this ontology. As a result, I take it that thin
reductionism about non-physics domains is a basic theoretical commitment of current scientific
practice. With this notion on the table, I want to turn to what ethical reductionism would look like,
and why we have inductive reasons to expect moral reductionism to be true, as opposed to moral nonnaturalism.
§3.2 ETHICAL REDUCTIONISM: A GOOD BET
Consider once again the set of all the facts in the world. Of these facts, there are descriptive
facts pertaining to the way the world is, and, possibly, moral facts, which pertain to what we should do,
40

This of course leaves the definition of “physical” to the physical scientists.
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and what’s right and wrong, good and bad.41 Assuming moral facts exist at all, what is the relation
between these two types of facts? Metaethicists have suggested quite a few nuanced accounts of the
relation. But on my view, the answer is quite simple: moral facts are (at the very least) identical to a
subset of descriptive facts. That is, moral facts at least thinly reduce to descriptive facts. In this
section I will give an inductive reason for preferring this account of the metaphysics of moral facts
over its alternative (ethical non-naturalism).
To start, note that the viability of ethical reductionism is a matter somewhat independent of
the correctness of any given theory of first-order ethics. Ethical reductionism is not in principle
committed to moral facts reducing to the descriptive facts picked out by any given deontological,
consequentialist, or virtue-theoretic theory. This account of the metaphysics of moral facts is not even
committed to moral facts reducing to response-independent facts. As such, we should understand
ethical reductionism as a schema for understanding the metaphysics of moral facts, whatever they “in
fact” turn out to be. In Chapter V I will say more about what kinds of facts morality is about, but
nothing about ethical reductionism should hang on the truth of any first-order moral theory.
Let’s turn, then, to why we should prefer ethical reductionism over a more glamorous account
of moral facts: non-naturalism. A non-naturalist, on this account, is anyone who rejects ethical
reductionism as I’ve defined it. This poses a slight terminological problem, however, because some
ethical naturalists like to have their cake and eat it too. Non-reductive ethical naturalists are just such a
group.

Non-reductive ethical naturalism holds that some moral facts are not identical to any

descriptive facts. Instead of identity, non-reductive ethical naturalists often hold that moral facts

41 Carving up the difference between moral and descriptive facts is notoriously difficult. One intuitive way of splitting
up these two categories is to call descriptive facts all of those facts which we paradigmatically refer to only by using “is”
statements, whereas moral facts are a subset of the facts we paradigmatically refer to using “ought” statements, or
statements using what are commonly thought of as “thin” moral terms, such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ etc. (I say
moral facts are a subset because presumably other senses of ‘ought’ are available – epistemic, pragmatic, etc.). In what
follows, I will assume that there is some at least prima facie difference between these two categories. I will also relegate
“thick” moral facts to the moral side of the divide, following Jackson (1998). Note however, that Jackson is concerned
with differentiating moral and descriptive terms, rather than facts.
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supervene on, are realized by, or are constituted by certain natural facts (David Owen Brink, 1989;
Devitt, 2002; Sayre-McCord, 1988), where these relations are not taken to imply that moral facts are
identical with some natural facts. Without getting too deep into the metaphysics of constitution,
realization or supervenience, my worry about such positions is that such moral facts may not always be
natural after all. Take, for instance, one of the moral facts that non-reductive naturalism denies is
identical to any descriptive fact. This would mean that this fact is not identical to any descriptive fact,
nor any conjunction or disjunction of descriptive facts, however specified. Now remember, as I
argued above, that thin reductionism about non-physics domains appears to be an implicit
commitment of current scientific practice. As such, the moral fact in question seems to be an
ontological dangler after all: it will be a fact not be countenanced by any scientific theory.
In point of fact, I think most non-reductive ethical naturalists would accept the version of
reductionism I’ve given.

After all, this version expressly avoids committing to many of the

problematic assumptions that plagued older versions of reductionism. If they do this, so-called nonreductionists can be just as committed to naturalism as I am. However, it would mean that they have
to say that moral facts are identical to descriptive facts in at least the sense that thin reductionism
specifies. What this means is that non-reductionists must choose sides: they must either commit to
this minimally reductionist view of naturalism, or commit to non-naturalism.
With that terminological issue aside, we can begin to consider we should prefer ethical
reductionism over non-naturalism. To start, we need only observe that any account of moral facts
which denies reductionism is, in principle, committed to a larger ontology than the sciences currently
accept. And this is not merely a matter of aesthetics. As I claimed above, making new ontological
claims puts a philosopher on thin ice when it comes to naturalism; the only proper way to expand an
ontology, given that methodology, is to show that the expanded ontology can be arrived at through the
scientific method.
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Most non-naturalists are not much bothered by these ontological considerations. For either
empirical or conceptual reasons, non-naturalists insist that moral facts, whatever they are, outstrip the
domain of descriptive facts. In §3.6 I will consider conceptual, a priori arguments against ethical
reductionism, which I take the most seriously. Sometimes, however, philosophers (non-naturalists and
anti-realists alike) express their skepticism of ethical reductionism in an empirical spirit.42 Philosophers
who share this suspicion hail from many sides of the discipline. Non-naturalists like Enoch (2011),
Parfit (2011), Nagel (1986), and Shafer-Landau (2003) as well as anti-realists like Prinz (2007) and
Street (2017) are all in agreement that something about ethical reductionism seems like a bad inductive
bet. Shafer-Landau provides a good example of this argument:
I think that this sort of view is not the immediately appealing one, but is seen by reductionists
as one that is forced on them by philosophical considerations, especially those to do with
ontological economy… There is a basic reason to think of the non-reductionist picture as the
presumptively correct one: the signal failure of classical naturalists to plausibly defend any
robust identity claims linking the fundamental moral properties with natural ones (2003, p. 67).
Shafer-Landau appears to be starting from the assumption that the possibility of a theoretical
reduction of moral facts should be doubted until a satisfying reduction has been given. It is important
to see that this suspicion gets the methodology exactly backwards. Given that thin reduction is an
assumption implicit in current scientific practice, we ought to view the theoretical reduction of moral
facts as a good bet. After all, if it turns out such a bet is wrong, and there exist facts which are not
reducible to facts in any other domain (with the exception of physics), this would constitute quite an
upending of current scientific practice. Of course, if there are good arguments for thinking that moral
facts simply can’t be the same thing as descriptive facts, we might be led to the sort of skepticism
Shafer-Landau embraces. But even if that is the case, we should recognize this as a highly revisionary
This style of argument might be seen as roughly analogous to the pessimistic meta-induction in philosophy of science
(see Laudan, 1981).
42
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outcome of our theorizing, not the epistemically respectable default.
As I have argued in this section, we have a simple account of the metaphysics of moral facts
available to us. Ethical reductionism appeals to a weak notion of reductionism already implicit in
current scientific theories, and can be formulated so as to avoid the quandaries that plagued earlier
versions of reductionism. Given a basic commitment to philosophical naturalism, it seems this
account should be the presumptive view of moral metaphysics. Moreover, we have little reason to
accept inductive suspicions to the contrary. So if this simple account of the metaphysics of moral facts
is in front of our faces, it is natural to wonder why philosophers have by and large swatted it away.
Ethical reductionism just can’t do justice to what we mean by ‘moral facts’. Based on conceptual
considerations, philosophers think moral facts must have special features that descriptive facts do not.
As a result, many philosophers allege that ethical reductionism simply changes the subject. As I will
argue later in this chapter, this objection relies on a notion of conceptual analysis that cannot be
justified. It is worth it, however, to take a quick detour to formally explain the connection between
moral and descriptive concepts (and language).
§3.3 THE SEMANTIC SCHEMA
Despite my assurances that the metaphysics of moral facts are oh-so-simple, such an account
may strike many readers as outrageous. After all, didn’t we learn from Hume that one cannot infer an
‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (Hume, 1740/1978)? I think Hume was wrong. There are at least two ways of
showing this. First, one might give a naturalistic theory of semantics for moral terms, such that the
meaning and reference of moral terms reduce to descriptive facts (see, e.g. (Boyd, 1988). Such an
account would get us around Hume’s dictum because we will have shown how the meaning of
‘oughts’ really depend on the way the world ‘is’. Though this approach been tried, it strikes me that
any such account runs the risk of being excessively parochial. After all, naturalistic semantics, which
aims to reduce meaning and reference to descriptive facts, is one of the most contentious areas of
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philosophy. Wedding the possibility of ethical reductionism to any one theory in this area seems both
foolhardy and unnecessary. The alternative that I favor is much more schematic. Building on
previous work in the area, I will show how moral terms can in principle be reduced to descriptive
terms, leaving open the question of how descriptive terms get their meaning and reference.
Reducing moral terms to descriptive terms can be accomplished using so-called Ramsey
sentences (Lewis, 1970; Ramsey, 1978). Lewis introduced this method as a way of defining theoretical
terms by appealing to their causal role. This method was originally applied to the realm of moral terms
by Jackson (1998), and my treatment of it will largely mirror Jackson’s in its formal features. My aim is
not quite the same as Jacksons, though, as we will see.
We start our reduction with a moral theory. This moral theory should be understood as a
collection of moral statements, all expressed in property-name style “Setting cats on fire has the
property of being wrong” and “Intentionally inflicting harm has the property of being wrong,” etc.
Call this collection of moral statements M. We then take the conjunction of all the sentences of M.
This gives us a very long sentence which includes every moral term and every moral sentence implied
by the theory. Next we replace every moral term that shows up in M with a single variable such that
M(x1, x2, …). Appending an existential quantifier gives us the Ramsey sentence of M: (∃x1)…M(x1, x2,
…). And appending a uniqueness condition gives us: (∃x1)…(y1), …(M(y1, …) iff x1 = y1 & x2 = y2…)
(Jackson, 1998, p. 140). These theoretical machinations provide us with a naturalistic reduction of
moral terms to natural terms. This is because all reference to moral terms has been dropped out of the
Ramsey sentence of M. Instead, each moral term has been replaced by an existentially bound variable.
When it comes to the use of Ramsey sentences, Jackson has far grander ambitions than I. For
example, he thinks that we can use this procedure to establish the meaning and reference of moral
terms. I do not think this is the case, because I reject the notion of conceptual analysis that such a
claim implies. (More on that in the next section). All I care to do with such a construction is show
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that it is in principle possible to reduce moral terms to descriptive ones. The procedure, again, is
purely schematic, and could be used to reduce the sentences of any given moral theory to the
sentences of some descriptive theory.
§3.4 A PROBLEM WITH THE REDUCTION PROCEDURE
Part of the reason for playing coy with the reduction procedure for moral language is that if
one tries to use it to definitively specify the meaning and reference of moral terms, one ends up in a
very difficult dilemma. This is because if one uses this procedure to determine the meaning or
reference of moral terms, one either makes moral semantics too restrictive or too permissive. The
problem originates in the moral statements that one feeds into the procedure: if the moral statements
one feeds in are too specific or parochial, this results in an account of moral language that excludes
anybody whose moral theory does not endorse those statements. This would seem to imply that
anyone who does not subscribe to the theory is not even competent with moral language. On the
other hand, if we only use very platitudinous statements in trying to fix the meaning of moral terms,
we end up with an underdetermined moral semantics. In what follows I’ll give a sketch of both of
these problems, and show how they point to a solution which gives us a meatier account of the
semantics of moral terms. The answer, I will claim, comes from reimagining the theoretical role of the
reduction procedure.
First, I will consider the objection that claims that the reduction procedure is too permissive.
Objections in this vein target the procedure’s reliance on the notion of mature folk moral theory. To
start, Yablo (2002) notes that according to Jackson, “It is analytic that an action is right iff it has
whatever property D meets descriptive condition E,” and that this condition is a result of the holistic
way Jackson defines the meaning of moral terms. But if we can determine analytically that property D
meets descriptive condition E, this seems to imply that any speaker competent with moral terms might
still wonder whether natural term E really gives the descriptive meaning of moral term D. (This is a
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version of Moore’s “open question argument” which I will consider in §3.6). Yablo notes that Jackson
has two responses available. First, he claims that because we currently lack a mature folk morality,
some openness in these identifications should be expected.

Second, if semantically competent

speakers still recognize a degree of openness in descriptive definitions of moral terms after we have
arrived at a mature;’ folk moral theory, we will be “entitled to dig in our heels and insist that the idea
that what fits the bill that well might still fail to be rightness, is nothing more than a hangover from the
Platonist conception of the meaning of a term like ‘right’ is somehow a matter of its picking out, or
being mysteriously attached to, the form of the right” (Jackson, 1998, p. 151 emphasis original).
It is this second response that Yablo finds particularly troublesome. He goes on to argue that
mature folk morality cannot simply be whatever morality we end up having in the future, as that might
be a terrible, unreasonable morality for all we know. So mature folk morality must be “reasonable” in
some sense. But because ‘reasonable’ appears to be an evaluative term, we will be forced into a
dilemma. On the one hand we can apply Jackson’s treatment of moral terms to ‘reasonable’. This
would involve giving the term a holistic meaning in virtue of its functional role in our “reason-theory.”
This, however, leads us to circularity, because the functional role played by ‘reasonable’ will end up
endorsing whatever theory it ends up as a part of. Alternatively, we can treat ‘reasonable’ as irreducibly
evaluative. But that would of course defeat the purpose that moral functionalism was invented to
serve: the descriptive reduction of moral terms.
Any of these responses seem to render the reduction procedure too permissive because it
means that mature folk moral theory is not, contrary to Jackson’s claim, unique. If many descriptive
accounts of the meaning of ‘reasonable’ are possible, then many accounts of folk morality are possible,
each endorsed by their own account of what’s reasonable. And what this means is that mature folk
morality does not place adequate restrictions on exactly what counts as competence with moral terms;
virtually any system of moral term usage would be acceptable. Furthermore, if virtually any system of
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moral term usage is acceptable, then for any putative moral dispute, the account would not adequately
demarcate whether that dispute counts as about moral facts of the matter, or whether the disputants
are simply talking past one another (i.e. using different moral concepts).
Another way of getting at the reduction procedure being too permissive comes from Smith
(M. Smith, 1994): the permutation problem. Smith compares a functionalist treatment of moral terms
with a functionalist treatment of color terms. If we assemble a vast array of platitudes about colors,
Smith says, we can specify the meaning of a given color term through the same process Jackson uses
for moral terms: combining all the platitudes about ‘red’ into one voluminous sentence, then
Ramsifying them. The result is much the same: ‘red’ gets its meaning from the place it occupies in the
network. The problem that’s revealed when we understand the meaning of color terms this way,
Smith says, is that all or most of the colors end up with the same functional definition. This is because
in Ramsifying the color terms, we strip out any reference to the color itself. The hope is that “we will
still be left with enough in the way of relational information to fix on a unique physical property with
which to identify each of the various colours” (1994, p. 50). But this hope is forlorn, Smith thinks,
because:
1. We acquire mastery of color terms inter alia by being presented with paradigms of colors
and by having our use of particular color terms directly ‘hooked up’ with the particular
colours these terms pick out.
2. The platitudes surrounding our use of colour terms therefore form an extremely tight-knit
and interconnected group (1994, p. 55).
The permuation problem arises because of these facts about our color concepts. Each of the
color terms acquires the same functional definition, so we cannot claim uniqueness for our definitions
of any one color term. And the problem for our moral term reduction procedure, Smith thinks, is that
our moral concepts share the same two facts – we acquire them by being presented by paradigms, and
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all of them form a tight-knit group. Therefore when we try to give functional definitions of moral
terms, we will run into the same problem; there will be no way to claim uniqueness for the definition
of any given moral term. And what this means is that “we may be unable to distinguish the various
moral properties from each other” (1994, p. 54).
Though Smith does not pursue this line of argument much further, it is easy to see how a lack
of uniqueness conditions would make a functional analysis of moral terms defective. For one thing, a
lack of uniqueness might seem to make moral communication impossible, because no two subjects
could be guaranteed to have the same moral concepts. But more importantly, it would also mean that
for any given person, there simply is no fact of the matter as to the content of her moral beliefs. Take
the moral belief that P “Burning cats alive is wrong.” The moral term (‘wrong’) could be given a
functional definition, but the lack of uniqueness would mean that when the subject reflects on her
moral beliefs, it would not be clear even to her whether her use of ‘wrong’ picked out one property
(wrongness) or a completely different (but functionally identical) property. The permutation problem
thus gives us more than a problem for moral communication; it also signals a radical indeterminacy in
moral thought.
One way of dealing with these problems is to build more content into the mature folk moral
theory that fixes the functional role of moral terms. Smith’s permutation problem is motivated by the
kinds of platitudes he thinks Jackson must rely on. In his treatment of the permutation problem for
color terms, Smith argues that there might be other platitudes we could rely on in further specifying
the functional role of color terms. Sentences like “Red is the colour of blood” would serve to
differentiate the functional role of ‘red’ from the functional role of other colors, for example (M.
Smith, 1994, p. 51). And similarly for the moral case, we might build sentences like “Wrongness is the
property that I notice when I see cats being burned for fun.” But these platitudes are the wrong kind,
Smith thinks, because they are not a priori, conceptual truths: “They do not constitute a statement of a
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set of inferences or judgments licensed by our colour concepts themselves” (1994, p. 51). Nevertheless,
one might simply deny that a functional definition of a concept needs to have only a priori, conceptual
truths as part of its Ramsey sentence. If that is the case, we can get uniqueness in our account of
competence with moral terms by building a great deal more content into the meaning of moral terms.
This would solve the uniqueness problem, and mean that moral functionalism is not too permissive.
Unfortunately, turning in this direction leads to the criticism that moral functionalism is too
restrictive. This charge can come from a number of directions. Returning for a moment to Yablo, if
we build too many substantive moral assumptions into our treatment of conceptual competence for
moral terms, we run the risk of labeling legitimate moral debate mere conceptual quibbling. As he says,
“moral dissidents, even hypothetical ones, come out as simply misusing the term” (Yablo, 2002, p. 7).
A similar argument comes from Zangwill (2000), who points to a particular example where
such moral dissidents would be labeled as “conceptually incompetent,” when we thought we were
disagreeing with them. Zangwill argues that there is profound ethical disagreement over who deserves
moral status, and how group relations affect that status. He uses the example of Herman Göring, who
claimed that some categories of people (Jews, Romani, homosexuals, etc.) were expendable, and did
not need to be given moral consideration when their interests conflicted with the German nation. It
seems that we and Göring have a profound ethical disagreement over who should count as part of the
moral community, and that Göring was not simply incompetent in his use of moral terms (Zangwill,
2000, p. 82). But the problem is that a content-rich moral functionalism seems to imply that he was
incompetent with the use of moral terms. Presumably mature folk moral theory will converge on the
claim that the categories of people Göring thought expendable are not actually expendable. But if it
does, then Göring is using moral terms incompetently; “right” in his mouth does not mean “right” as
we use it.
Horgan & Timmons (2009) make the same charge in a moral general way in. There they argue
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that the theory cannot cope with semantic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth cases. They point to
Putnam’s original Twin Earth thought experiment, and claim that this experiment is successful in
showing that speakers’ semantic intuitions incline away from a purely descriptivist treatment of natural
kind terms. That is, in response to Putnam’s Twin Earth, subjects judge Earthlings and Twin
Earthlings to be speaking about different things with their respective terms ‘water’. However, when a
(putatively similar) thought experiment is run involving moral terms, this experiment shows the
opposite: rather than judging that speakers are referring to different natural properties, subjects are
inclined to judge that speakers on Earth and Twin Earth are speaking about the same things, but differ
in their moral beliefs.
Horgan and Timmons start by asking us to imagine a Moral Twin Earth, where speakers are
nearly identical to speakers here on Earth. Their moral language bears all the same “formal marks”
that characterize our moral language (they use this language to talk about human welfare, they take
certain uses of the language to coincide with having overriding reasons to do certain actions, etc.)
(2009, p. 225). The only difference between Earth and Moral Twin Earth is that Twin Earthlings have
converged on a different mature folk morality that identifies a different set of natural properties for
their important moral terms (‘right’, ‘good’, etc.). On Earth our mature folk moral theory Tc is
consequentialist in character. As a result, conceptual analysis on Earth assigns the term ‘good’ to the
functional role played by a set of descriptive properties that involve something like “increasing human
welfare.” By contrast, on Moral Twin Earth, their mature folk moral theory Td is deontological, and so
conceptual analysis there will assign the term ‘good’ to the functional role played by a different set of
descriptive properties (say, “treating others as ends rather than mere means”). The result is that if
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings were to encounter each other, moral functionalism claims that they
would be talking past each other; each group would be using distinct moral concepts. But this seems
like a problem, Horgan and Timmons say, because it conflicts with a semantic intuition that subjects
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have when considering the Moral Twin Earth case. That is, most people tend to judge that if
Earthlings and Twin Earthlings met, they would immediately see the differences between them as not
mere conceptual differences, but as differences in moral belief and theory.
One final way of making this charge against the reduction procedure is to claim that the theory
is chauvinistic. Horgan and Timmons compare this position to psychofunctionalism in philosophy of
mind, which claims that a mature empirical psychology will define commonsense mentalistic language
in terms of the functional roles of mental states. But, given that folk mentalistic language appears to
apply to some species that might lack those roles, psychofunctionalism is committed to denying that
those species have mental states at all (Block, 1980). Similarly, they argue that moral functionalism is
“committed to claiming that actual or possible agents who have a mature folk morality different from
that of humans would not possess the concepts of goodness, rightness, etc. at all” (Horgan &
Timmons, 2009, p. 10).
Let’s take stock. Faced with the apparent difficulty that one cannot derive an “is” from an
“ought,” I appealed to a Jackson’s Ramsifying reduction procedure to show how moral language can
be reduced to descriptive language in principle. The problem with this reduction procedure in practice
is that a great deal depends on how one specifies the moral theory that one is reducing. Too
platitudinous, and it will not uniquely pick out the descriptive properties that are identical to the moral
properties. Too content-rich, and the procedure will imply that those who do not accept that content
are not even competent with the relevant moral terms. In the next section I will offer a way out of this
dilemma.
§3.5 A QUINEAN INTERPRETATION
I think that we can salvage the reduction procedure by reimagining the theoretical role of the
reduction procedure. To start, it is important to note one apparent difficulty in the literature claiming
that this procedure is excessively permissive.

It treats language as though there were a strict
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delineation between a speaker’s conceptual competence and her substantive beliefs. This is perhaps
understandable, given that the procedure is supposed to apply to our moral language, not our moral
beliefs. But it runs counter to a general Quinean principle, that there is no principled way to draw the
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. While a full-throated rejection of the analyticsynthetic distinction could occupy an entire dissertation, I’ll just rehearse a few of the reasons for its
rejection, then go on to show how, if we reject this distinction, the reduction procedure is neither too
permissive nor too restrictive.
Stated in simple terms, the analytic-synthetic distinction seems quite intuitive. Some sentences
(the analytic ones) are true or false in virtue of their meaning, and some sentences (the synthetic ones)
are true or false in virtue of something about the world. It seems pretty obvious that the statement
“circles are round” can be known just by interrogating the meaning of the terms involved and seeing
that they are synonymous, while “Jane has ten fingers” requires actual empirical investigation. But
sixty years after “Two Dogmas” (and a hundred years after Duhem!), I think it’s time we gave up.
Though there are still plenty of people that cling to the distinction, there are plenty of reasons to give it
up.
Let’s start with Quine. He famously observed that there is no good explanation of what
“synonymy” means. Every explanation we might give (Quine goes through several of them, appealing
to notions of contradiction, definition, intension, etc.) simply reproduces the problem, and we never
get an adequate account (Quine, 1951). Quine of course went on to conclude that this implied that
there is no workable notion of linguistic meaning, and that there is no fact of the matter as to whether
two statements have the same meaning, but we need not go that far. The argument may simply imply
that we cannot know a priori that two statements have the same meaning. I’ll return to this point in a
moment.
If we reject the analytic-synthetic distinction, as I think we should, this implies that there is no
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principled way of distinguishing between a belief that is held as a result of conceptual competence and
one that is a substantive claim about the world. With enough changes in one’s web of beliefs,
statements that are putatively constitutive of competence could be falsified without necessarily
rendering someone incompetent with moral terms. And conversely, substantive statements that make
claims about the instantiation of moral properties in the world could be held come-what-may (again,
assuming enough changes in one’s web of beliefs). Importantly, this is not a point about the mere
difficulty of finding the line between these two kinds of statements. On this view, that line does not exist.
This view has some important implications for our interpretation of the reduction procedure.
If we take a Quinean approach, we should not view the procedure as providing the definitive
conditions for conceptual competence with moral terms. On such an account of moral terms, we
should not expect a mature folk moral theory to settle (once and for all) the meaning of moral terms.
To be sure, such a theory may be possible. The result of this is that, while we can specify a Ramsey
sentence for a moral term in a moral theory at a particular time, this sentence should not be read as
definitive of linguistic or conceptual competence for everyone. Other Ramsey sentences are possible,
given other theories.
This line may strike some as simply relocating the problem. For the major objection still
remains: how could moral communication be possible if the standards of conceptual competence vary
depending on one’s moral theory? Without one standard for conceptual or linguistic competence with
moral terms, it might seem to be magic that individuals with significantly different moral concepts
could converse at all (J. Fodor & Lepore, 1991). This is a familiar objection to so-called “meaning
holism,” which is the thesis that claims that linguistic meaning is fixed by one’s entire system of
meaning (see e.g. (Hempel, 1950; Quine, 1951; Sellars, 1974)). This objection is in a sense correct, but
only insofar as it applies to meaning holism, and we need not accept that thesis. Rejecting the analyticsynthetic distinction need not imply holism or skepticism about linguistic meaning. Instead, as I
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mentioned previously, we can see it as simply implying that meaning is not knowable a priori.
The possibility of communication is not dependent on our knowing how communication
occurs. We do not need to determine the meaning and reference of moral terms before we can even
start a moral discussion, and indeed, having a moral discussion is exactly how we start the process of
determining how communication occurs. On this view of the matter, building a theory about what
constitutes the meaning of disputants’ terms is itself part and parcel of moral debate. It is only when
we have a substantial catalogue of a person’s moral judgments that we can get an idea (form a theory)
of what her moral terms mean. As we build such a theory, we compare her conceptual scheme to our
own, and devise a translation that allows for substantive moral debate. This is an empirical task, and it
means far more work than simply stipulating conditions for her competence with moral terms, then
declaring her incompetent or conceptually unreachable when her use of moral terms fails to match
ours exactly.
Note that this way of viewing moral debate squares quite well with a reductionist view of
moral facts. If it turns out that moral facts just are a subset of descriptive facts, this goes quite a ways
toward helping us determine what people are talking about. When I ask a friend why he thinks a tax
rate is immorally high, I can ask what descriptive facts make the tax rate immorally high. He can then
go on to describe the features of the tax rate that constitute this immorality. If by contrast it turned
out that moral facts were not (at least thinly) reducible to some set of descriptive facts, we’re in for
some trouble. That’s because his concept of immorality might simply be different from mine, and if
that’s the case, he can’t even point to a set of descriptive facts that constitute immorality. That would
make communication between us very difficult, as without those descriptive facts to point to, we
would end up talking past each other.
Relatedly, we should not view the project of determining the meaning of moral terms as one
that only theorists are capable of engaging in. Everyday people do it all the time. When I say that
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capital punishment is morally wrong, one less-than-fruitful way of approaching the debate is to make
assumptions about what I must mean, given your own moral theory. Thus in describing capital
punishment as morally wrong, my introduction to philosophy students will sometimes assume I mean
that it is something proscribed by God, and that I have a particular theological interpretation I am
ready to give them. In this instance, my students are constructing a (false) theory, both about the
meaning of my moral terms and about why that meaning applies to the states of affairs I am talking
about. But this does not mean that my students and I are incapable of moral dialogue. All they have
to do to begin the dialogue is to ask me for elaboration. What do I mean when I say something is
wrong? What about the institution of capital punishment do I think this wrongness applies to? The
answers to these questions surely ramify the potential theories my students are (in their own way)
constructing. But they rule out others: when I say I do not believe in any gods, a non-deflationary
theological view is ruled out as a good explanation of my moral standpoint. The process of evaluating
my moral beliefs (and deciding whether they are reasonable) is inextricably tied to the (ordinary,
everyday) process of theory-building about the meaning of my moral terms.
A final advantage of this approach is that it actually gives us a new dimension of first-order
moral critique. It is possible that once we get enough information about a moral theory, then run it
through the reduction procedure, we will find that some theories fail to pick out unique natural
properties for their moral terms, or fail to pick out natural properties for their moral terms at all. This
will count as a strike against these theories, as it implies that something about them isn’t actually
naturalistic. The reduction of moral terms to natural terms is not a conceptual constraint on any
possible moral theory. Rather, it is a consideration in favor of a theory if it can specify its moral terms
in natural terms, and a consideration against a theory if it cannot.
Suppose I am correct, and that once we blur the distinction between semantic competence and
substantive moral belief, we get an adequate account of the relation between moral and descriptive
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language. There is yet another potential problem in the offing, because the defensibility of reducing
moral to descriptive language does not just depend on the plausibility of the reduction procedure itself.
It also depends on two further factors: (1) whether the content of moral language is in principle
reducible, and (2) whether moral facts are in principle reducible. Many philosophers think there are
important features of moral language or moral facts that just aren’t amenable to reduction. In the next
section, I will examine this claim, and argue that it is false.
§3.6 ON THE SUBJECT OF CHANGING THE SUBJECT
As philosophers are wont to do, I recently found myself engaged in a long, stubborn, and
ultimately pointless debate with someone online.

My interlocutor insisted that ‘feminists’ were

committed to the subjugation of men, and pointed to examples of supposed female-supremacist
behavior by campus radicals across the country. Not one to be swayed by a few extreme examples, I
insisted that feminists are not committed to the subjugation of men, but rather the mere political,
economic, and social equality of the sexes. I say the debate was ultimately pointless, of course, because
both of us saw the other as merely changing the subject. I didn’t know what real feminism was, he
said. Each of us had taken the word ‘feminist’ to have obvious, intuitive definitions, and this made
talking past one another unavoidable.
It seems to me that something similar has been afoot in metaethics for a long time. As I will
argue, many metaethical debates are premised on the assumption that intuitions about the meaning of
a term can justify rejecting a theory which implies that the term has a different meaning. This
assumption leads many philosophers to think that any account of moral facts which runs afoul of their
preferred account of moral meaning is “changing the subject,” and ought to be doubted. This chapter
will focus on just one of the places where this appeal is par for the course: the debate about
reductionism in ethics. I will argue that the “changing the subject” objection to ethical reductionism
relies on an unjustified epistemology of semantics. Once we understand that semantic intuitions only
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come with epistemic warrant when they are implied by substantive moral theory, we will see that
ethical reductionists need not fear the “changing the subject” objection.
Ethical reductionism says that moral facts are identical to a subset of natural facts.43 Much of
the modern debate over this thesis derives from G.E. Moore’s famous “open question argument,”
which claimed that moral facts cannot be identical to natural facts (Moore & Baldwin,
1903/1993/1903). Of course, many philosophers now accept that some of the strong assumptions
about meaning implicit in that argument are wrong, and it is often thought that the post-Moorean age
in which we now is much more careful about questions of semantics. As I will endeavor to show, this
is not the case. Contemporary anti-realists and non-naturalists are still very much in the grip of a basic
Moorean misconception, and it is one that we ought to reject.
So let’s start with the open question argument itself. This argument holds that moral and
natural properties could not be identical, because if they were, we should be able to provide definitions
of moral terms using only natural terms (1993/1903, p. 68). We are not able to do so, Moore
reasoned, because for any purported definition, we can recognize (a priori) that it is still an open
question whether the definition is true. Many philosophers reject this argument, notably because it
seems to involve a “paradox of analysis.” A good definition is one that is informative; it tells us
something we did not already know about the term being defined. But for Moore, the only way to
avoid a definition spawning ‘open questions’ is for the definiens and the definiendum to be synonymous.
And these two requirements on definitions are in obvious tension with one another: if a definition is
informative, it cannot preserve synonymy. And if a definition preserves synonymy, it cannot be
informative.
Solving this problem meant that something had to go, and this represented an important

43 This chapter will use this definition exclusively. Note that reductionism, as I’m using the term, is not committed to
any semantic or epistemic thesis. Refer to the facts however you like; ethical reductionism in my sense is only about the
facts themselves, and not the way we talk about them or know them.
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choice point in theorizing about semantics. Some philosophers insist that definitions should remain
analytic, but that this does not spawn open question problems because some analytic definitions are
non-obvious (e.g. Jackson, 1998). Other philosophers insist that some definitions are synthetic, and
thus only discoverable by empirically determining the hidden essence to which the term refers (Boyd,
1988; David Owen Brink, 1989). This chapter is not be especially concerned with these attempts to
solve the open question argument. The important point is that just about everybody (anti-realist, nonnaturalist, and naturalist alike) thinks that Moore’s open question argument gets the semantics wrong.
Given that the open question argument was aimed at undermining something like ethical
reductionism, one might have thought that a conclusive rebuttal of this argument would revive that
thesis. But that did not happen: most philosophers still reject it. This is because, even if we cannot
continue to assume that definitions have to be provided in obviously synonymous terms, it still seems
quite intuitive that any definition of goodness is going to spawn open questions.
Let’s survey some of the philosophers who take this semantic intuition seriously. Enoch
(2011), for example, takes the intuition that normative facts are “just too different” from natural facts
to be decent evidence that something about normative facts that cannot be reduced to non-normative
facts:44
Normative facts sure seem different from natural ones, different enough to justify an initial
suspicion regarding reductionist attempts ... When I ask myself what I should do, it seems that
just answering “oh, pressing the blue button will maximize happiness” is a complete nonstarter, it completely fails to address the question … Rather than answering my question, such
an answer simply changes the subject (Enoch, 2011, p. 108).
Though Enoch phrases his objection in metaphysical terms (he’s discussing moral facts, not moral
concepts or language), I think the source of his skepticism about reductionism is ultimately conceptual,
44

This chapter is only concerned with one species of normative facts—moral facts—but the point is the same.
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rather than metaphysical. After all, the major problem with such reductions is that they “change the
subject.”45 Indeed, most philosophers who take seriously this intuitive difference between normative
and natural facts are explicitly motivated to do so by the apparent “irreducibly normative” feel of
normative concepts or language. Take Parfit (2011):
I believe that I use ‘ought’ in a meaningful, irreducibly normative sense. Suppose again that I
am outside your burning hotel, and I believe that you ought to jump into the canal. I would
not be believing that this act would fulfil your desires … I would believe that you have decisive
reasons to jump, and that if you don’t jump you would be making a terrible mistake. You should
and must jump (p. 292, emphasis original).
Observe Huemer (2005) making a similar move:
The intuitions to which Moore appeals … are ones that occur after competent speakers of
English have thoroughly understood the definition of ‘good’ under discussion and have
reflected carefully on it. Therefore, these intuitions provide at least a prima facie test of the
definition's correctness. That is, in the absence of specific, independent grounds for rejecting
these intuitions or holding them to be unreliable, they provide adequate reason for rejecting
the reductionist's definition (p. 71).
This move is by no means limited to non-naturalists. Many anti-realists also feel the pull of the
irreducible. Take Street (2017), for example:
I agree that … there exists a distinctive, nonpsychological concept of one thing’s counting in
favor of or calling for another, and that this concept is primitive in the following sense. While
we may point to the concept in various ways, locating it for one another and helping others to
acquire it, there is no way to explain, in other language, the sense of the expression ‘a
normative reason’ without in one way or another merely invoking other normative terms (p.
Changing the subject could be a result of metaphysics, but it seems to me likely that Enoch also thinks our normative
concepts and language are just “too different” from natural concepts and language, too.
45
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3).
This appeal to intuitions about the meaning of normative concepts or language is a bit more
sophisticated than Moore’s. These philosophers admit that two different concepts (one normative and
another descriptive) could end up referring to the same thing even if they are not synonymous (a la
water and H2O).46 Instead, they are invoking something they intuit as distinctive about their own
concepts or language that licenses a prima facie suspicion (or even an outright rejection) of any
naturalistic reduction. As such, when someone proposes a reduction of moral facts to descriptive
facts, it seems obvious to them that the reduction is likely illicitly changing the subject to a different
domain of facts altogether. I believe this is what many philosophers have in mind when they raise any
given variant of the “changing the subject” objection. We cannot, as David Chalmers puts it, “define
‘world peace’ as ‘a ham sandwich’” and thereby make world peace achievable with a bit of bread and
some deli meat (1997, p. 105).47 To the extent that ethical reductionism recommends just such a
strategy, it will remain vulnerable to this objection. Though Moore’s intuitionism has been rejected, its
echoes persist.
Ought they persist? Let’s examine the conditions under which we should say a given theory of
the metaphysics of some domain of facts really is illicitly “changing the subject.” Neglecting a bit of
specificity, we might give the following account:
Changing the Subject: a theory T changes the subject iff the meaning of a term K or concept C
that we use to refer to a property P is sufficiently different from the meaning of a term K* or
concept C* that T uses to refer to P.
This account seems to me to capture what many philosophers have in mind, and it certainly has a
degree of prima facie plausibility. When an ethical reductionist supplies a potential reduction of
They have other arguments against such a possibility (see e.g. Parfit, 2011, pp. 295–297).
Another way non-naturalists reject ethical reductionism is by saying that non-naturalism should be the default
position, and that the failure of many reductions licenses a pessimistic induction about future reductions (e.g. ShaferLandau, 2003, p. 67).
46
47
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goodness to some natural property, anti-reductionists object that the reduced term (e.g. ‘good’) or
concept (e.g. GOOD) is just too different in meaning from the term (e.g. ‘harm reduction’) or concept
(e.g. HARM REDUCTION) we have for the putative reduction base.
Now we can ask: what’s the epistemic status of such an objection? This means determining
whether our intuition about the meaning of ‘good’ or GOOD justifies the judgment that we ought to
reject a theory that conflicts with that intuition. There are at least three different possible epistemic
relations between the semantic intuition and a judgment about T. They are the following:
Maximalism: when a person’s intuition about the meaning of a person’s term K or concept C is
sufficiently different from the meaning of term K* or concept C* employed by theory T, this
alone is sufficient grounds for rejecting T.
Minimalism: when a person’s intuition about the meaning of a person’s term K or concept C is
sufficiently different from the meaning of term K* or concept C* employed by theory T, this
alone is prima facie grounds for rejecting T.
Eliminativism: when a person’s intuition about the meaning of a person’s term K or concept C
is sufficiently different from the meaning of term K* or concept C* employed by theory T,
this alone provides no grounds whatsoever for rejecting T.
Though both maximalism and minimalism seem to have great appeal with moral philosophers, as I will
argue, there are good reasons for thinking that eliminativism is correct.
In order to know whether semantic intuitions can justify rejection or suspicion of a given
reductionist theory on their own, we need to know where semantic intuitions get their epistemic
warrant. There are only two ways semantic intuitions might get such warrant, and neither of these
ways give us a positive reason to prefer maximalism or minimalism over eliminativism.
First, one might claim that introspection or analysis of one’s own semantic intuitions reveals
that these intuitions have epistemic warrant. Some meanings appear intuitively correct, and others
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incorrect, and this introspective appearance is the source of the epistemic warrant entailed by
maximalism or minimalism. This would mean that both positions depend on what Devitt & Sterelny
(1999) call the “Cartesian assumption”: “that a person's linguistic competence gives her some sort of
privileged access to facts about meaning, access that she exemplifies in her intuitive judgments” (p.
179).
Going this route immediately leads to problems, because there are plenty of reasons to doubt
the Cartesian assumption. First, cases of ignorance and error for names and natural kind terms and
names (Burge, 1979; Devitt & Sterelny, 1999; Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1973) seem to show that the
meaning of some terms is not fixed by the descriptions speakers associate with terms. As Putnam
would say, sometimes meaning just ain’t in the head. Such cases seem to show (at the very least) that
we cannot assume competent speakers always have cognitive access to the meanings of their terms.48
More importantly, however, we shouldn’t even assume speakers have cognitive access to the meaning
of their terms when we explicitly expect a description theory of the meaning of a term to be correct.49
As Devitt & Sterelny argue:
Suppose for example that an internal relation to 'writing instrument' really is part of the
meaning of 'pencil'. So if Susan, who understands 'pencil', thinks 'this is a pencil', she is apt to
infer 'this is a writing instrument'. The first problem for Cartesianism is that it surely does not
follow that Susan thereby notices this. She may not be a keen student of her own inferential
dispositions. Suppose, however, that she does notice. The second problem for Cartesianism is
that it is still another step for Susan to believe that this inferential relation is part of the
meaning of 'pencil'. Why should we suppose that her competence alone enables her to make
this apparently large theoretical step? Suppose, however, that she does make it. The third and

Assuming that meaning determines reference, of course.
A description theory of meaning holds that the meaning of a term is fixed by the descriptions a speaker associates with
a term.
48
49
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most serious problem for Cartesianism is that we seem to have no basis for thinking that,
simply in virtue of her competence, Susan's belief is justified. We have no basis for giving her
belief about meaning any special epistemic authority, and thus turning it into knowledge (Devitt
& Sterelny, 1999, p. 180).
For all these reasons, I think we should reject “Cartesianism about meaning.” We do not have
unmitigated cognitive access to the meaning of our terms. Because of this, defending minimalism or
maximalism on the basis of introspection looks very unpromising. Semantic intuitions are neither
special nor pretheoretical. As such, it is hard to see how we can appeal to introspection to support
either maximalism or minimalism.
The other possibility for providing a positive argument for minimalism or maximalism adverts
to the epistemic warrant of a semantic theory. Even if we do not enjoy privileged access to the
meaning of our terms, we might still have good reason to believe in a semantic theory which assigns
certain meanings to our terms. In this way, a maximalist or a minimalist could support her claim to the
epistemic warrant of her meaning judgments by arguing that this warrant is inherited from a welljustified semantic theory that comports with her meaning judgments.
This method of arguing for maximalism or minimalism is especially suspect. After all, we are
very unsure of the right account of semantics for any domain, let alone morality. The naturalization of
semantics is one of the most controversial topics in philosophy. There is no consensus about the
proper account of meaning and reference for any domain of facts, and no reason to believe that we are
more certain of the semantics of morality than any other area of knowledge. Vast uncertainty about
semantics can hardly provide epistemic warrant for semantic judgments.
What all this means is that there is no positive reason for preferring maximalism or
minimalism over eliminativism. We have no good reason to believe that introspection or a semantic
theory provide even prima facie epistemic warrant for “changing the subject” objections to
89

reductionist theories of ethics. And this implies that if someone objects that a reductionist account of
ethics changes the subject, we have no positive reason whatsoever to defer to her semantic intuitions.
Of course, the fact that there is no positive reason to accept maximalism or minimalism does
not imply that eliminativism is true. But there is in fact an independent reason to think that
eliminativism is true. This reason derives from a very simple and natural interpretation of semantic
intuitions, once we’ve rejected the Cartesian assumption.

If semantic intuitions are not the

unblemished deliverances of semantic competence, what are they? One obvious candidate is that such
intuitions are expressions of our beliefs about what we mean.50 This interpretation of semantic
intuitions supports eliminativism. After all, we do not assign epistemic warrant to a class of beliefs
willy-nilly, and semantic intuitions are just a belief like any other. Absent a positive reason why this
class of belief ought to come with special epistemic warrant, we ought to treat it like all the others.
And this implies that semantic intuitions come with no epistemic warrant of their own.
If semantic intuitions are just beliefs about what we mean, and eliminativism is correct, this
does a lot to defang “changing the subject” objections. When I claim that a theory is “changing the
subject,” I am simply claiming that my belief about the meaning of my concepts or language is
incompatible with the meaning that the theory ascribes to that concept or language. But this is neither
surprising, nor much of an objection. Without a reason to privilege my belief about meaning over the
one implicit in the reductionist theory under consideration, the fact that these meanings are
incompatible no longer threatens the theory at all.
If eliminativism is true, this does not imply that “changing the subject” objections have no
epistemic warrant. Rather, it implies that no epistemic warrant comes from the fact that a person’s
belief about what they mean by a term like ‘good’ is incompatible with a theory’s implicit meaning for

50 Here I will simply flag a potential choice-point in the argument: if you deny that semantic intuitions are beliefs about
the meaning of our words, we may not have a positive reason to prefer eliminativism. But then one must provide some
alternative account of the nature of semantic intuitions that does not have an implication that supports eliminativism.
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‘good.’ But it is important to be clear that even though they do not come with their own epistemic
warrant, “changing the subject” objections do often have epistemic warrant; it simply does not derive
from anything semantic about them. Instead, when an objection like this has epistemic warrant, it
derives from the fact that our belief about what we mean by a term is supported by a well-confirmed
theory about the facts that the term refers to.
Let’s return to the well-justified “changing the subject” objection to a theory which implies
that ‘world peace’ means ‘a ham sandwich.’ On a maximalist interpretation, this objection would
derive its epistemic warrant from the semantic fact that the meaning of my term ‘world peace’ is not
equivalent to the meaning of my term ‘a ham sandwich,’ and this fact would be sufficient to reject the
theory. The minimalist interpretation differs only insofar as this semantic fact is not taken to be
sufficient reason to reject the theory, but only prima facie reason. Neither of these interpretations,
however, can provide a good reason for where this epistemic warrant comes from.

On the

eliminativist interpretation, by contrast, the objection derives its epistemic warrant solely from the
putative fact that my belief about what I mean by ‘world peace’ and ‘a ham sandwich’ is embedded in a
mostly true, well-justified, referring theory about the world, its entities, and its properties. This theory
implies that world peace and a ham sandwich (the entities, not the concepts or terms) have different
properties, and there are no candidate revisions to the theory which would cancel these implications
without simultaneously upending the theory in its entirety. Thus, we ought to believe that the term
‘world peace’ is not equivalent to ‘a ham sandwich’ because we know that these entities and their
properties are different, and again, we have no alternative theory which implies their identity. In this
way, eliminativism better explains the epistemic warrant of apparently successful “changing the
subject” objections than does maximalism or minimalism.
In general, if eliminativism is true, this means that when we are faced with an objection which
claims that some reduction has “changed the subject,” our best bet will be to examine the theories in
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which the objection and the reductionist theory are respectively embedded. If a theory implies that a
given reduction would be changing the subject and that theory has excellent global epistemic features,
this will give us (defeasible) reason to reject the reduction. If that theory is true, explanatory, fruitful,
predictive, unifying, etc., this gives us reason to trust its implications about meaning.
So where does that leave us when it comes to whether any given reduction of the ethical to the
natural is objectionably “changing the subject”? The ethical reductionist says that moral facts are
identical to a subset of descriptive facts. The non-naturalist responds by claiming that the offered
reduction has simply changed the subject. The ethical reductionist’s next move in the dialectic should
be clear. She should say that such objections are just expressions of various semantic intuitions –
intuitions which are plausibly constituted by the non-naturalist’s beliefs about her own meaning.
These beliefs will have no more claim to authority than the theory in which they are embedded. This
is not to say that such a non-naturalist theory couldn’t win on general theoretical grounds. But she
must do a lot more than simply claim that she believes she is using the concepts in a way that makes
them irreducible; she has to justify that belief by developing an ethical theory which can beat out the
alternatives. In other words, it is high time metaethicists come to realize that the Quine-Duhem thesis
applies to their work, too. To paraphrase Quine (1951), claims about the content of moral concepts
face the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body. Insisting on intuitive definitions, talking past
one another, and “changing the subject,” will continue until we come to appreciate this fact.
CHAPTER III CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have argued that we have good reason to expect that, whatever they are,
moral facts will be identical to some subset of descriptive facts. The reduction procedure I discussed
gives us a way to show how we can derive an “is” from an “ought,” and once we understand the
theoretical role of the reduction procedure, it can avoid the charge that it is either too restrictive or too
permissive. Moreover, the major conceptual objections to ethical reductionism, which claim that
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moral concepts or facts are in some sense irreducible, put the cart before the horse. We cannot
determine whether a theory “changes the subject” except in a holistic way. It may yet be that a nonreductionist theory of moral facts can win the day. But we have good inductive reasons to be
suspicious of these theories, both because these theories cannot be thinly reduced, and because we
have no good reason to believe that moral concepts or facts are so special that they cannot be
accommodated by a scientific worldview. In the chapters that follow, I will argue that once this simple
metaphysics for moral facts is available, many of the doubts about the objectivity and universality of
morality can be overcome.
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CHAPTER IV
ETHICAL REDUCTIONISM AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF MORALITY
Many philosophers have thought that moral facts do not exist, or that they do not exist mindindependently. Error theorists (e.g. Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977/1990) hold that moral facts do not
exist. Non-cognitivists (e.g. Ayer, 1946/2012; Stevenson, 1937) hold that moral judgments are not in
the business of making claims about the world in the first place. Constructivists (e.g. Korsgaard &
O’Neill, 1996; Street, 2012) hold that moral facts exist, but that these facts are in some way dependent
on the attitudes of agents. All these views should be classed as anti-realist, in the sense that they deny
one or another of the two constituent claims of moral realism. This chapter will appeal to ethical
reductionism as a way of responding to these objections. I take on anti-realist objections from
supervenience (in §4.1), explanation (in §4.2), and evolutionary history (in §4.3). As I will argue, these
major objections to moral realism are ultimately motivated by unfounded suspicions about ethical
reductionism.
§4.1 SUPERVENIENCE
The first major objection to moral realism begins with the striking fact that most philosophers
accept that the moral supervenes on the descriptive, no matter what their considered metaethical
positions. Such supervenience means that there can be no change in moral facts without some
corresponding change in descriptive facts. A primary question when it comes to moral metaphysics,
then, is how to explain this putative supervenience. This point was raised cogently by J. L. Mackie in a
variant of his famous “queerness argument”:
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty –
say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment,
a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The
wrongness must somehow be 'consequential' or 'supervenient'; it is wrong because it is a piece
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of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? (Mackie,
1977/1990, p. 41)51
Non-naturalists deny that moral facts are identical with any natural fact but accept the supervenience
of the moral on the natural.

This means they face an apparently insurmountable explanatory

challenge. It is simply unclear how one can account for the surprising dependence of the moral on the
descriptive if no identity relations obtain between them.
Non-naturalists have of course proposed ways of disputing the argument, and I do not intend
to get into it here. What is important, though, is that ethical reductionism gives us an obvious
explanation. What relation is signified when we say that an action is wrong because it is a piece of
deliberate cruelty? Why, identity! We might say, for instance, that the descriptive fact that the action is
an instance of deliberate cruelty is identical to the moral fact that the action is wrong.5253 The nice
thing about such a theory is that it dispenses with hand-wringing about the relation between moral and
descriptive facts and instead gives us a non-mysterious relation that we have good reason to believe
obtains in every other respectable area of science. Moral facts are just identical to a subset of
descriptive facts. True identity statements are as unmysterious as it gets.
§4.2 EXPLANATION
The next important criticism of moral realism holds that whether or not moral facts exist, they
cannot play a role in explanations of our experience. The classic statement of this argument comes
from Harman (1977), who claims that, whereas we must postulate certain physical facts to explain our
experience, we need not postulate any moral facts at all. In the case of a physicist observing a
disturbance in a cloud chamber, a successful explanation of the experience hinges on a physicist’s

See also Horgan & Timmons (1992b) and Blackburn (1993) for similar arguments to this effect.
Or perhaps more commonly, between a moral fact and a conjunction or disjunction of descriptive facts.
53 The example is imperfect, as something being an instance of “deliberate cruelty” might already be moral, insofar as
“cruelty” is possibly a “thick” normative concept. I ignore that complication here, presuming that some line can be
drawn, at least prima facie, between normative and descriptive language.
51
52
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judgment (“there goes a proton!”) being correct. But in the case of a moral theorist observing a cat
being set on fire, the successful explanation of the experience does not seem to hinge on the moral
theorist’s judgment (“that’s morally wrong”) being correct at all. In the moral case it seems that we
can successfully explain the experience simply by talking about her judgment, whether or not we think
that judgment is true (1977, pp. 6–7, see also 1986).
It seems to me that Harman’s objection relies on the idea that moral facts, whatever they are,
cannot be identical to descriptive facts. To see why, it is necessary to take a detour into what moral
theorizing would look like if ethical reductionism is true. One implication of such metaphysics is that
moral theories, like scientific theories, must play the same role that other scientific theories play in
explaining the world around us. In both cases our theories provide identity statements between sets of
facts which help to explain the myriad facts we observe. Suppose we come upon a sample of salt.
The facts we observe (that the salt is white, that the salt has a crystalline structure, etc.) are all
explained in virtue of a chemical theory that tells us what salt is: sodium chloride. Our chemical theory
identifies facts about salt with facts about sodium chloride, and thereby explains those facts. It is in
virtue of this reduction that our theory provides an explanation at all. After all, if there were facts
about salt that were not identical to facts about sodium chloride, our chemical theory would leave those
facts unexplained.54 Similarly, I claim, our first-order moral theories should be seen as identifying the
moral facts we observe with descriptive facts, thereby explaining those moral facts.
So suppose we see a group of rapscallions setting a cat on fire. We think we’ve observed a
putative moral fact: it’s wrong to set the cat on fire. Our first-order moral theory (say, utilitarianism)
identifies facts about wrongness with a proper subset of descriptive facts. In the case of utilitarianism,

Indeed, our chemical theory does not explain all the facts about salt. After all, salt tastes salty. That fact is not
identical to any single fact about sodium chloride. It is rather identical to the conjunction of that fact and many other
facts, including facts about a given person’s taste receptors, the systems representing the output of those taste receptors,
etc. This is perhaps an illustration of how complex and interlocking our theories must be, but doesn’t seem to
undermine the claim that finding such identities is necessary for explanation.
54
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facts including the property wrongness are identical to those descriptive facts which involve failing to
minimize the pain of sentient beings. So the fact that the cat being set on fire fails to minimize the
pain of sentient beings is identical to the fact that it is wrong. Note that when I say identical, I mean
identical. So, contra Harman, when we explain why someone judged that setting the cat on fire is wrong,
in what sense can we dispense with the moral fact? In what sense could we dispense with the truth of
the moral judgment? Denying that setting the cat on fire is wrong is the same as denying that the cat
was set on fire and that this act failed to minimize the pain of sentient beings.55
It could be that Harman means to deny, not that the moral fact is explanatory, but that the
moral theory which posits those facts is explanatory. If ethical reductionism is true, this means that for
a moral theory to fail to be explanatory, the identity statement it provides must not be explanatory.
One could try and justify this move in two ways. First, one could be skeptical that our moral theory is
correct in identifying wrongness with its reduction base. If we are skeptical of preference utilitarianism
for instance, we might deny that the moral fact (wrongness) really is identical to the descriptive
reduction base present in the case. If we have good reason to believe them, such skeptical worries
would indeed render the putative moral fact non-explanatory. Such skeptical concerns can’t be ruled
out offhandedly; whether preference utilitarianism is the correct moral theory is very much a subject of
debate. But note that this doesn’t constitute a reason to be skeptical of moral facts in general. It is
rather a reason to be skeptical that the moral fact (wrongness) obtains in this case in the first place.
The second way we might deny that the identity of a moral fact and its descriptive reduction
base is explanatory is if we thought that, by identifying the moral fact with a descriptive reduction base,
we have lost what made the moral fact moral. But this is just another instance of the “changing the
These facts are themselves reducible in turn, of course, but our moral theory only provides the first step in this
reduction. Note that I am here committed to reductionism being a necessary condition for explanation. It is not,
however, a sufficient condition. There may be other theoretical relations which bear on whether an identification counts
as an explanation, or which bear on whether a given identification is a good (or bad) explanation. Nevertheless, there
are interesting parallels between this view and both the deductive-nomological and unificationist theories of explanation.
See Hempel & Oppenheim (1948) for the former and Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989) for the latter.
55
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subject” objection. As I argued in §3.6, such claims have no special epistemic status, and so cannot be
used to settle the issue.
As I have argued, adopting ethical reductionism preempts the major moves available to
someone who wants to deny the explanatory role of moral facts or moral theories. Obviously much
more needs to be said about moral explanation and how it relates to scientific explanation. This is not,
however, the last objection to the objectivity of moral facts.

Let’s turn, then, to evolutionary

skepticism.
§4.3 EVOLUTIONARY SKEPTICISM
Suppose that the creationists are wrong. We are nothing but (mostly) hairless apes ambling
about on a tiny planet, circling an ordinary sun in a nondescript corner of the universe. We humans
are the product of eons of evolutionary history, unguided and aimless. Now suppose that one of us
human animals claims that she knows about some moral fact: it’s right to take care of your children.
Not only is it right, she says, but it’d even be right if we all thought it wasn’t! Given our evolutionary
history, shouldn’t we be a bit skeptical that her claim is as objective as she thinks it is? After all, having
such an attitude would be pretty convenient for us humans, as it would give the offspring of those
who believed it quite an adaptive advantage over their rivals. Prevailing opinion holds that our
contingent evolutionary history suggests moral anti-realism, but I will argue that such an inference is
misguided. That we have such a history should not in itself produce any additional skepticism about
the existence or mind-independence of moral facts.

As I will argue in this section, if ethical

reductionism is true, the fact that our evolutionary history has an influence on our moral judgments
shouldn’t in itself make us any more skeptical of moral realism.
In what follows I will focus exclusively on the most rigorous explication of the evolutionary
suspicion: Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006). Street’s argument proceeds in the following
way. Given that something like evolutionary biology (and Darwinian natural selection) is true, moral
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realists of all stripes must provide an account of the relation between evolutionary pressures that
shaped our evaluative attitudes and the independent moral truths that realism hypothesizes. Street
argues that realists have two options. They can either (1) claim that moral truths are not at all related
to the evolutionary pressures on our evaluative attitudes, in which case moral realism would be
committed to an implausible skepticism about commonsense ethical claims, or (2) claim that
evolutionary pressures on our evaluative attitudes do have some relation to moral truths, in which case
moral realism would be committed to an unscientific explanation of the relation (Street, 2006, p. 109).
It seems to me that moral realists can take the second horn of the dilemma. Before we get to
that, though, let me explain why Street thinks this horn of the dilemma leads the realist to posit an
unscientific explanation of the relation between the evolutionary pressures on our evaluative attitudes
and moral truths. Street holds that a realist that accepts this horn might hold that evolutionary
pressures caused our evaluative attitudes to “track” moral truth. We have the moral judgments we
have because those judgments are true, and the truth of those judgments was fitness-inducing (2006, p.
126). Though this account of the relation might seem promising, Street points out that realists which
take this position would be committed to such a claim being a scientific explanation. But there are
better scientific explanations on offer:
According to what I will call the adaptive link account, tendencies to make certain kinds of
evaluative judgements rather than others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success
not because they constituted perceptions of independent evaluative truths, but rather because
they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses to those
circumstances, getting them to act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be
reproductively advantageous (p. 128).
Given these two competing hypotheses, Street claims that the adaptive link account should win out.
This account is a better explanation because it does not posit independent evaluative truths at all (p.
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129). Rather, it explains the presence of our evaluative attitudes by linking the presence of those
attitudes directly to the circumstances that enhanced our ancestors’ reproductive advantages.
I do not think that a realist should accept the tracking account as stated. After all, it is not
clear that the realist should accept the assertion that finding moral truth consistently gave our
ancestors adaptive advantage. It seems rather more likely that adaptive advantage accrued both to the
villains and the heroes of evolutionary history. Luckily, the realist can go further than simply rebutting
Street’s argument from parsimony. In fact, the realist can accept the adaptive link account! Take a
look at the main claim of the adaptive link account again:
Adaptive link account: tendencies to make certain kinds of evaluative judgements rather than
others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success … because [these evaluative
judgments] forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses to
those circumstances, getting them to act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be
reproductively advantageous (Street, 2006, p. 127).56
The explanandum here is our tendency to make certain evaluative judgments which contributed to
reproductive advantage. The explanans is the adaptive links that our judgments forged between our
circumstances and their responses, and reproductive advantage. Now, suppose we thought that the
moral facts the realist posits include (that is, some of these facts are identical to disjunctions which
include) some set of our ancestor’s circumstances and their responses to those circumstances.
Circumstances like starvation or plentitude might be instances of badness and goodness, and our
responses to those circumstances—say, sharing or hoarding—might well be instances of rightness and
wrongness. If this were the case, then our ancestors’ evaluative attitudes would be forging adaptive
links between the goodness (and badness) that our ancestors encountered and their right (and wrong)
responses to those instances of goodness (or badness). Those adaptive links caused our ancestors to
The ellipsis here removes the explicit claim that the tracking account is false. What matters, though, is whether the
realist can accept the positive claim of the adaptive link account.
56
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“act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be reproductively advantageous” given their
circumstances (Street, 2006). It just so happens, the realist can say, that those circumstances were
themselves instances of goodness or badness!
If the realist can accept the adaptive link account, this will help realism avoid what is perhaps
Street’s most devastating objection: that the adaptive link account, unlike the tracking account, explains
the connection between evolutionary pressures and our false evaluative attitudes. She points to cases in
which we judge that the fact that a person is a member of an out-group is a reason to afford that
person lesser treatment than those of our in-group (2006, p. 133). Most of us believe that these
judgments are false, but these judgments nevertheless obviously contributed to the reproductive
advantage of our ancestors. Can the realist admit that that some evaluative judgments we view as false
contributed to our evolutionary advantage?
To this, I say: of course! A moral realist is not required to hold that all our true evaluative
attitudes contribute to reproductive advantage, and that all our false evaluative attitudes detract from
reproductive advantage. If this were the case, we would be saddling the realist with the implausible
claim that acting rightly always or even usually contributes to fitness. But there is an abundance of
obvious cases where goodness does not contribute to fitness, and where evil does contribute to fitness.
Ceteris paribus, a doctor who volunteers his time and risks his life to treat Ebola in Africa is certainly
risking decrease in his reproductive advantage. And ceteris paribus, a nationalistic citizen who volunteers
for an unjust war of aggression may be contributing to her group’s reproductive advantage by doing
so. Yet the presence or absence of adaptive advantage should not lead us to conclude that the first is
doing something wrong, or that the second is doing something right. The fact that crime does
sometimes pay is not an indictment of the fact that crime is (usually) wrong. It could be that our
ancestors wrongly came to value certain kinds of evil and that this “contributed to our ancestors’
reproductive success because [such valuing] forged adaptive links between our ancestors’
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circumstances and their responses to those circumstances” (Street, 2006, p. 127). But that wouldn’t
have any bearing on whether these behaviors really were instances of mind-independent evil.
The general problem posed by the Darwinian Dilemma involves explaining how we can know
that our moral judgments are correlated with mind-independent moral truths.

Suppose ethical

reductionist realists embrace the adaptive link account, as I’ve suggested we should. Remember that
that account does not say anything at all about the mind-independent moral truths that the realist
posits. So if we embrace ethical reductionism, we still owe Street an explanation of the relation
between those moral truths and the evolutionary pressures on our evaluative attitudes. After all, if
there were no relation, we’d be stuck on the first horn of the dilemma, not the second. Moreover,
whatever our account of the relation, it needs to be one that doesn’t itself introduce new skepticism to
normative ethics.
Street considers an objection along our lines in her original paper. There, she proposes that a
“value naturalist” (ethical reductionist) might say that moral facts are identical to some natural facts,
and that we might have the ability to track them in much the same way that we track natural facts
about “fires, predators, cliffs, and so on” (2006, p. 136).57 Her problem with a proposal like this is that
it simply puts off the problem. As she points out, value naturalists do not propose new ways of
knowing about moral facts. Instead, most proposals like this simply embrace the way we are already
proceeding in ethics: reflective equilibrium. But Street argues that this ignores the fact that the
judgments we rely on in reflective equilibrium are thoroughly permeated by evolutionary influence.
Once we acknowledge this fact, we end up back where we started:
What then is the relation between that influence and the independent truths I’m seeking to
Street also distinguishes between versions of “realism” that wouldn’t count as realism on her account, such as Railton
(1986). These versions of realism wouldn’t count because they imply that moral facts rely for their existence on our
actual evaluative attitudes. The kind of realism she is interested in is stronger than this: “[i]n order to count as genuinely
realist, then, a version of value naturalism must take the view that which natural facts evaluative facts are identical with is
independent of our evaluative attitudes” (Street, 2006, p. 137, emphasis original). To be clear, the version of ethical
reductionist realism I am proposing is of this stronger kind.
57
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uncover – these independent truths about natural-normative identities? … it is even more
obscure how tracking something as esoteric as independent facts about natural-normative
identities could ever have promoted reproductive success in the environment of our ancestors.
The adaptive link account again wins out [as the best explanation] (Street, 2006, pp. 140–
141).58
As I’ve said nothing about epistemology yet, it’s important to acknowledge the force of this objection.
The realist must provide an account of the relation that doesn’t simply push the problem back.
I think there is a ready-made account of the relation on hand. Here it is important to
emphasize, as I did in the last section, that having some true (or false) evaluative attitudes does
improve our reproductive advantage, and that having other true (or false) evaluative attitudes reduces
our reproductive advantage. If ethical reductionism is true, there is always a relation between moral
truths (and falsehoods) and reproductive advantage. An obvious account of the relation, then, is the
following:
The either-or account: either the tendencies to make certain kinds of true evaluative judgments (φ)
contributed to reproductive success because they were true, or the tendencies to make other
certain kinds of false evaluative judgments (ψ) contributed to reproductive success because
they were false.
This account specifies that the class of true moral judgments (φ) gave our ancestors
evolutionary advantage because they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances
(instances of goodness or badness) and their reactions (right actions). The class of false moral
judgments (ψ) gave our ancestors evolutionary advantage because they forged adaptive links between
our ancestors’ circumstances (instances of goodness or badness) and their reactions (wrong actions).
The truths of φ and the falsehoods of ψ are related to evolutionary advantage because they are made
I won’t pursue this line here, but it is important to note that our ancestors may have been tracking independent moral
truths without tracking natural-normative identities about those truths.
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true (or false) by the moral facts, which just are the natural facts that Street’s adaptive link account
specifies. What this means is that whenever the adaptive link account provides an explanation of our
tendency to make certain evolutionarily advantageous judgments in terms of the adaptive benefits of
making those judgments, the either-or account gives us a parallel and compatible explanation which
also invokes moral truths (and falsities).59
Note that the relation posited by the either-or account does not rely on our ancestors
consciously tracking independent evaluative truths, or doing so in a justifiable way. For even the
judgments in (φ), which contributed to evolutionary advantage because of their truth, need not have
done so because our ancestors cognized them as morally relevant at all. They may have even thought
of the judgments in (φ) in purely self-interested terms. Our ancestors may have judged that it was right
to take care of their children because they recognized that without their children they would not have
enough workers to harvest their crops, not because they thought it was the right thing to do.
Nevertheless, it is the truth of the judgment that it’s right to take care of one’s children that gave our
ancestors adaptive advantage. When our ancestors judged that taking care of their children was right,
that judgment is true just in case the action of taking care of their children implicates the natural
property that happens to be identical to rightness. In this way, the either-or account decouples the
truth of our ancestors judgments from the justification our ancestors may have given for those
judgments. In every case where our ancestors got adaptive advantage from making the judgment they
did, the truth or falsity of the judgment explains why our ancestors got that advantage, and it does not
matter whether our ancestors consciously tried to justify themselves or not.
Of course, even if there is always a relation on hand, we might worry that this hasn’t rescued
One might be tempted to introduce a parsimony objection at this point: why invoke moral truths at all, if you get just
as good an explanation without them? Here it is important to keep in mind the distinction between moral truth and
moral facts. If ethical reductionism is correct, moral truth introduces no new ontology. And with no new ontology, it’s
not clear that the parsimony objection has any bite. After all, the number of truths licensed by a theory seems generally
irrelevant to parsimony: one can always generate an endless list of truths for any theory by simply reiterating the theory’s
statements in semantically or syntactically permuted language.
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104

us from evolution-induced skepticism about normative ethics. If evolutionary influences permeate our
judgments, doesn’t this mean that reflective equilibrium won’t be a good method for determining
whether a tendency to make a moral judgment is in φ or ψ? If we can’t tell the difference between
these classes in any systematic way, this seems like it would imply skepticism.
First, let’s remind ourselves of the thesis of this section. All I am claiming is that evolutionary
influences on our moral judgments do not introduce any additional skepticism about the existence or
mind-independence of moral facts. Street’s argument against ethical reductionism relies heavily on the
idea that if there is a relation between independent moral truths and evolutionary influences on our
attitudes it must be some type of unscientific tracking relation. But once we have the either-or account
of the relation, it is not the relation that needs addressing, but the epistemic implications of
evolutionary influences. So we have to consider whether the influence of evolution on our attitudes
should lead us to think that there is something especially epistemically suspect about moral judgments.
To that end, let’s consider when (in general) we think evolutionary influence on a class of judgments
gives us some reason to infer skepticism or anti-realism about the judgments’ domain.
It is striking that such a move is almost never made outside the context of morality. Even
when we know that a judgment is false or unjustified, we do not take evolutionary influences to imply
that we cannot know facts about that judgment’s domain, or that the domain is not mind-independent.
Take cases of evolutionary mismatch, where our tendency to make a false judgment results from a
mismatch between the environment in which the tendency evolved and our current environment. We
plausibly have adaptive tendencies to make false judgments when it comes to diet (Armelagos, 2014;
Lucock, Martin, Yates, & Veysey, 2013), exercise (Saniotis & Henneberg, 2013), gambling (Spinella,
2003), risk assessment (Robson & Samuelson, 2011), and addiction (Durrant, Adamson, Todd, &
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Sellman, 2009), just to name a few examples.60
Take a case like diet, where we plausibly have a tendency to make false judgments about the
proper level of calorie, sugar or carbohydrate consumption. Suppose we have good evidence that our
tendency to make such false judgments is the result of adaptive pressures on our ancestors. These
pressures led our ancestors to judge as more desirable calorie-dense, sugary foods. What do we take
such pressures to imply about these judgments? If we didn’t already know that these judgments were
false and unjustified, we might take evolutionary influences to generate doubt about their truth.
Perhaps at most, such pressures might also cause us to doubt the folk theory in which those judgments
are embedded. (No granny, I really shouldn’t have a fourth helping of mashed potatoes, even if I am a
growing boy). Even this very charitable reading of epistemic import of evolutionary influence on our
judgments doesn’t go all the way to skepticism or anti-realism. Doubting the truth of a set of
judgments is simply not the same thing as being a general skeptic or an anti-realist about the
judgments’ domain of facts. It would be preposterous to infer that we can’t know what a healthy diet
is, or that there is no healthy diet, from knowledge that diet-judgments are the product of evolutionary
pressures. Without some further reason for being skeptical of the existence or mind-independence of
moral facts, I think we have good reason to reject the idea that the mere fact of evolutionary influences
on our moral judgments implies skepticism or anti-realism.
Of course, Street often phrases her appeal to skepticism by reference to the sheer
pervasiveness of evolutionary influences on our moral judgments:
[W]e are left with the implausible skeptical conclusion that our evaluative judgements are in all
likelihood mostly off track, for our system of evaluative judgements is revealed to be utterly
saturated and contaminated with illegitimate influence (Street, 2006, p. 122).
Here it’s important to see that this claim relies entirely on the premise that there is no relation between
Of course, evolutionary mismatch in these cases is not limited to judgments; just about any mental state could be
mismatched, and these cases plausibly involve the mismatch of preferences, emotions, or moods as well as judgments.
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evolutionary influence on our ancestors’ attitudes on the one hand, and mind-independent moral
truths on the other. For as long as we have an either-or account of the relation, it’s hard to see how
moral judgments look especially epistemically problematic, even considering pervasive evolutionary
influence on a class of judgments.

Suppose we acknowledge that there has been pervasive

evolutionary pressure on our ancestors’ moral judgments. All this would do is place moral judgments
in the same category as physical judgments. After all, there was immense evolutionary pressure on our
ancestors to make the physical judgments they made (that objects fall when dropped, that water could
not be walked on, etc.). Creatures that failed to make these judgments would have had an immense
adaptive disadvantage. If we were to infer anti-realism or skepticism when evolutionary influences are
pervasive, we’d have to be skeptics or anti-realists about physical facts too.
It seems to me, then, that the force of the Darwinian Dilemma depends entirely on its demand
for a relation between independent moral truths and the adaptive influences on our ancestors’
judgments. Indeed, it is telling that Street’s argument proceeds by first showing that no good realist
account of the relation is available, and then arguing that antirealism allows us a better account of the
relation (Street, 2006, pp. 152–154). This lets her to avoid making sweeping pronouncements about
the epistemic import of evolutionary influences, and allows her to frame her argument as merely
providing a better alternative to the various (terrible) realist proposals. But once we have sidestepped
the need for any deep relation beyond the either-or account, we are left wondering what about
evolutionary influences themselves could possibly lead to skepticism or anti-realism. I think this
indicates that the source of evolutionary suspicions does not result from evolutionary pressures in the
first place.
If something else seems to be driving evolutionary suspicions about moral realism, what is it?
My guess is that worries like Street’s are the result of an antecedent skepticism about the possibility of
a successful ethical reduction. Take the following:
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Exactly what natural fact or facts does the evaluative fact that one should care for one’s
offspring reduce to, or irreducibly supervene upon … ? It seems unattractive to get into such
complexities when one can just say … that ancestors who judged that they should care for
their offspring met with greater reproductive success simply because they tended to care for
their offspring and so left more of them (Street, 2006, p. 131).
My point has been that even a realist can say that “ancestors who judged that they should care for their
offspring met with greater reproductive success simply because they tended to care for their offspring
and so left more of them” (2006, p. 131). That explanation is consistent with realism, provided that
caring for one’s offspring is a mind-independent instance of right action. We might doubt that caring
for one’s offspring really is a mind-independent instance of right action. That is, we might doubt any
reduction that identifies some feature of caring for one’s offspring with the property of rightness.
There may be good reasons for such doubt, but evolutionary pressure is not among them. It is rather
the other way around: evolutionary pressure only looks like a reason for skepticism if we doubt that a
reduction is possible in the first place.
Suppose for instance that we came to doubt that there really is any good reduction of facts
about belief (as a psychological kind) to functional or physical facts about the brain and the
environment. It would nevertheless be true that there are pervasive evolutionary influences leading us
to act as if beliefs are a perfectly objective psychological kind. For whatever reason, our ancestors got
immense advantage from acting this way. Now, we can ask: on the assumption that there is no
reduction to be had, don’t those evolutionary influences look like they are purely distorting? Rather
than lead us to the truth, those influences lead us to think there is such an objective thing as a belief.
Next, suppose I insisted that there really is an objective psychological kind called belief, but that
there is no relation between the evolutionary influences on our belief-judgments and the mindindependent truths about what beliefs are. That indeed looks like it would result in pretty radical
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skepticism about beliefs. To paraphrase Street, our system of belief-judgements would be revealed to
be utterly saturated and contaminated with illegitimate influence (2006, p. 122). Alternatively, suppose
I said that tracking the objective psychological kind, belief, is what gave our ancestors adaptive
advantage. In such a case, you might accuse me of positing an unscientific relation between the
evolutionary influences on our ancestors’ belief-judgments and independent truths about the
psychological kind, belief. After all, a better account is available that makes no reference to those
independent truths. Whether or not there really are beliefs as a psychological kind (and truths about
them), the evolutionary influences on our ancestors belief-judgments produced adaptive advantage
simply by getting them to respond to their circumstances in ways that proved to be reproductively
advantageous. And there you have it, a Darwinian Dilemma about belief.
What I’m getting at is that all of this sounds completely fine as long as we are proceeding on
the assumption that there really is no objective reduction of belief (as a psychological kind) to
something non-psychological. But as soon as we come to think that there is such a reduction, the
dilemma evaporates. For if such a reduction were possible, the pervasive influence of evolution on
our ancestors’ belief-judgments would be epistemically irrelevant. We could propose an either-or
account for the relation between belief-judgments and mind-independent truths about beliefs as a
psychological kind:
The (belief-judgment) either-or account: either the tendencies to make certain kinds of true beliefjudgments (α) contributed to reproductive success because they were true, or the tendencies to
make other certain kinds of false belief-judgments (β) contributed to reproductive success
because they were false.
We could then separate (α) from (β) by trying to determine the correct reduction. If a reducing theory
implies that beliefs are identical to functional state F, then whether a particular belief-judgment falls
under (α) or (β) will be a matter of whether or not that belief-judgment implicates functional state F.
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This is not to say that we are totally out of the woods, epistemologically-speaking. In order to
preempt the Darwinian Dilemma, both in the case of evaluative judgments and belief-judgments, a
proposed reduction is necessary. Indeed, if we discovered a reduction was impossible, the dilemma
looks inescapable, pending some other neat solutions.61

Nevertheless, since even pervasive

evolutionary influences on our judgments do not imply skepticism or anti-realism unless no reduction
is to be had, moral realists who turn to ethical reductionism need not be too worried. If they propose
a reduction, they will have a way of separating (φ) from (ψ). They will not be threatened by normative
skepticism any more than one would be so-threatened if one were trying to distinguish between
reproductively advantageous belief-judgments that were true and reproductively advantageous beliefjudgments that were false.
One last remark on this topic. I began this digression by pointing out that Street thinks that
ethical reductionism simply pushes the problem back. Reflective equilibrium, she claims, looks like a
questionable method if all of its judgments are thoroughly infected with evolutionary influence. As
I’ve argued, those evolutionary influences only look epistemically relevant if no reduction of the
subject matter is possible. But one might think that there’s an important difference between beliefs,
on the one hand, and moral facts on the other.

After all, unlike beliefs, where we can run

psychological experiments, we cannot independently check moral judgments against the world. Moral
facts don’t appear to be explanatory or predictive in the same way that beliefs are (see e.g. Harman,
1986).
It’s my view that this objection also follows from skepticism about ethical reductionism. After
all, if moral facts are identical to a subset of descriptive facts, moral judgments are just as capable of
being explanatory and predictive as any other judgment. They will only implicate perfectly natural and

61 Some of those other neat solutions include, inter alia, third-factor accounts (Artiga, 2015; Berker, 2014; K. Brosnan,
2011; Copp, 2008; Enoch, 2011; Graber, 2012; Huemer, 2005), and overgeneralization responses (FitzPatrick, 2014;
Kahane, 2011; Millhouse, Bush, & Moss, 2016; Shafer-Landau, 2012; Vavova, 2014; White, 2010).
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causal entities and properties, just like judgments about beliefs.62 Of course, even if I am wrong about
this (and I won’t argue for it here), my thesis would still be established. Evolutionary suspicions would
ultimately stem from doubts about the possibility of moral explanation, not evolutionary influences on
our moral judgments.
To sum up, Street takes it to be the case that our evaluative judgments fall in one camp or
another: they were either distorted by evolutionary influences, or they tended to track moral truth. But
her skepticism about the possibility of a successful ethical reduction leads her to overlook another
possibility: both the truth and the falsity of our evaluative judgments play a role in the explanation of
why we have the judgments we have. This introduces no additional skepticism into normative ethics
because as long as a reduction is possible, we will be able to propose working methods of determining
whether a judgment falls into either category. Those methods are not themselves epistemically
threatened by evolutionary influence on our judgments unless a reduction is not possible in the first
place.
Now let’s return to where this section began: our tiny, parochial planet. We started out with
the understandable suspicion that things couldn’t be really, objectively wrong, given that we are mere
human animals with a contingent evolutionary history. If I am right, such contingency is beside the
point. Even if our moral judgments are a contingent result of our evolutionary history, this need not
have any bearing on whether there really is right or wrong, or whether right and wrong are merely in
the eye of the beholder. As we’ve seen, if we put a little faith in ethical reductionism, the Darwinian
Dilemma poses no threat to moral realism. It is indeed oh-so-likely that we would have the moral
judgments we have. But that doesn’t mean they’re subjective. Or objective. Or false. Or true.
CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION
As I have argued in this chapter, once we embrace ethical reductionism, and show that
62

A good explication of this point can be found in Sinhababu (2018).
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morality need not presuppose any special features, we have no special reason to doubt its objectivity.
Problems that plague other, less stringent versions of moral metaphysics, simply don’t arise when one
considers moral facts to simply be a subset of descriptive facts. Ethical properties supervene on
descriptive properties because they are identical to those properties. No mystery there. Moreover,
ethical properties can play an explanatory role in our experience because, again, they are identical to a
set of descriptive properties, and thus inherit the explanatory role of the properties to which they are
identical. Finally, the fact that we have the moral judgments we have because of the process of
evolution does not threaten the objectivity of morality, because once we understand moral properties
in this reductionist way, it is much easier to understand the relation between those evolutionary forces
on our moral judgments and the mind-independent moral facts that they track. The result, after the
last two chapters, is that we have good reason to expect that some form of ethical reductionism will be
true, and that moreover, that form of ethical reductionism will be objective. Moral facts exist, they are
mind-independent, and they are descriptive facts.
As we will see, however, showing that we have good reason to expect moral facts to have
these properties does not immediately imply that we are all tracking the same moral facts. Even if moral
facts exist, are mind-independent, and perfectly natural, one might still be able to motivate an
argument for a type of anti-realism by showing that radical moral disagreement cannot be resolved.
Given the threat of moral disagreement, we might be pushed directly into some form of relativism. In
the next chapter I will consider this issue, and argue that we have good reason to believe that moral
facts are not only objective and natural, but that some of them are universal as well.
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CHAPTER V
THE LIMITS AND STRUCTURE OF UNIVERSAL MORALITY
As I have argued in previous chapters, there is a promising interpretation of ethics that renders
the subject both natural and objective. Once we understand that the metaphysical pretensions heaped
on morality are unrealistic and unnecessary, many of the reasons for preferring a subjective
understanding of morality can be overcome. Nevertheless, establishing that morality is perfectly
natural and objective does not imply that we are all bound by some of the same moral rules; it does
not imply that morality is universal. In this chapter I will argue that a truly universal morality is
possible. In §5.1 I begin by discussing the dimensions of difference between objectivity in morality
and universality in morality. Then in §5.2 I pose the classic argument from disagreement, which
purports to show that moral disagreement indicates that morality is not objective or universal. In §5.3
I elaborate a traditional response to the argument from disagreement, which involves showing that it
overstates the extent of truly moral disagreement, and argue that most moral disagreements are the
result of disagreements about non-moral facts. This will not eliminate all moral disagreements,
however, as there are some truly fundamental moral disagreements. In §5.4 I argue that foundational
moral content is the product of innately fixed cognitive modules, and that fundamental moral
disagreements are a result of differing cultural emphases on this moral content. This moral content
comes in two broad families: the individualizing foundations, which are conceptually foundational
moral judgments concerning harm and fairness, and the binding foundations, which are conceptually
foundational moral judgments concerning purity, loyalty, and respect for authority. Finally, in §5.5 I
point to empirical evidence that the binding foundations are subject to widespread and irresolvable
moral disagreement, and that, conversely, the individualizing foundations are subject to widespread
moral agreement. These facts give us reason to accept a targeted argument from disagreement. This
new argument from disagreement undermines the metaphysical status of the binding foundations—
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they are best given an anti-realist treatment—while reinforcing the metaphysical status of the
individualizing foundations, which are best given a realist treatment. Moral judgments based on harm
and fairness are universally shared, and aimed at securing objective facts. As such, the range of
legitimate moral debate can be circumscribed by metaethics along broadly liberal, enlightenment lines.
§5.1 THE META-ARGUMENT: UNIVERSALITY AND OBJECTIVITY
First, it is important to be clear about the distinction between the objectivity and universality
of morality. As I’ve mentioned in previous chapters, moral facts are objective insofar as they exist, and
are independent of our attitudes. On the other hand, moral facts are universal insofar as they apply to
all similarly situated moral agents. Strictly speaking, then, one’s conception of morality can be perfectly
objective and at the same time embrace a deep and comprehensive relativism.63 Moreover, one’s
conception of morality could be subjective, and yet also universal.64
In what follows, I will often speak of universality of moral judgment, which we ought to contrast
with the universality of moral facts. Later in this chapter I will argue that certain foundational moral
judgments are shared across all societies. On its own, universality in moral judgment does not imply
universality in facts. However, as I have argued in Chapter III, we have reason to believe that,
whatever moral facts are, they are natural. And as I argued in Chapter IV, anti-realism about moral
facts is only motivated by the assumption that morality cannot be both natural and objective. Finally,
as I also argued in Chapter IV, the reasons for preferring subjectivist, emotivist, prescriptivist, noncognitivist, and expressivist interpretations of moral judgments (as opposed to facts) ultimately derive
from skepticism about objective moral facts. Having dealt with this skepticism, we have reason to
treat moral judgment like any other species of judgment. Moral judgments, like other judgments, are
For instance, Wong (2006) advocates for a “pluralistic relativism” that falls roughly along these lines. On this type of
view, different cultures have different fundamental moral concerns, but these moral concerns are equally objective and
legitimate.
64 Korsgaard (1996) represents a position much like this – moral facts, such as they are, obtain in virtue of a deep need to
maintain one’s identity. But the features of one’s identity that make moral rules normative are shared universally,
meaning that this theory is both subjective and universal.
63
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simply mental states that assert something about the world.
If moral judgments simply assert the existence of natural moral facts, and some of these
judgments are universally shared, then either all ordinary humans are wrong about the existence of
these facts, or some moral facts universally obtain.

In other words, this chapter ought to be

understood in the context of the following meta-argument:
1. Moral facts are natural (argued in Chapter III).
2. Moral judgments are ordinary judgments (argued in Chapter III and IV).
3. Moral facts are objective (argued in Chapter IV).
4. Some moral judgments are universal (argued in the present chapter).
5. By (1), (2), (3), and (4), some moral facts are natural, objective, and universal.
Moreover, if the considerations adduced in Chapter II hold, we have moral reasons to treat our own
moral beliefs as objective and universal. This means that we have a moral reason to think that, if some
moral judgments are universal, moral facts are universal as well.
This chapter will argue that a domain of moral facts is objective and universal, but it will do so
in a way that leaves open a great deal of debate as to the specific contours of the domain. Which
actions are right, and states of affairs are good, are questions that cannot be settled by metaethics
alone, though we can use metaethics to identify the areas where disagreements about these matters
must be resolved, and the areas where we ought to expect disagreements not to matter. As I will
argue, there are large portions of folk morality that are best given an anti-realist treatment, because
disagreements in these areas are not only widespread, they are irresolvable. This is not the case for the
entirety of folk morality, however, and we ought to be optimistic about resolving moral problems in
the portion of morality that is best treated as universal and objective. The realm of legitimate firstorder moral disagreement can be circumscribed to broadly liberal, enlightenment concerns about
reducing harm and treating people fairly. Beyond that, metaethics has little to offer.
115

If a domain of morality is universal and objective, this requires that moral disagreements
within this domain be resolvable in principle.65 Fundamental moral disagreements are those that
would persist even in suitably idealized conditions—conditions wherein a disagreement does not
derive from non-moral belief, self-interest, or other biases.66 After all, if irresolvable disagreements
obtain in some domain of an ostensibly universal and objective morality, this at the very least
constitutes an irresolvable epistemic problem for people trying to act according to that morality. It
may even constitute a reason to doubt the metaphysics of the domain, though this point is less
obvious and would need further argument. In any case, it is imperative that an account like this deal
with fundamental disagreement.
As I will argue, though there is in fact wide disagreement on a variety of moral issues, this
disagreement is mostly the result of disagreements about non-moral facts.67 It is my view that a
naturalistic understanding of morality implies that first-order moral theory is ultimately about
discovering the natural features of our experience that constitute right and wrong, good and bad. It is
obvious, though, that different individuals and cultures have vastly different moral experience: we see
different things as good, right, bad, and wrong. How, then, are we to account for this difference? In
the next section, I will discuss how the argument from disagreement constitutes a problem for a
universal and objective account of ethics, and discuss a few of the responses that moral realists have
put forward.

65 Setting aside, for the purposes of this chapter, “divergentist” interpretations of moral disagreement (see (Bloomfield,
2001; Shafer-Landau, 2003).
66 Ideal observer theories deal with moral disagreement by introducing further idealizations aimed at removing the
conceptual possibility of that disagreement (Baier, 1958; R. B. Brandt, 1955; Firth, 1952; Hare, 1981; Hume, 1740/1978;
A. Smith, 1759/2010). However, it is doubtful that such idealizations can be justified, since they must idealize away
many features of ordinary human beings that appear to motivate moral judgment and action (R. B. Brandt, 1955;
Henberg, 1978). Whatever the outcome of this debate, I believe what I offer in this chapter constitutes a better
approach, not based on conceptual analysis, but on empirical evidence.
67 This does not mean that there are no “faultless disagreements,” only that there is a substantial domain of morality not
subject to such disagreements.
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§5.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM DISAGREEMENT
The argument from disagreement starts with the apparently obvious fact that there is massive
disagreement about moral matters. Of course, it would be too quick to conclude that a subject matter
is not objective if judgments about it are not universally shared. However, in cases where we have
reason to believe that disagreement about some set of facts is fundamental, this produces a dilemma:
either we ought to doubt the existence or mind-independence of facts in the domain, or we ought to
doubt our epistemic access to those facts. In this section I will examine some of the ways that
philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of disagreement for moral facts. I will then turn to
what I think is the most effective counter to this argument, which is to claim that substantial portions
of moral disagreement are not moral in the first place, but are rather the result of non-moral factual
disagreements about the expected outcomes of actions or policies. This argument will not get us all
the way to establishing a universal morality, but it will allow us to narrow our focus to truly
fundamental moral disagreements.
A simple expression of the argument from disagreement comes from Mackie (1977/1990), and
takes the form of an argument to the best explanation. The great differences in moral judgment across
cultures and individuals, Mackie argues, “are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect
ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate
and badly distorted, of objective values” (p. 27). Mackie goes on to note a common response to the
argument from disagreement, which holds that though there may be widespread disagreement, this
disagreement concerns specific implementations of more general moral principles that do in fact
command universal assent. But, he claims, these general principles can’t go far enough in supporting
ordinary moral thought:
That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not
because … they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance
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could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses
immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses
in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies
many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’ (p. 27).
Here, Mackie is conflating two important issues: the psychological question concerning whether moral
reasoning proceeds from rational general principles to particular moral judgments, and the normative
question of how moral reasoning is justified. Mackie is right to doubt the psychological notion that
moral reasoning proceeds this way. There is good evidence that most moral judgments arise from
immediate emotional responses to particular cases, and general principles are attempts at rationally
defending this hodgepodge of emotionally caused judgments (see Haidt, 2001).68
However, we should be wary of moving so quickly from the descriptive question of how
moral judgments are typically made, to the normative question of whether and how these judgments
are justified.69 One can hold that moral judgments are justified by moral principles endorsed by
explicit reasoning, even if moral judgments themselves not produced by explicit reasoning from these
principles. It is possible that moral judgments are justified in the same way as any other type of
judgment. Externalist, internalist, coherentist, and foundationalist theories are all contenders for the
justification of moral judgments, and the fact that moral judgments issue from an intuitive rather than
explicit system of reasoning does not imply anything about their justification.
More pressing, though, is the possibility that a more careful version of Mackie’s hypothesis is
true: that moral judgments express commitments to different ways of life, rather than disagreements
about a common subject matter. If moral disagreements are widespread and fundamental, it might
Of course, even Haidt and the intuitionists do not doubt that some moral judgments are not intuitive, but are instead
the product of explicit reasoning. See Sripada & Stitch (2005) for a “dual process” model that expands on this element
of moral norms and judgment, and Huebner et al. (2009) for a critique of the claim that intuitive affective responses are
necessary for moral judgments.
69 For more on the question of how justification might be affected by the structure of intuitionist moral judgment, see
Colebrook (2011).
68
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well be that the best explanation of these disagreements is some form of anti-realism. As such, any
objectivist, universalist account must somehow rebut this charge, either by showing that moral
disagreement is not so widespread after all, or by providing an alternative hypothesis about this
disagreement, more attractive than Mackie’s.
Moral realists have developed many strategies for responding to the argument from
disagreement. Shafer-Laundau (2003) argues that the argument from disagreement overgeneralizes; if
disagreement in ethics implies anti-realism, then disagreement in philosophy generally ought to imply
anti-realism about virtually all philosophical topics (p. 220). Other responses to the argument from
disagreement are more general. Brink (1989) and Parfit (2011) argue that we can explain away the
extent of moral disagreement by pointing out that relatively few resources and relatively little time has
been spent on philosophical (rather than theological) accounts of ethics, as compared with scientific
theories. Enoch (2009) argues that moral disagreements result from the conflict between self-interest
and moral judgments.
I am sympathetic to many of these arguments; each of them provides at least some reason to
doubt that widespread disagreement is truly fundamental. In the next section I aim to build on the
realist case by elaborating on one traditional realist response to the argument from disagreement. This
section will consist of an argument that moral disagreement is a result of non-moral factual
disagreements. This will not eliminate all moral disagreement, though. As such, §5.4 will argue that
some moral content derives from innate cognitive modules, §5.5 will develop a targeted version of the
argument from disagreement against some foundational moral judgments. Each of these steps is
necessary to defend the claim that disagreement in a portion of morality is best explained by an
objective, universal account of moral judgment and moral facts.
§5.3 THE NON-MORAL FACTUAL BASIS OF MOST MORAL DISAGREEMENTS
Moral disagreements are all around us: socialists and conservatives disagree about the proper
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role of government in the economy, secularists and religious traditionalists disagree about the
legitimacy of prayer in public schools, my neighbor and I disagree about the proper decibel level of
music at 3AM. At first glance, such disagreements – even in our own society – look so ubiquitous that
it is hard to see how they might stem from a shared morality. The first step in showing that the depth
of disagreement is overstated is to look at the level of generality at which the disagreement arises. For
any given disagreement, we must ask whether the moral belief in either individual’s moral system is
deeply inferentially connected with another, or whether it is relatively isolated.70 Some moral beliefs or
principles might be relatively isolated from the rest (that is, if belief B is inferentially isolated, giving up
belief B will have relatively few implications for one’s other beliefs), whereas other beliefs or principles
are deeply inferentially enmeshed in one’s system of moral beliefs. If a moral principle has many
implications, disagreement about it will often imply disagreement about many derivative moral beliefs.
What are especially concerning for the prospect of a universal morality, then, are disagreements about
moral beliefs that occupy a foundational or central role in our systems of moral belief. As we will see,
though, few of the moral disagreements that animate our discourse occur at the level of foundational
moral beliefs. Indeed, few moral disagreements are moral at all.
Let’s look, then, at a few examples of supposedly deep moral disagreement. Consider the role
of government in the economy. Disagreement on this fairly core question animates disagreement
throughout the political arena.

When Republicans and Democrats argue about tax cuts,

unemployment benefits, welfare payments, minimum wage, etc., it may appear as though these
disagreements issue from fundamentally different philosophies about the proper role of government in
the economy. One side seems to be committed to the proposition that government intervention is
The inferential structure of moral beliefs in general is subject to disagreement. Foundationalists argue that one or just
a few general moral principles justify the rest of our system of moral beliefs. Coherentists argue that our systems of
moral beliefs are better interpreted as a Quinean web, where no moral belief is foundational, but where different moral
beliefs and principles have different degrees of inferential relations. For the purposes of the argument that follows,
though, it is enough that each theory admits that there are some moral beliefs with many more inferential connections
than others. It is these beliefs I aim to focus on.
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seldom (if ever) justified to accomplish socially good ends, whereas the other takes a more expansive
view of justified government intervention. This disagreement may look irresolvable because it issues
from a central tenet of each (divergent) political ideology. Resolving it would seemingly require one
side giving up much of what they hold dear. Yet if we look deeper into the reasons for these beliefs,
we will see that the difference is not in fact moral at all.
Consider the typical arguments one hears about the social safety net. Here is conservative
Republican Paul Ryan, addressing US anti-poverty programs in the Republican budget proposal, “The
Path to Prosperity”:
Above all, the role of policymakers must be to lift government-imposed barriers to stronger
communities and flourishing lives. Fiscal responsibility and economic opportunity are but
means to a more critical end: the rebuilding of broken communities and the empowerment of
families and citizens. The ever-expansive activism of the federal government drains the vitality
and displaces the primacy of the bedrock institutions that define America (Ryan, 2012).
And here is the Facebook response from Elizabeth Warren, liberal Democratic senator:
Speaker Paul Ryan just announced the Republicans’ “poverty agenda” – and it looks more like
an agenda for creating poverty than reducing it. In fact, if you look closely, Paul Ryan’s new
plan is just a shiny repackaging of Paul Ryan’s old plan: Keep huge tax breaks and special
loopholes open for billionaires and giant corporations, gut the rules on Wall Street, then say
there’s no money for Social Security, for Medicare, for education, or anything else that will
help struggling working families … It’s good to see that progressives are ready with a serious
agenda to tackle poverty: one that lays out policies to boost wages, improve access to good
jobs, ensure fair scheduling at work, and provide real ways to help families get ahead. We need
to fight for policies that level the playing field for working families, rather than set them back
(Warren, 2016).
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These two public figures could hardly be further apart on the US political spectrum. And they have
massively different expectations about the effects of different government programs for eliminating
poverty. Yet there is a striking convergence about the moral question at hand. Both politicians are
aiming at reducing poverty, and improving the material circumstances of the poor. They just disagree
about the best way to do it. There is a tendency, of course, to regard the other side as merely
advocating for their position on the basis of self-interest – Republicans often explain Democrats’
support for welfare programs as offering “hand-outs” in exchange for votes, and Democrats often
counter that Republicans’ policy proposals are simply a thinly veiled attempt at reducing the tax
burden on their wealthy contributors. But there appears to be little reason not to take these politicians
at their word: their disagreement is sincere, though as we’ve seen, it’s not moral.
This suggests a possible test for whether a moral disagreement is sufficiently deep to endanger
the possibility of a universal morality. What I have in mind involves some imagination. When faced
with a moral disagreement, ask: if I shared all the non-moral factual beliefs of my interlocutor, would
my moral judgment remain the same?

In this case, suppose you are a liberal arguing with a

conservative about the need for a fifteen dollar an hour minimum wage. Your conservative opponent
has several non-moral factual beliefs about the effects of such a wage on many aspects of the economy
– job creation, overall economic growth, global competitiveness, etc. Suppose you took on board all
these beliefs: that a higher minimum wage would cause unemployment and limit the creation of new
jobs, that it would have a significant negative effect on economic growth, and that it would make the
country less competitive with other countries that have lower wages. If you sincerely believed that all
these effects would obtain as a result of implementing a higher minimum wage, would you still support
it? The answer, I imagine, is “no.” But if the answer were still “yes,” you should think about what
purpose you think such a minimum wage would serve. If such a wage did not make people materially
better off, why would you support it? This exercise in imagination allows us to see that our
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disagreement is really about the expected effects of different policies, rather than a basic moral
principle. Both sides in the debate profess to want to materially improve workers’ conditions, they just
disagree about how to go about it. It is my contention that almost contemporary moral disagreements
are of this nature, and that, as a result, the extent of moral disagreement is quite overstated. We
cannot eliminate all moral disagreement through this method, but we can eliminate quite a bit of it.
Of course, showing that disagreements in our own society are not deeply moral disagreements
only goes as far as our own society. If we are to show that a universal morality is possible, we must go
further than that. Even Rawls, who started A Theory of Justice (1971/2009) with universalist aspirations,
ended his career by admitting an unbridgeable gap between liberal and “decent” societies in Law of
Peoples (2001). Accordingly, we should consider some cultures where our moral disagreements seem
even more significant. Let’s turn, then, to a favorite example: the Nazis.
Coming as we do from an egalitarian and anti-racist time, it is hard to put ourselves in the
mindset of Hitler, someone whose moral values appear antithetical to our own. And I admit it seems
tone deaf to even speak of mere “moral disagreement” with someone who organized and led the
systematic murder of millions. But I think the example will be instructive, because, as I contend, even
in the case of the Nazis, our disagreements are not in the end moral at all. As I’ll try to show, Hitler
and the Nazis were not motivated by any deep moral divergence from us, but rather by a racial
ideology and a slew of conspiracy theories that are composed of (false) factual claims about the world.
If, in principle (and only in principle) they could be convinced of the falsity of these claims, we would
find that little moral disagreement would persist.
If one undertakes the repulsive task of reading through Nazi speeches and publications, it is
striking how many appeals there are to the notion of self-defense. Consider the following statement
from Goebbels, given during a lecture in 1941 at the German Academy:
Sympathy or even regret is wholly out of place. World Jewry in unleashing this war made a
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completely false assessment of the forces at its disposal. It is now suffering a gradual process
of annihilation that it intended for us and that it would without question have carried out if it
had the power to do so (Evans, 2009).
This appeal to self-defense, a moral principle that enjoys widespread acceptance across cultures and
times, only makes sense in the Nazi context if one assumes the conspiracy theories and racial ideology
that pervaded right-wing circles at the time. One prominent element of this was the belief in “Jewish
Bolshevism” – the conspiracy theory that Jewish interests were behind the rise of the Bolsheviks in
Russia. Importantly, this racist canard implicated a worldwide conspiracy of Jews as a racial group,
seeking to undermine European nation states in a bid for worldwide domination. In Hitler’s mind,
this conspiracy was not just operating in Russia, but in every state that opposed Germany during the
war. Here is Hitler, speaking to the Reichstag in 1941:
For more than two decades the Jewish Bolshevik regime in Moscow had tried to set fire not
merely to Germany but to all of Europe…The Jewish Bolshevik rulers in Moscow have
unswervingly undertaken to force their domination upon us and the other European nations
and that is not merely spiritually, but also in terms of military power…Now the time has come
to confront the plot of the Anglo-Saxon Jewish war-mongers and the equally Jewish rulers of
the Bolshevik center in Moscow! (Hillgruber, 1989).
It is hard for egalitarians like ourselves to imagine the racial generalizations that people thought
perfectly truth-tracking at the time. During this height of “scientific racism,” race was thought to be
useful for explaining all manner of social ills, and it is important to see that these social ills were
ascribed to character traits thought to obtain in virtue of one’s race.
Now let’s examine what (false) non-moral factual beliefs can do. Once again, this imaginative
exercise is not pleasant, but I think it is worth engaging in. Imagine that the “scientific” racists were
right. Imagine that race does in fact correlate with all manner of character traits. And imagine that the
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best evidence you have available to you indicates that certain racial groups (Jews, in particular) are
particularly prone to all the worst character traits on offer: greed, bloodthirstiness, deceitfulness, an
unquenchable desire to contaminate and dominate. (It is no coincidence that Jewish people are
portrayed as less than human in Nazi propaganda: they were literally believed to be less than human.) Now
imagine that you also believe that this group of people is operating behind the scenes to manipulate
the levers of power in every country on Earth, intent on destroying your racial group and all the good
that stems from its (again, racially induced) character traits: hard work, honesty, loyalty, and a scientific
and enlightened mindset.
Suppose you believe all that, and you are faced with what appears to be imminent destruction
on all sides.

Is it impossible to imagine inflicting horrible suffering and destruction on these

(inherently evil) enemies, purely in self-defense? If one truly believes one’s opponents are not human, is
it really impossible to inflict the worst depravities on them? I say this as an egalitarian: if I were to
believe the (false) racial ideology that dehumanized Jewish people, and the outlandish conspiracy
theories that promised imminent disaster, I could hardly see myself resisting coming to similar
conclusions.

Even universalistic and humanitarian normative theories like utilitarianism and

Kantianism are powerless to recommend against repression (and even genocide!) if we assume all these
(false) factual belief about the sub-humanity of Jewish people and the impending doom they threaten.
I submit that, in large part, we do not avoid the Nazi’s conclusions because we are more moral (though
we are), we avoid the Nazi’s conclusions because we are more epistemically virtuous. One does not need
outlandish moral principles to rationalize horrible acts of genocide and depravity. One only needs
outlandish (and false) factual beliefs about the nature of one’s enemies and the imminence of one’s
own destruction.
Of course, even if we could in principle convince the Nazis that their scientific racism and
conspiracy theories about “Jewish Bolshevism” were false, this does not mean that they would give up
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their hatred of Jewish people. In fact, such hatred might be the very thing that motivates a belief in
these conspiracy theories, and the theories might well be post-hoc rationalizations of that hatred.71 But
even this would not mean that we have a moral disagreement with the Nazis. Just as disagreements
about factual beliefs do not constitute moral disagreements, competing emotions do not constitute
disagreements, either.

Unless one (controversially) considers that hatred to constitute a moral

judgment on its own, it is hard to see how a Nazi’s hatred of Jewish people involves a moral
disagreement with an egalitarian that has no hatred of Jewish people. The point is this: if we imagine
factual disagreements were resolved on one side or the other, no moral disagreement remains. In this
case, both the egalitarian and the Nazi believe that humans have a right to self-defense, and our
disagreement is simply over whether there is any non-human threat to defend ourselves from.
As we’ve seen, then, there is good reason to believe that even some of the most intransigent
moral disagreements are at bottom not moral at all (see also Rachels & Rachels, 2014). This limits the
moral disagreements that threaten an objective and universal interpretation of morality. And if it is the
case that there are few genuinely moral disagreements, this bolsters the case against the argument from
disagreement: the best explanation of the many apparently moral disagreements is not (as Mackie
argued) a commitment to different ways of life. Instead, the best explanation is that the world is
complicated. Disagreements about non-moral facts cause widespread (surface) moral disagreements
because there are so many contentious non-moral facts for people to disagree about.
Our work is not done, however, because there is still a legitimate doubt about whether the
argument I’ve pursued in this section is sweeping enough to undermine the argument from
disagreement. It seems possible that even if most moral disagreement is the result of disagreements
about non-moral facts, there are still some truly fundamental disagreements. We may not be able to
imagine ourselves into alignment with some groups, simply because the things we value are so basically
71

I thank Hagop Sarkissian for this observation.
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different. If we aim to show that moral disagreement is best explained by differing perceptions of
objective and universal moral truth, these fundamental disagreements must be dealt with.
One example of apparently fundamental moral disagreement concerns matters of honor.
While many western, secular liberals tend to regard honor as a meaningless or non-moral concept,
there is good evidence that considerations of honor play a significant role in the morality of other
cultures. Indeed, even within Western cultures, there are differences in the extent to which honor
seems to matter. Doris & Plakias (2008) argue that Southern culture in the United States is more
concerned with honor than Northern culture, and that this constitutes a fundamental disagreement.
They point to work done by Nisbett & Cohen (1996), which seems to show that white males in the
South are more likely to be involved in homicides over resulting from arguments, more likely to
believe that violence is justified in response to insults, and more likely to forgive other men who have
been involved in violence over these insults (Doris & Plakias, 2008). They argue that these differences
between North and South are not readily explained by various “defusing” strategies that moral realists
typically employ, and my favored strategy is among them. This disagreement does not seem to stem
from disagreement about non-moral facts, nor from self-interest, nor irrationality, nor from
Southerners’ background theory.
I won’t get into the details of their arguments against these defusing strategies, because I think
they are mostly correct. In fact, I think their choice of moral disagreement is quite apt, because it not
only represents a fundamental moral disagreement, but seems to represent a dimension of moral
thought that spawns quite a lot of disagreement.

There are numerous other examples of

disagreements about the proper role of honor in morality across cultures. Doris & Plakias could have
appealed to, for instance, honor killings in Pakistan, or the widespread practice of dueling in Europe
through the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and beyond. We should accept that disagreements about
honor constitute fundamental moral disagreements. Nevertheless, I think there is a way of securing a
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universal morality, even though these fundamental disagreements exist. In the section that follows I
will argue that moral judgment comes with innately specified content. However, as I point out in §5.5,
not all types of innately specified moral content are created equal.
§5.4 INNATE FOUNDATIONAL MORAL CONTENT
In this section I will argue that moral psychology gives us good reason to believe that,
whatever the other particularities of moral judgments, the foundational content of moral judgments is
the product of innate cognitive modules. Before we begin, it is important to note that the notion of
‘moral content’ I will be using is fairly new, though it is becoming a standard in moral psychology as of
late. Philosophers and psychologists have identified many of features that they take to be definitive of
moral content in one combination or another: seriousness, universality, objectivity, authority
independence, justifying punishment, etc. (e.g. Hollos et al., 1986; Kohlberg, 1973; L. P. Nucci, 2001;
L. P. Nucci & Turiel, 1978; L. P. Nucci et al., 1983; L. Nucci & Turiel, 1993; Smetana, 1993; Smetana
& Braeges, 1990; Smetana et al., 1993; E. Turiel, 1979; Elliot Turiel, 1983). As I touched on in
Chapter III, though, there is good reason to think that morality cannot simply be defined by
conceptual analysis. If morality is to be studied as an empirical phenomenon in a naturalistic way, we
must not rule out any given conception of morality at the outset. The alternative identifies morality by
its function. Arguing for a more expansive definition of morality, Graham et al. (2011) give the
following functional definition:
Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions,
technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or
regulate selfishness and make social life possible (p. 368).
On this approach, psychologists and philosophers can use a functional definition of morality to
identify those types of content (and those types of judgment) that are playing a moral role.
In principle, any type of content that fulfills this function can be moral content. What I am
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concerned with, however, is “foundational” moral content. By foundational content, I mean content
that recurs across many different moral judgments, whatever their other features. So, for example,
harm considerations are one type of foundational moral content. Moral judgments which reference
harm are ubiquitous. Though judgments about harm vary along many dimensions (who suffers the
harm, who inflicts the harm, what caused the harm, what effects the harm has, etc.), these judgments
all invoke harm as a central moral concern. As we will see, there are only a few types of foundational
moral content, and this this has implications for the argument from disagreement.
Given this functional understanding of moral content, let’s turn to the question of how we
obtain it. This gets us to an important question: to what extent is morality learned, and to what extent
is it innate? Though I do not intend to definitively establish one interpretation of the innateness of
morality, I believe we have reason to think that some types of moral content are the products of innate
cognitive modules, even if other features of moral judgment (including much moral content) are
learned.
Philosophers and psychologists have advanced innateness claims of varying strengths. The
strongest claim to innateness comes from theories that claim that humans possess an innate moral
faculty that operates according cross-culturally fixed rules with specific moral content.

An

intermediate position, which I will favor, claims that humans have many innate cognitive modules that
produce moral content, but that particular moral rules are filled in by enculturation. The weakest
position, which I won’t spend much time on, holds that the propensity to make judgments using moral
criteria per se is innate, but doesn’t claim that any content is produced by innate modules.
The strongest claims about the innateness of moral judgment derive from work that compares
the faculty of moral judgment to the language faculty (Dwyer, 1999, 2006; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007,
2011; Rawls, 2009). In spirit, this work derives from Chomsky (1965, 1980), who argued that linguistic
development exhibits key features that cannot be explained by learning from experience. Crucially,
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children develop substantial linguistic knowledge despite what Chomsky calls “poverty of stimulus”:
they can make subtle distinctions between different kinds of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences
without having been exposed to these sentences beforehand. Chomsky appealed to this fact (along
with others) to argue for the existence of a “universal grammar,” which is innate to the language
faculty, and is developed and specified in different ways depending on a child’s language environment.
Proponents of a universal moral grammar use similar arguments to claim that humans possess
an innate faculty of moral judgment. On this view, moral judgment cannot be explained by the
stimulus children receive at an early age, and this “poverty of the stimulus” provides evidence that
some moral rules must be innate. Children are simply not given enough moral instruction to explain
the facility with which they learn, deploy, and generalize about some moral rules. Therefore, these
philosophers argue, we have good reason to think that many deontic rules and fleshed-out moral
content develop from an innate moral faculty, assuming children are given at least minimal moral
instruction (Dwyer, 1999, 2006; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007, 2011; Rawls, 2009).
Though the approach may appear promising, there are some reasons to doubt that a universal
moral grammar with fixed rules and highly specific content exists. Prinz (2008), for instance, argues
that we do not have good enough evidence to conclude that moral judgments are innate, as opposed
to issuing “from general-purpose emotion systems and socially transmitted rules” (p. 157). He points
out several disanalogies with linguistic learning. Unlike linguistic development, moral development
does not seem to have a critical period. Whereas children that are not exposed to language after a
critical period of development exhibit significant lifelong deficiencies, there is no evidence of a similar
critical period in moral development. Children do not seem to exhibit significant lifelong moral
deficiencies if they fail to receive moral instruction by a certain age, and adults are often capable of
drastically changing their moral outlook later in life. Second, moral development occurs in concert
with a great deal of punishment and praise, whereas linguistic development does not. Third, Prinz
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points out, the variations in moral rules across cultures do not seem to be the result of a single rule in a
universal grammar being switched on or off. Rather, moral rules seem to be variable in an open-ended
way; even the prohibition on harm, which is widely shared across cultures, is not simply implemented
in an on-off way in different cultures. Instead, this rule is implemented in a multitude of different
ways, with different cultures endorsing harm prohibitions in many different circumstances. All these
points, he argues, should give us reason to doubt the linguistic analogy, and point to the possibility that
moral judgment is the product of learned rules, not innate dispositions.72
I take it that the existence of innately fixed moral rules with highly specified content is
currently unproven. But this does not entail that morality is not innate. A more moderate program is
available, which claims that moral judgment contains foundational moral content produced by innate
cognitive modules, even though that content does not involve fixed rules or highly specified crosscultural content. On this understanding, foundational moral content constitutes a “rough draft” of
every human’s morality, even though it is differentially specified depending on the cultural context that
one is born into. So, for example, all cultures make judgments that involve harm. A culture’s specific
conceptualization of harm, though, depends on enculturation. If one were born into pacifist Moriori
society, this content might be expanded to include moral judgments about many different actions,
types of suffering and sufferers. If one were born war-like Aztec society, by contrast, this harm
content might only be deployed for a few moral judgments, and might only apply to a few, situationally
specified contexts.

This approach to explaining the source of moral content is called Moral

Foundations Theory.
Moral Foundations Theorists appeal to the notion of an innate module to explain why some
types of moral content recur in moral judgments cross-culturally (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). The
concept of modularity derives from Fodor (1983), who argued that the mind is not one all-purpose
72

Similar skepticism can be found in Sterelney (2010) and Nichols (2005).
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system, but that certain cognitive functions (namely, perceptual capacities) have features that set them
apart from more general cognition. These features are the subject of debate, but as Fodor describes
them, they are domain specificity (modules only take certain inputs), informational encapsulation
(modules don’t need to refer to other systems in order to operate), obligatory firing (modules are not
subject to voluntary control), fast speed, shallow outputs (modules output simple information), limited
accessibility, characteristic ontogeny (modules exhibit regularity in their development), and fixed neural
architecture (1983).
Moral foundations theorists argue that at least five types of foundational moral content exhibit
enough characteristics to legitimately be called modules. The modules that produce these types of
content evolved for solving particular problems in the social lives of our ancestors (though the
“original triggers” that these modules were sensitive to are not necessarily the same as the “current
triggers” that they respond to in contemporary life) (Graham et al., 2013, p. 67). Moral foundations
theorists point to culinary taste as an analogy. Though cuisines across the world differ dramatically,
culinary judgments are based on just a few innate taste receptors. Similarly, moral judgments in
different cultures will vary in many ways, but all of them are based on just a few types of moral
content, produced by just a few moral modules (2013, p. 67). In what follows I’ll discuss how these
modules are conceptualized, then go over some of the evidence for the existence of these modules.
Whether or not one thinks there is adequate evidence to accept that these content-producing
modules exist depends in part on what one takes to be key to the existence of a module. These
modules, whatever they are, do not meet all the criteria Fodor originally discussed. For example,
moral judgments do not seem to issue from a fixed neural architecture. In a neuro-imaging study,
Parkinson et al. examined subjects as they judged various moral scenarios, involving harm, dishonesty,
and sexual disgust. If the content of moral judgments were the product of a modular faculty with
fixed neural architecture, we might expect all these judgments to show activity in distinct brain regions.
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If on the other hand moral judgment is domain-general, and not the product of such a specialized
faculty, we would expect different scenarios to elicit activity in different areas of the brain. Parkinson
et al. found the latter. Even though subjects judged actions across these different types of scenarios as
morally wrong, moral violations with different content (harm, dishonesty, sexual disgust) elicited
activity from different brain regions (Parkinson et al., 2011).
Should we take the fact that moral content does not seem to issue from a fixed neural
architecture to be evidence that the content of moral judgments is not modular, and therefore not
innate? Not necessarily. Another way of specifying a module simply drops this requirement. Arguing
against a restrictive understanding of modularity, Sperber (2004) says:
[I]f apparent lack of hardwiring was an obstacle to acknowledging modularity, this would be an
obstacle in the case of Fodor's linguistic input modules too. Take the case of a bilingual. Surely
she has two modules, one for each language. Both result from fixing parameters and filling a
lexicon in a template module, the language acquisition device. However, we should be
reluctant to imagine that there were (at least) two hardwired templates in place, waiting to be
initialized (p. 63).
Moral foundations theorists acknowledge that there may be multiple cognitive systems that produce
specific content for moral judgments, but embrace Sperber’s functional approach to specifying moral
modules: “Whatever functional systems made it easy and automatic to connect perceptions of
suffering with motivations to care, nurture, and protect are what we call the care/harm foundation”
(Graham et al., 2013). Thus, moral judgment may be the product of modules that innately specify
moral content without being instantiated in a fixed neural architecture.
Graham et al. (2013) develop several criteria that help to identify moral modules that produce
foundational moral content. One criterion concerns whether the content springs from automatic and
affective processes – in other words, whether moral intuitions tend to come with that type of content.
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As Graham et al. say, “[i]f a moral reaction can be elicited quickly and easily, with a variety of images,
bumper-stickers, or one-sentence stories, that is a point in favor of its foundationhood” (Graham et
al., 2013, p. 110). As it is hypothesized to result from innate moral modules rather than general
cognition, foundational moral content ought to be quickly accessed and affectively loaded.
Another criterion for identifying foundational moral content concerns whether a type of
content is culturally widespread. Innate moral modules ought to produce foundational moral content
in many different cultures and contexts, and when they do not, this aberration must be explained. This
does not necessarily mean that foundational moral content is expressed in every culture, because there
may be social mechanisms which suppress the use of some moral content. In looking for crosscultural foundational moral content, Graham et al. place emphasis on traditional small-scale
agricultural societies and hunter-gatherer societies, as these societies constitute lifestyles that are likely
closer to the environment in which moral foundations originally evolved. And though societies that
exhibit modern, Western, liberal and secular values are “arguably the worst places to look” for moral
foundations, convergence on a basic moral concern across these societies and more traditional
societies constitutes good evidence for the existence of a moral foundation (2013, p. 111).
Finally, if there is evidence of innate preparedness for moral rules that invoke a type of moral
content, this is evidence for its being a type of foundational moral content. Evidence for innate
preparedness can either take the form of automatic development of moral content with little to no
training, or evidence that children learn moral rules that invoke these concerns faster than other rules.
The former, for example, seems to be shown in the case of infants who prefer puppets that help other
puppets, as opposed to harming them (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Graham et al. (2013) point to
other research that indicates that children also spontaneously develop responses to fairness violations
and in-group/out-group distinctions. We can also find evidence for innate preparedness in research
on primates, which seems to show that some of the basic components of morality are present in
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several different species: bonobos and chimpanzees, for example, seem to respond in prototypically
moral ways to situations which involve harm or care (Hrdy, 2009; Preston & De Waal, 2002), as well as
loyalty (De Waal, 2007), and authority (S. F. Brosnan, 2006).
Where the universal moral grammarians argue for a single mental faculty which produces
moral content of all kinds, the moral foundations theorists argue for the existence of multiple moral
modules, each producing its own type of foundational moral content. Graham et al. (2013) identify at
least five moral modules, individuated by the content they produce: care/harm, fairness/cheating,
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Each of these modules is identified
based on the criteria above and must be given an evolutionary explanation. For instance, the
care/harm module evolved to help our ancestors solve the problem of taking care of young that are
relatively helpless.

Those of our ancestors who responded to signs of “suffering, distress, or

neediness” were more successful than their competitors (p. 68). Because of this evolutionary history,
we are born with the propensity to develop moral modules that track these concerns. I now turn to
some of the evidence for the existence of these modules. Though this evidence is certainly still in flux,
I believe we now have enough to justify belief in the existence of modules that produce foundational
moral content.
To start, moral judgment across many domains seems to exhibit a degree of encapsulation and
speed not found in other types of judgment. For instance, when subjects are asked to judge examples
of consensual brother-sister incest, they judge that the action is wrong, and when pressed, cannot
provide any justification. The action simply “seems wrong.” This seems to be evidence that the
mental process producing these judgments does not need access to more general reasoning systems in
order to issue its verdicts. Though subjects often come up with post-hoc justifications for their
judgments, the judgment itself is produced rapidly and without any explicit reasoning (Haidt & Joseph,
2007), see also (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2006)).
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Even though our evolutionary history may be similar, different cultures place different
emphasis on the development and elaboration of different moral modules. Haidt usefully separates
them into two categories: the “individualizing” foundation, constituted by care/harm,
fairness/cheating, and liberty/oppression modules, and the “binding” foundation, constituted by the
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation module.

These two types of

foundations are an elaboration of the work done by Shweder et al. (1997), who claim that different
cultures tend to emphasize moral concerns that stem from differing notions of the self. Those
cultures that emphasize the individualizing foundations tend to have a view of the self as independent
of others, and cultures that emphasize the binding foundations tend to have a view of the self that
stresses its interdependence, with each person relying for her existence on the relationships she has
with others.

This dichotomy not only reflects the differences between societies, but also the

differences within societies, with liberals appealing to the individualizing foundations as the basis of
their moral judgments, and conservatives appealing to both foundations.
Even though there is some evidence that some types of moral content are produced by innate
cognitive modules, this remains a controversial view. Prinz (2008), for example, argues that even if we
suppose that the content identified by moral foundations theory is universal, this does not imply that it
is innate. This is because there are many cultures where one or more of these foundations are not
moralized. The mark of whether a type of content is moralized is whether a society views violations
characteristic of this content to be appropriate targets of blame or punishment. It is clear that not
every culture moralizes all five moral foundations identified by the moral foundations theorist –
liberals, for instance, do not seem to moralize purity, respect for authority, or loyalty (Graham et al.
2009). Of course, moral foundations theorists can accommodate this evidence, as they think we
merely have an innate propensity to learn moral rules involving these foundations. But Prinz goes
further, arguing that we can account for our propensity to learn particular rules without appealing to
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innateness: moral judgments made on the basis of the moral foundations might simply be extensions
of innate emotions. As he argues:
Consider purity. Suppose people are naturally disgusted by a variety of things, such as
pollution, rotting meat, bodily fluids, disfigurement, and certain animals. This hodgepodge is
unified by the fact that they all cause disgust … Now suppose, for whatever reason, that a
particular society chooses to condemn some of these behaviors. That society will draw
attention to the similarity between these behaviors and natural disgust elicitors, and it will
inculcate feeling of both self- and other-directed blame for those who engage in them under
certain circumstances. Once a society uses disgust to moralize certain behaviors, its members
can be said to have a purity domain in their moral psychology. (Prinz 2008, p. 382).
If this is the right account of why we learn moral rules with purity content, there is no need to posit
innate moral content; we can learn to make moral judgments based on purity simply by extending the
target of disgust and moralizing it.
In some places, moral foundations theorists seem to deny the burden of proof implicit in
Prinz’s argument. Graham et al (2013), for example, say “It may have been a defensible strategy in the
1970s to assume that the mind is a blank slate and then require nativists to shoulder the burden of
proof, but nowadays, we believe, the discussion should focus on how exactly moral knowledge is innate,
not whether it is” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 100). This type of burden-shifting hardly seems defensible,
however. Regardless of prevailing orthodoxy, if there are alternative explanations of the content of
moral judgments, it seems we ought to entertain them. Nevertheless, there is a way for the moral
foundations theorist to escape Prinz’s critique.
Let’s focus, for a moment, on a crucial claim in the argument: that the set of disgusting things
is unified by the fact that they cause disgust. This is an important move, because if it really is the case,
it will mean that the only thing that unifies the targets of purity moral judgments is the fact that we
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have a particular emotional response (e.g. disgust). Such a view of moral content fits well with Prinz’s
account of moral judgment, where moral judgments are constituted by certain emotional responses
(Prinz, 2008). If it is the case that our emotions target a hodgepodge of things and actions determined
largely by culture, we no longer need innate moral content to explain how we come to learn moral
rules. We would simply learn them based on the emotional responses that our culture inculcates in us.
But we need not take on such a view, because it is not the case that all our moralized emotions target
hodgepodges.
It is telling that Prinz chooses the purity domain when levying his critique of innate moral
modules. The reason is that Prinz’s interpretation is most plausible when it comes to purity, and least
plausible when it comes to foundations like harm and fairness. It may indeed be the case that
disgusting things are only unified by the fact that we find them disgusting. But even so, we need not
draw this conclusion about things that make us angry.

Things that make us angry are not a

hodgepodge, and they are unified by more than our subjective responses to them. We get angry when
someone disrespects us, when someone hurts a nonconsenting party, or when someone flouts an
established system of rules that they have previously agreed to. It is true that there are many ways to
disrespect someone, hurt a nonconsenting party, or flout the rules. But unlike the case of disgust,
where we only have our own subjective responses to turn to, these intermediate conceptualizations
seem perfectly sufficient to unify the various things that cause us to get angry.73
Another way to look at this issue would be to consider, from the third person perspective,
what we would need to know to predict that someone will experience moralized anger, compared with
what we would need to know in order to predict they would experience moralized disgust. In the case
Note that this account is neutral between so-called “cognitivist” theories of emotion, which claim that emotions are
caused by (or constituted by) representations of threats or opportunities for an organism, and non-cognitive theories,
which claim that emotions are not always a result of these appraisals, but are at least sometimes “pure feelings” (see
(Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1993) for the former, and (Goldie, 2000; James, 1884; Prinz, 2004) for the latter).
Independent of whether emotions are always caused by a cognitive appraisal, they may still target an identifiable set of
objective features.
73
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of disgust, we cannot tell what will morally disgust a person without knowing quite a bit about her
society: what her society eats and avoids eating, when and with whom they have sex, how they
maintain personal hygiene, how they dress, etc. Compare this with anger: to predict when she will
show moralized anger, we only need to know how her society conceptualizes insults, socially expected
rules, and harm.

Though the implementation differs in different societies (and sometimes

dramatically!), the intermediate layer of concepts between this implementation and the production of
moralized anger is cross-culturally the same. In other words, moralized disgust is what might be called
an “open” program. It is an emotion that can be plausibly extended to virtually any target (Gert,
2005). But moralized anger is not quite so open. It has certain conceptual prerequisites that must be
satisfied to be activated, and though these prerequisites may themselves target different things because
of enculturation, they do not vary cross-culturally.74
Let me propose a just-so evolutionary story for why anger would be mediated by these
concepts, while disgust has no similar conceptual intermediaries.

Disgust evolved because our

ancestors had an evolutionary need to avoid noxious substances. Those noxious substances varied
depending on where our ancestors lived, so a disgust mechanism with highly rigid targets would not
have been favored over a more open mechanism (Gert, 2005). If an organism has a rigid disgust
program and moves into a new area with new opportunities for food, or new dangers from poison, it
loses out on many opportunities, and fails to avoid new dangers. An open-ended and sensitive disgust
program would function far better giving an adaptive advantage to any creature that had it. Compare
this evolutionary story with another plausible story about the anger program. Unlike disgust, the
advantages that anger provides do not vary much with the environment in which the creature finds
herself. A creature that gets angry when its food or mate is taken, or when it is threatened, or when it
74 I say “moralized anger” and “moralized disgust” in order to remain neutral as regards cognitivist or non-cognitivist
theories of emotion. Even if anger and disgust can be experienced without a cognitive appraisal, moralized anger and
disgust must have targets. Moralizing an emotion happens when we judge that it is appropriate to punish or praise
someone as a result of their actions, where their action or its result constitutes the target of our emotion.
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finds another conspecific free-riding, will be just as successful in one environment as in another.
There is thus very little reason to expect an open anger program that can be enculturated to target just
about anything. Having a relatively rigid and inflexible anger program would confer more advantage
than either having an open program, or relying on general learning mechanisms in order to do the job.
Thus it should not be surprising if anger is more rigid in its targets than disgust.
If it is the case that what unifies the various targets of the harm and fairness domains is more
than our mere subjective responses, this undermines Prinz’s explanation of how we might use innate
emotions to learn moral content, and points to a phenomenon that seems to need a nativist
explanation. After all, why would moralized anger be cross-culturally activated by intermediary
concepts like insult, unfairness, and harm? If we have no innate propensity to form moral rules based
on the activation of these concepts, there must be a reason why we learn rules which activate them.
Evidence for the modularity of some foundational moral content can shed light on the source
of moral disagreements. Rather than viewing moral disagreements as divergences of very different
moral systems with many different foundational concerns, we can see these disagreements as the result
of different cultural emphasis on just a few shared foundational moral concerns. If a liberal and a
conservative disagree on whether gay marriage should be legal, this may be because a liberal is relying
more heavily on concerns about fairness and harm reduction, whereas a conservative is relying more
on concerns about the purity or sanctity of society. If the disagreement seems to arise because of what
seems to be a new moral foundation, we can assess this claim using the criteria I discussed above. If
we determine that a putative foundational moral content does not spring from intuitive, affective
processes, is not culturally widespread, or that children show no sign of being innately prepared to
learn moral rules with this content, this is evidence that the concern is not in fact foundational. This
gives us a way of separating out the kinds of moral judgments that are mere cultural additions from
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those that are elaborations of foundational moral concerns.75 If Prinz is correct about the purity
foundation leading to moral judgments about a culturally influenced, inconsistent hodgepodge of
behaviors, this would be a good reason to believe that purity is not actually foundational.
Of course, I do not aim to settle the matter of whether purity content is foundational in this
argument. Others have argued that purity is not foundational, and have gone into much greater detail
(Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2017). For the purposes
of my argument it is enough that not all of morality is like purity. As we’ll see in the next section,
whether purity is foundational or not, there are good reasons to believe it does not refer to anything
objective or universal.
Before moving on to that argument, however, it is important to note one philosophical
implication that results from moral foundations theory, when combined with a naturalistic
interpretation of morality. The fact that morality springs from a few types of foundational content
directly undermines one of the intuitive appeals of the argument from disagreement. Even though the
argument usually appeals to real moral disagreement, there is a sense in which merely coherent
disagreement seems to be a problem for an objective, universal account of ethics. One could imagine
an argument from disagreement where one engineers many “ideally coherent” moral systems, and then
contends that the defenders of an objective, universal morality must contend with the possibility that
these moral systems are just as justified as the more standard moral systems we find in the wild. Street
(2009) calls agents that have these systems “coherent eccentrics.”76 They are agents whose desires or
values run contrary to our own in such deep ways that we cannot criticize them without begging
questions against them. They come in various flavors, from Hume’s man who prefers the destruction
of the entire world to the scratching of his finger, to Street’s own “ideally coherent Caligula,” who
This is not to say, given what I argue in the next section, that moral judgments based on cultural additions are always
best given an anti-realist metaphysics. Nevertheless, I expect many would be.
76 Strictly speaking, Street’s purpose in this article is to argue that such ideally coherent systems do not constitute a
reductio ad absurdum of subjectivist accounts of value.
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delights in inflicting as much suffering as possible. If an objectivist, universalist account of ethics does
not account for the conceivability of these eccentrics and their bizarre moral systems, it runs the risk of
chauvinistically excluding these systems from our definition of morality. These considerations make it
seem like no system of morality could be universal: there are just too many coherent, equally justified
alternatives.
An empirically grounded approach to morality offers us a way out of this problem. Morality is
not something defined by moral philosophers. It is an empirical phenomenon, to be studied in the
wild by empirical methods. As such, the mere conceivability of alternative “moral” systems does not
threaten a truly universal account of morality. Compare the study of morality to the study of physics.
Physicists rightly do not spend any time worrying about merely conceivable systems of physics, none
of which could describe the world we occupy. Insofar as they consider it at all, they do not take their
claims about physical laws to follow from a conceptual analysis of which coherent systems of physical
intuitions can be dreamed up. Instead, they try to account for observed phenomena by positing laws,
entities, and systems that describe those phenomena, intuitions be damned. Because morality is an
empirical phenomenon, we should take the same approach. We have moral experience, and in trying
to account for central features of moral experience (right and wrong actions, good and bad states of
affairs), we ought to determine how our judgments about this experience arise, and what features of
the objective world our judgments are thought to be tracking. Imagining possible alternative systems
of judgments tracking alternative objective facts simply has no bearing on the study of morality. In
other words, we have no reason to expect that moral laws will be any less contingent than physical
laws.
One might object here, and claim that the mere fact that one party to a disagreement is not
relying on foundational moral content does not itself entail that the party is wrong. It might be that
morality is partially constituted by cognitive modules producing foundational moral content, but also
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constituted by a multitude of other, learned concerns that do not contain foundational moral content
at all. I think we should accept this possibility. In fact, I think a great deal of disagreement probably
results from culturally-inculcated moral concerns being treated as though they were foundational. But
as I will argue in the next section, we can run an argument from disagreement against these moral
concerns. There is simply too much disagreement about them for us to believe that they constitute
objective perceptions of moral facts. The key is that not all of morality is this way.
In evaluating the philosophical implications of their work, moral foundations theorists Haidt &
Bjorklund appeal to Wiggins’ (1997) notion of anthropocentric truths, claiming that moral foundations
theory implies that moral truths are “true only with respect to the kinds of creatures that human beings
happen to be” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 214). Moral facts, then, only exist in virtue of the fact that
a human moral community has created them. This means that moral judgments fall in the same
category as aesthetic judgments, or judgments of taste. I think this judgment is far too quick. In fact, I
think moral foundations theory gives us a good basis on which to argue for a truly objective and
universal morality. We have already gotten quite a way toward such a goal. To review, moral
disagreement is not actually as deep as it seems: quite a number of moral disagreements that appear on
first glance to be matters of competing core moral principles are in fact disagreements about nonmoral facts, and expected outcomes of various policies. While these disagreements may be especially
hard to ameliorate, the fact that they are not truly moral gives us a reason to think that a universal
morality is possible in principle. Moreover, as I’ve argued in this section, there are good reasons to
think that moral concerns boil down to a few core concerns about harm and fairness (the
individualizing foundations) and possibly loyalty, respect for authority, and purity (the binding
foundations). The variety of different moral systems present in divergent cultures can be explained by
a combination of different understandings of non-moral facts, which leads to superficial moral
disagreements, and the fact that different cultures emphasize one or more of these basic moral
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concerns more than others, which leads to fundamental disagreements.
§5.5 A TARGETED ARGUMENT FROM DISAGREEMENT
Evidence that a part of morality is innate gives the proponent of a universal and objective
morality a special way of explaining away a large amount of moral disagreement. To be clear, I do not
intend to argue that, because some of the content of moral judgment is produced by innate cognitive
modules, we ought to consider moral judgments involving that content to be objective or universal.
Rather, what I have in mind appeals to the fact that some of this innate content is subject to far less
disagreement than the rest, and plausibly cannot therefore be reduced to any consistent set of
descriptive facts. In this section I will turn the argument from disagreement loose on the binding
foundations and show how this will bolster the realist’s case against the general argument from
disagreement.
As I pointed out in §5.2, the argument from disagreement is often put forward as an inference
to the best explanation. Given evidence that moral disagreement is widespread and fundamental, the
argument goes, we are to conclude that the best explanation is that moral judgments express
commitments to different ways of life, rather than disagreements about the same subject matter. The
argument from disagreement tends to presuppose that disagreement ranges widely over many areas of
moral discourse, and this produces the impression that a random sample of two culture’s values would
produce roughly the same level of disagreement as any other sample taken from those two cultures.
But we ought not lump all of morality into one category. Some content is produced by innate
cognitive modules and deployed in moral rules that are shared cross-culturally. Other content is
produced by innate cognitive modules, but specific moral rules are not shared cross-culturally, and still
other content is neither innately produced nor shared cross culturally.

As I will argue, moral

judgments based on the individualizing foundations are both innate and widely shared, and therefore
ought to be treated differently from the rest. We ought to be realists about judgments issuing from
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modules comprising the individualizing foundations, and anti-realists about everything else.
A burgeoning field of evidence attests to widespread agreement about individualizing
foundational moral content, and widespread disagreement about binding foundational content. The
World Values Survey (WVS) periodically conducts nationally representative surveys in nearly one
hundred countries (WVS, 2014). Though the survey includes hundreds of items, my interest here is
the portion of the survey assessing “morally debatable behaviors.” Survey respondents were asked
how justifiable various actions were. Some questions tap into the individualizing foundations (e.g.
stealing property, violence against other people), whereas other questions tap into the binding
foundations (homosexuality, sex before marriage). Other questions are less clear, and could be tapping
into either or both of these foundations, or might depend on substantive metaphysical or political
assumptions (euthanasia, abortion, suicide).
For those questions that clearly involve harm or unfairness, the data shows a striking
convergence of opinion. Observe, for instance, responses for how justifiable it is to commit violence
against other people (Figure 4). Aside from two outliers (South Africa, with a mean of 4.18 and the
Philippines, with a mean of 3.47), the mean response for every country surveyed is below 3, and the
median response on this question is 1 (never justifiable) for every country, with very few exceptions
(Bahrain, Iraq, Rwanda, and Singapore had a median response of 2). This question taps into the harm
foundation, and on this foundational issue, the WVS gives us good reason to think there is broad
cross-cultural overlap.77 There is a similar pattern of responses to the question of how justifiable it is
to steal property (Figure 5). Again, the mean response for every country surveyed is below 3, and the
median response is 1 (never justifiable) for every country with only a few exceptions (South Africa = 3,

WVS data also includes questions that assess the justifiability of other forms of violence, such as parents beating their
children and a husband beating his wife. Responses to these items show significant cross-cultural divergence. Unlike
the question which simply asks about violence against others, however, these items do not plausibly tap into the
individualizing foundations themselves, since they certainly involve significant non-moral beliefs, or moral beliefs that
rely on the binding foundations.
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the Philippines = 2, and Bahrain = 2).

For questions that clearly tap into the individualizing

foundations, there is notable cross-cultural convergence.
The WVS also includes an item from the Schwartz Value Survey that taps into the
individualizing foundations. This question asks respondents to assess their similarity to someone for
whom “It is important to help people living nearby; to care for their needs” (Figure 6). As you can
see, when asked whether they identify with someone that cares for the needs of people living nearby,
median responses to this item cluster tightly around the “like me” response. The only notable
exceptions are Japan and South Korea. Mean responses are even more striking; only Japan (3.42),
South Korea (3.46) and Thailand (3.02) have averages higher than (3) “somewhat like me.”
The convergence of the individualizing foundations is more surprising once one sees the data
on the binding foundations.

Look, for example, at the wide disagreement about whether

homosexuality is justifiable (Figure 7). Unlike judgments about stealing or harming others, acceptance
of homosexuality varies widely across nations, with some countries clustered around the poles (the
Netherlands = 10, Sweden = 10, Russia = 1, China = 1) and others clustering toward the center (US =
5, Brazil = 5).
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Fig. 4: “Violence against other people.” Median response to “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified,
or something in between.” on a scale of 1 – never justified, to 10 – always justified. (Wave 6, 2010-2014 data).

Fig. 5: “Stealing property.” Median response to “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or
something in between” on a scale of 1 – never justified, to 10 – always justified. (Wave 6, 2010-2014 data).
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Fig. 6: “Caring for others nearby.” Median response to “Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether
that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you?: “It is important to help people living nearby; to care for their needs.” On
a scale of (1) very much like me, (2) like me, (3) somewhat like me (4) not like me, or (5) not at all like me. (Wave 5 & 6, 2005-2014 data). Some countries were surveyed
twice (in wave 5 and wave 6). Germany, the Netherlands, and Rwanda shifted from a median response of 2 to a median response of 3 between waves.
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Fig. 7: “Homosexuality.” Median response to “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between” on a scale of 1 – never justified, to 10 – always justified (Wave 6, 2010-2014 data).

151

Fig. 8: “Sex before marriage.” Median response to “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or
something in between” on a scale of 1 – never justified, to 10 – always justified (Wave 6, 2010-2014 data).

A similar pattern can be observed for judgments about the justifiability of sex before marriage
(Figure 8). Responses to this question varied widely throughout the world as well, with some countries
having a very negative view of sex before marriage (e.g. India = 1, Turkey = 1) and others having a
very positive view of the action (e.g. Sweden = 10, the Netherlands = 10). Both sex before marriage
and acceptance of homosexuality are quintessential binding foundations concerns, each having to do
with sexual purity.
This pattern does not only occur in the World Values Survey data. In a meta-analysis of many
surveys conducted with the Rokeach Values Survey, Vauclair et al. (2011) showed that an aversion to
dishonest behavior appeared cross-culturally, while an aversion to “improper” sexual behavior was the
subject of widespread disagreement. This pattern also repeats within the United States. For instance,
Graham et al. (2009) showed that liberals and conservatives in the US both appeal to the
individualizing foundations in equal measure. Moreover, while conservatives tended to also appeal to
the binding foundations in addition, liberals saw these concerns as morally irrelevant.

More

information from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire is forthcoming and will have to be analyzed,
though preliminary analysis tells in favor of this hypothesis.
Of course, we ought not move from moral disagreement immediately to anti-realism. In fact,
if there were data available about worldwide judgments about homosexuality or sex before marriage
prior to (say) the year 1700, there might have been striking convergence on these matters too. It is not
the current disagreement that matters, so much as the variability of judgments issuing from the binding
foundations, both across countries and across time. The fact is that moral judgments with binding
foundational content are simply too variable, and too culturally influenced, to plausibly be
disagreements about a shared subject matter. Though more data is certainly needed, these preliminary
measures give us good reason to think that notions of what counts as “purity,” “loyalty,” or “respect
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for authority” are simply massively divergent. Crucially, there is no obvious way of bringing these
various cultural conceptions into alignment. If one’s cultural conception of sexual purity implies that
homosexuality is wrong, for example, and another person disagrees because her cultural conception of
sexual purity is different, there is no obvious way to adjudicate the disagreement. Unlike harm or
fairness, for which there are plausible naturalistic reduction bases (physical and psychological pain,
varying systems of resource allocation), there is no way to provide a naturalistic account of sexual
purity that could plausibly ameliorate disagreements about sexual purity. In short, the variability of
moral judgments issuing from the binding foundations, combined with the dim prospects for
naturalistic reduction, mean that the best explanation of these moral judgments is that they are not
tracking moral facts at all. (Or that they are not tracking any mind-independent facts). For these
reasons, I believe we should simply accept the argument from disagreement about judgments arising
from the binding foundations. Moral judgments deriving from the binding foundations do indeed
express commitments to different ways of life, rather than disagreement about a shared subject matter.
But we ought not conclude the same thing about judgments issuing from the individualizing
foundations. As I argued above, here, the data is different. When it comes to the individualizing
foundations, the broad consensus about the importance of harm and fairness considerations supports
the opposite hypothesis: moral disagreements based on these foundations are in fact disagreements
about a shared subject matter. Disagreements stemming from the individualizing foundations reflect
disagreements about whether an action or policy will produce a fair or less harmful outcome than its
alternatives. While much must be done to naturalize “harm” and “fairness,” I submit that the
prospects for such a reduction are far better than for moral judgments with binding foundational
content.
If this targeted argument from disagreement is correct, we should examine its implications.
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Different philosophers propose that we draw different conclusions from the argument from
disagreement: some conclude we ought to be expressivists (Blackburn, 1993; Gibbard, 1992), some
conclude that moral judgments are not factual (Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977/1990), some combine the
two (Timmons, 1999), and some conclude we ought to be relativists (Harman, 1996, 2000; Prinz,
2007). I won’t sort out what the implications are, here, but it is important to see that whether
judgments based on the binding foundations are non-factual, expressive, or purely relative, this fact
helps to establish the universality of the individualizing foundations. Treating the binding foundations
in an anti-realist way allows us to adjudicate disagreements that arise when judgments with binding
foundational content and judgments with individualizing foundational content conflict. If a liberal and
a conservative are arguing about the permissibility of same sex marriage, and the conservative’s
ultimate rationale rests on one of the binding foundations, it is easy to see how a convincing case for
the non-reality of the binding foundation concerns could tell in favor of one side. This is not to say
that the disagreement between them is not legitimately moral, or that the conservative is not using
morality correctly. She is just using a part of morality that is best given an anti-realist treatment. And
when an argument between two people hinges on the false assumption that something is real (when it
is not), it is easy to see who should win. When we are faced with a disagreement about what to do
with the old hermit woman who lives in the forest (whether to release her or burn her as a witch), the
outcome of this disagreement plausibly ought to turn on whether the concept of “witch” is nonreferring, non-factual, or expressive. It is clear who ought to win the argument if witches are not real
in any of these ways.

So it is with moral disagreements that turn on the similarly non-real

considerations of intrinsically good “honor,” “purity,” “sanctity,” and “loyalty.”
fundamental moral disagreements, but one side is correct, and the other side is incorrect.
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There are

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION
The argument I have covered in this chapter involved a series of steps that helped us explain
away most moral disagreement. In surveying some of the persistent disagreements in our society and
with our society’s moral opponents, we saw that even these intense disagreements were not ultimately
based on disagreements over moral facts. This did not eliminate all moral disagreements, since there
certainly are truly fundamental moral disagreements. To tell in favor of one side or another, we must
consider the psychological source of our moral judgments. As I argued, there is good reason to
believe that some moral judgments involve innate moral content. Yet not all innate moral content is
created equal: compared with the binding foundations, moral judgments with individualizing
foundational content are subject to little disagreement and are more readily naturalizable. This gives us
reason to distinguish the reality of these two types of moral judgments. Judgments based on the
individualizing foundations refer to facts that exist, and are mind-independent, while judgments based
on the binding foundations, if they refer to facts at all, refer only to mind-dependent facts.
The account I have provided still leaves many questions unanswered. What is harm? What is
fairness? Can these two foundational values be reconciled, or must we abandon one? The naturalistic
realist interpretation of ethics that I have sketched in this dissertation does not give us answers in these
pressing moral debates. This should not be surprising, since it might be too much to expect that
metaethics will completely prefigure normative ethics. Yet it does give us something to work with in
normative ethics. This interpretation of ethics gives us a broad outline of the types of moral content
we can appeal to in moral debate, and gives us reason to reject other types of content outright. In a
way that may be comforting to many western liberals, the types of moral content we ought to accept
are those on which the liberal western tradition is based. In broad outline, considerations of harm and
fairness are the media of a natural, objective, and universal morality. Though we may not know its
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ultimate contours, my hope is that this dissertation provides a glimpse at what will be a science of
morals.
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APPENDIX
THE DIALETHEIC (OR ANTI-REALIST) THEORY OF MORAL TWIN
EARTHLINGS
In response to Moore’s Open Question argument, some naturalistic moral realists (NMRs)
argue that moral terms have “natural,” as opposed to conventional or analytic definitions ((Boyd, 1988;
David O. Brink, 2001; David Owen Brink, 1989; Sayre-McCord, 1997). Natural definitions are
different from conventional or analytic definitions in that the meaning of a term with a natural
definition is discovered empirically, rather than stipulated or determined by conceptual analysis. This
strategy has been challenged in recent years by the so-called “Moral Twin Earth” (MTE) thought
experiment, proposed by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (H&T) (1991, 1992a, 1992b). This
thought experiment is taken to elicit a semantic intuition which undermines the claim that moral terms
have natural definitions. I contend that conceptual requirements on the construction of the thought
experiment mandate one of three possible construals. Only one of these generates H&T’s semantic
intuition. Unfortunately, this construal also requires that true contradictions exist, or that moral facts
are mind-dependent.

At best, I conclude, MTE only supports the (far less useful) conditional

conclusion that, if naturalistic moral realism (NMR) is false, moral terms do not have natural
definitions.
§A.1 THE MOTIVATIONS OF NATURALISTIC MORAL REALISTS
Moral realism is a metaphysical thesis that holds that there are moral facts, and that these facts
are mind-independent; they do not obtain as a result of anyone’s beliefs, attitudes, or theories.
Naturalism, for our purposes, is the thesis that all facts depend on physical facts, and are the subject
matter of science. Naturalistic moral realism is committed to holding that moral facts are natural, in
the sense that moral facts depend on physical facts, and can be used (like non-moral facts) in
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explanations of causal processes.

NMR is committed to a project of showing how a realist

interpretation of moral facts, moral language, and moral epistemology is compatible with the
metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic features of science and its methods. Richard Boyd puts the
goals of this project succinctly. NMRs must: “[s]how that moral beliefs and methods are much more
like our current conception of scientific beliefs and methods (more “objective”, “external”,
“empirical”, “intersubjective”, for example) than we now think” (Boyd, 1988, p. 309; see also David
Owen Brink, 1989, p. 4). If this project is successful, it will take the wind out of the sails of alternative,
antirealist positions, which rely for their motivation on “a presumed epistemological contrast between
ethics, on the one hand, and the sciences, on the other” (Boyd, 1988, p. 309).
However, the hope of giving a unified, realist account of the moral and scientific domain
seemed to many to be forlorn due to the influence of the so-called Open Question Argument (Moore
& Baldwin, 1903/1993). G.E. Moore claimed that moral and natural properties could not be identical,
because if they were, we should be able to provide analytic definitions of moral terms in natural terms
(p. 69). We are not able to do so, he reasoned, because for any purported definition, we can recognize
(a priori) that it is still an open question whether the definition is true.
Those who have hope for the project of making ethics compatible with science think that
Moore’s Open Question Argument can be rebutted. Of course, if that project required its defenders
to hold that “moral terms possess [analytic] definitions in the vocabulary of the natural sciences,”
(Boyd, 1988, p. 335) this would be quite an unpalatable result. NMR would then be committed to
claiming that speakers can determine the definitions of moral terms a priori—something they
manifestly cannot do, and have never done. 78 Such a claim can be rejected, however, on two separate
grounds. I will briefly mention both, though this chapter will focus on the second.
Some NMRs hold that Moore’s challenge can be rebutted in alternative ways. For instance, Jackson (1998) holds that
such analytic definitions will be possible with a “mature folk morality” (p. 133). This kind of theory has its own set of
problems, however (see e.g. Horgan & Timmons, 2009; M. Smith, 1994; Yablo, 2002; Zangwill, 2000).
78
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First, NMRs can hold that Moore’s argument relies on a form of excessively restrictive
reductionism according to which every natural fact must be definable, ultimately, in the language of
physics. And there is simply no reason to think that all natural facts are ultimately definable in this
way. Michael Devitt, for instance, argues:
The demand here is not for some crude reduction. The idea is rather that there is a hierarchy
of “levels” of facts, each to a degree autonomous, and yet each supervening on a “lower” level
until we reach physics…There is no need to give a priori naturalistic “definitions” of moral
terms, defining ‘x is good’ as ‘x is N’, thus committing “the naturalistic fallacy”. So there is no
worry with Moore’s open question: “Is being N good?” The thesis that a moral fact
supervenes on certain nonmoral facts will not be knowable a priori; it is an empirical thesis
(2002, pp. 188–189).
Given that psychological, social, biological, and moral facts appear to be multiply realizable functional
facts, no analytic definition of these need be expected. This approach is still consistent with the idea
of making moral theory compatible with science, because even if moral facts merely supervene on
natural facts, they do still depend on natural facts. And what’s more, they depend on those facts in the
same way that other scientifically acceptable facts depend on physical facts.79
Second, even if NMRs think that moral facts must be identical to some set of natural facts, they
can claim that moral terms need not have analytic or conventional definitions. Many feel comfortable
in rejecting analytic definitions because the semantic theory that required them has been significantly
undermined by developments in philosophy of language. Cases of ignorance and error for natural
kind terms (Burge, 1979; Devitt & Sterelny, 1999; Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1973, 1975) seem to show
that the reference of some terms is not fixed by the descriptions speakers associate with those terms.
79 Of course, NMRs need not hold that moral facts supervene directly on physical facts. It is far more plausible for
moral facts to supervene on social facts, psychological facts, economic facts, etc.
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This means that description theories, which claim that these descriptions are sufficient for successful
reference, fail. As a result, the meaning of many terms is not necessarily given by appeal to a “nominal
essence” – the sensible properties of a term’s referent (Boyd, 1988, p. 320; David O. Brink, 2001, p.
121; Sayre-McCord, 1997, p. 269). Instead, some terms require natural definitions, according to which
empirical discoveries about a referent will provide us with the meaning of the term.
This chapter will be concerned with this second response to Moore. The best exponent of
such a position is Boyd (1988). To explain the relation between natural and moral facts, Boyd’s view
appeals to a species of natural kind: homeostatic property clusters. These are groups of properties that
co-occur in a stable way across states of affairs and individuals (pp. 322–325). On this account,
goodness just is a homeostatic cluster of human goods (p. 329). If that is the case, however, Boyd
must explain why analytic definitions are unnecessary for moral terms:
If the traditional empiricist account of definition by nominal essences (or “operational
definitions” or “criterial attributes”) is to be abandoned in favor of a naturalistic account of
definitions (at least for some terms) then a naturalistic conception of reference is required for
those cases in which the traditional empiricist semantics has been abandoned (1988, p. 321).
Boyd thus proposes a theory of reference on which moral terms will have natural definitions.
This is the causal regulation thesis:
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, etc.) k just
in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what
is predicated of the term t will be approximately true of k (1988, p. 321).
If Boyd’s semantic account (or a suitably similar one) is right, NMRs will have gone quite a
way in construing ethics as compatible with science. Both the metaphysics of moral facts and the
semantics of moral terms will be given a suitable naturalistic explanation. The semantics of moral
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terms will function the same as the semantics of natural kind terms, and moral facts will be rendered
innocuous by their identity to homeostatic clusters of natural properties. If this is the case, Boyd’s
account can overcome Moore’s Open Question Argument as well. The meaning of natural kind terms
on this view is given by their natural definitions, which are in turn discovered by empirical
investigation and theorizing. Similarly, the meaning of central moral terms will be given by our
empirical theory on the nature of human flourishing. Because discovering the meaning of these terms
is an empirical undertaking, we should have no expectation that competent speakers will find any given
identification of the moral and the natural semantically satisfying. If moral terms have natural
definitions, Moore’s argument will be moot.
§A.2 (MORAL) TWIN EARTH
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons propose the Moral Twin Earth (MTE) thought experiment
in order to elicit intuitions that they take to be empirical evidence against the claim that moral terms
have natural definitions (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a, 1992b, 2009).80 They model their thought
experiment on Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth. As the features of Twin Earth (TE) will be important for
my arguments in §A.3, it is worth taking a moment to review that thought experiment, and what
Putnam thought it showed for the meaning and reference of natural kind terms.
Putnam asks us to imagine Twin Earth, which is exactly like Earth, but does not contain the
natural kind H2O. Instead, it contains the natural kind XYZ. This natural kind XYZ has all the same
sensible properties as H2O, though its chemical makeup is different. Given that speakers on Earth and
Twin-Earth are psychologically identical, they will both have the term ‘water.’ Now, Putnam asks,
what is the referent of the term ‘water’ in either place? It seems that on TE ‘water’ refers to XYZ, and
on Earth it refers to H2O. But, Putnam points out, this would be the case even without a detailed
80 Horgan & Timmons (2009) give related arguments, based on the same intuitions, against theories which give analytic
definitions of moral terms.
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understanding of chemistry. If we “roll back the time” to a time before an understanding of chemistry
was available (say, 1750), Putnam thinks ‘water’ will still refer to XYZ on TE and H2O on Earth
(Putnam, 1975, pp. 141–148). The conclusion: “the extension of the term ‘water’ … is not a function
of the psychological state of the speaker by itself” (p. 141). This thought experiment appeared to
show that natural kind terms will have natural (rather than conventional or analytic) definitions, and
formed one of the important motivations for NMRs who aim to rebut Moore (discussed above).
H&T advance MTE, modeled after TE, in an effort to conclude the opposite: unlike natural
kind terms, moral terms do appear to depend on the psychological state of the speaker. If that is the
case, the thought experiment seems to show that moral terms will not have natural definitions after all.
They invite us to imagine a world that is exactly similar to Earth, but in which a different functional
property causally regulates usages of the term ‘good’:
[I]f Twin Earthlings were to employ in a proper and thorough manner the same reliable
method of moral inquiry which (as we are already supposing) would lead Earthlings to
discover that Earthling uses of moral terms are causally regulated by functional properties
whose essence is captured by the consequentialist normative theory Tc, then this method
would lead the Twin Earthlings to discover that their own uses of moral terms are causally
regulated by functional properties whose essence is captured by the deontological theory Td
(Horgan & Timmons, 1991, p. 460).
Despite this difference in causal regulation, the term ‘good’ plays many of the same roles for Moral
Twin Earthlings (MT Earthlings) that it plays for us Earthlings:
Of particular importance here is the fact that Moral Twin Earthlings have a vocabulary that
works much like human moral vocabulary; they use the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and
‘wrong’ to evaluate actions, persons, institutions and so forth … the uses of these terms on
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Moral Twin Earth bear all of the “formal” marks that we take to characterize moral vocabulary
and moral practice (Horgan & Timmons, 1991, p. 459).
Given these differences between the two planets, H&T think that we have two options when
describing the differences between Earthlings’ and MT Earthlings’ uses of the terms: (1) hold that
‘good’ on Earth refers to the functional essence characterized by Tc, and that on MTE, ‘good’ refers to
the functional essence characterized by Td, or (2) hold that that ‘good’ on Earth and MTE does not
differ in meaning or reference, and that disagreements between these two groups are genuine
disagreements of moral theory and belief (1991, p. 460). If NMRs are to maintain symmetry between
TE and MTE they must hold (1), but in this instance (2) appears far more intuitive. But that’s not all:
if NMRs nevertheless want to maintain that we should opt for (1), they must explain why MT
Earthlings and Earthlings, on encountering each other and learning the differences in the referents of
their terms ‘good’ would bother to debate which referent of ‘good’ is correct.

As H&T say,

“recognition of these differences ought to result in its seeming rather silly, to members of each group,
to engage in intergroup debate about goodness—about whether it conforms to normative theory Tc or
to Td” (1991, p. 460). After all, if (1) were correct, these two groups would not have divergent beliefs
about what makes something good, they would mean something different by their use of the term
‘good.’
Regarding Boyd’s specific causal theory of reference, H&T argue that if the intuition derived
from MTE is correct, then for moral terms, causal regulation does not determine reference (Horgan &
Timmons, 1992a, p. 160).81 But H&T take the lesson of this argument to be more than a debunking
of Boyd’s causal theory of reference. Indeed, they take the lesson to be that any position that claims

H&T take the intuition to be empirical evidence which counts against NMR’s semantic claims, and by extension,
NMR itself (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a, p. 160). We might question whether semantic intuitions do in fact count as
empirical evidence in the first place (see Sonderholm, 2013, p. 83). For the purposes of this argument, I will take for
granted H&T’s claim that such intuitions would constitute empirical evidence.
81
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that basic moral terms have natural definitions (what they call “synthetic semantic naturalism” or SSN)
will be undermined by a suitable MTE thought experiment:
For any potential version of SSN that might be proposed, according to which (i) moral terms
bear some relation R to certain natural properties that collectively satisfy some specific
normative moral theory T, and (ii) moral terms supposedly refer to the natural properties to
which they bear this relation R, it should be possible to construct a Moral Twin Earth scenario
… in which twin-moral terms bear the same relation R to certain natural properties that
collectively satisfy some specific normative theory T’, incompatible with T (Horgan &
Timmons, 1992a, p. 167).
It is important to see where H&T’s argument is meant to strike NMR. By replacing analytic or
conventional definitions with natural definitions, Boyd and other NMRs aim to make moral theory
compatible with science in a way that circumvents Moore’s Open Question Argument. And Boyd
himself aims to make moral theory compatible with science in the strongest possible way: moral facts
just are natural facts. H&T think that MTE shows that we have good empirical reasons to believe that
moral terms will not have natural definitions in the first place. If they are correct, Boyd’s approach to
rendering morality compatible with science, and his approach to rebutting Moore, will be thrown into
doubt.
§A.3 THE CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS OF THEORIES ON MTE AND EARTH
Despite the ingenuity of H&T’s argument, something seems to have gone wrong relatively
early. Remember that H&T want to get the intuition that “the differences [between MT Earthlings
and Earthlings] involve belief and theory, not meaning” (Horgan & Timmons, 1991, p. 460). Because
the claim that moral terms do not have natural definitions is supported by this intuition, that claim can
be rebutted by evaluating the conditions under which MTE can conceivably produce such an intuition.
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As I will argue, the thought experiment requires that some of the claims of theories Tc and Td be true.
If this is the case, then there are three construals of MTE, only one of which produces H&T’s
intuition. On this construal, MTE either implies that true contradictions exist or that moral facts are
mind-dependent. As a result, MTE cannot be used to support an independent argument to the effect
that moral terms cannot have natural definitions. The best it can do, I will argue, is imply that if NMR
is false, moral terms do not have natural definitions.
Let’s start with my claim that some of the claims of the theories on Earth and MT Earth are
true. In describing MTE, H&T often say that the different functional essences causally regulating each
planet’s term ‘good’ are “characterizable” by means of a particular normative theory Tc or Td (Horgan
& Timmons, 1991, p. 459). But what does it mean for a moral theory to “characterize” a functional
essence? H&T are vague on this point, but one natural way to understand this notion is that the
theory implies some true claims about that functional essence.82

Indeed, though it might not

constitute a sufficient condition for characterization, making enough true claims about a functional
essence seems at the very least a necessary condition. For instance, it seems necessary that, in
characterizing H2O, our theory about water makes many true statements about it. Our theory implies
that H2O is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, that H2O is the substance that
causes our perception of wetness, that it is the substance that slakes our thirst, etc. If it turned out
these claims about H2O were false, we might doubt whether it was even H2O that we were
characterizing. Similarly, the theories Tc and Td must (at the very least) characterize their respective
functional essences by making true claims about those functional essences.
The idea that Tc and Td must make some true claims about their respective functional essences

I leave aside complications introduced by characterizing functional essences via Ramsey sentences. What matters for a
successful characterization is that the generalizations of a theory be true of a particular object, essence, etc. Whether this
characterization is done in terms of Ramsey sentences may be important for ensuring a non-circular reduction, but not
important for ensuring characterization per se.
82
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does not just come from a fairly intuitive understanding of what it means to “characterize” a functional
essence. Such a requirement is actually mandated by H&T’s stipulation that moral terms are causally
regulated by functional essences. Remember the dialectic here: MTE is supposed to provide evidence,
via our semantic intuitions, that even if a moral term is causally regulated by a functional essence, such
regulation will not determine the reference of the moral term. And as a result, moral terms cannot
have natural definitions. So recall what causal regulation is all about. If a functional essence causally
regulates a moral term, then (according to Boyd above), “there exist causal mechanisms whose
tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what is predicated of the [moral] term t will be
approximately true of” that functional essence (Boyd, 1988, p. 321). In stipulating that Tc and Td’s
‘good’ terms are in fact causally regulated by some functional essence, H&T have already committed
themselves to those theories making some true claims about those functional essences.83
Maybe H&T do not mean to grant this much. Suppose H&T thought that Tc and Td only
make false claims about the functional essence regulating their terms ‘good.’ If this is the case, it’s not
clear how we are meant to understand what it would be for a functional essence to be “regulating” Tc’s
term ‘good.’ After all, this would be akin to a chemical theory which made only false claims about
H2O, attributing to that substance all the wrong causal roles and all the wrong properties. What would
it even mean for H2O to regulate such a chemical theory? Furthermore, if H&T intended to be neutral
as regards the requirement that a theory make true claims about the functional essence that regulates
its terms, it is puzzling why they would choose Boyd’s causal regulation thesis as a target. That thesis
explicitly builds in the assumption that what is predicated of a term tends to be approximately true of
the functional essence in question. If H&T want to use MTE to refute the causal regulation thesis
H&T commit themselves to central moral terms in Tc and Td being regulated by functional essences in many places,
with no stipulation that they use the term in a way that departs from the meaning expressed by Boyd’s causal regulation
thesis. For one: “although causal regulation may well coincide with - or even constitute - reference for certain terms …
we claim that for moral terms anyway, causal regulation does not coincide with reference” (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a,
p. 160). See also H&T (1991, p. 459) and H&T (1992b, p. 244).
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(and more generally, the claim that moral terms can have natural definitions), they cannot use a notion
of causal regulation that forswears this requirement. Otherwise, such H&T’s argument would involve
a simple equivocation: it would show that “causal regulation” (whatever that is) does not give us the
meaning and reference of moral terms. But such an argument would totally fail to show that causal
regulation, as it is understood by NMRs, does not determine the reference of moral terms.84
Thus the only natural and dialectically useful construal of the thought experiment requires that
theories Tc and Td make true claims about the functional essences which regulate their terms ‘good.’
This, combined with H&T’s intuition, place MTE at a crossroads of construals. If MTE is to produce
H&T’s intuition, it must be possible for Earthlings and MT Earthlings to have a difference of theory
or belief, but mean the same thing. As a result, the theories of Earthlings and MT Earthlings (Tc and
Td) must be different (and thus imply different claims). As I see it, there are only three construals of
MTE which meet these requirements, none of which will allow H&T to formulate an independent
argument to the effect that moral terms do not have natural definitions.
Start with construal (A), in which the true claims made by theories Tc and Td are only true of
entirely different functional essences, and thus the two theories do not contradict each other. This
could be the case if each theory was incomplete.85 It might be, for instance, that Tc only makes claims
about the morality of institutions, whereas Td only makes claims about the morality of personal
relations.

It might be that Earthling moral philosophers simply did not recognize the moral

84 An anonymous reviewer argues the following in connection with this point: “consequentialist properties can causally
regulate the use of our moral terms and yet consequentialism can still fail to be the correct moral theory. That
consequentialist properties causally regulate the use of our moral terms doesn't settle the moral debate in favor of
consequentialism.” The point that Tc is not necessarily the correct moral theory is well-taken, if being the “correct moral
theory” implies that Tc makes only true claims. However, the theory must make at least some true claims in order for us
to say that its central moral terms are being causally regulated at all.
85 Another way that the theories could fail to contradict one another is if they do not actually make genuine claims about
moral properties at all. Of course, we should remember that at this stage in the dialectic, it is an ‘open question,’ so to
speak, whether causal regulation suffices for supplying the reference of central moral terms. Whether that is the case is
supposed to be supported by the semantic intuition that MTE generates. If, conversely, MTE is constructed so as to
presume the inadequacy of causal regulation for successful reference, H&T would be begging the question. I thank an
anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point.
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importance of the functional essence characterized by Td, and vice versa. The “difference” between
the theories would thus not be the theories directly contradicting each other, but would rather be both
theories implying statements about different aspects of morality. If this were the case, however, it is
quite obvious that moral philosophers on either planet wouldn’t be disagreeing. Instead, they would
simply have a difference of meaning. Such a construal of MTE allows both theories to make true
claims while remaining different, but could not conceivably produce H&T’s intuition.86
Next, and alternatively, Earthlings and MT Earthlings could have a difference of theory or
beliefs if we construe Tc and Td as complete moral theories which really do make contradictory claims.
But if this is the case, we can then ask whether (in principle) moral philosophers on either planet can
ameliorate their differences and reason their way to the same point of reflective equilibrium.87 This
presents two more construals of MTE: either (B) it is possible, in which case MT Earthlings and
Earthlings will share the same theory and beliefs at the end of the process or (C) it is not possible, in
which case they will not be able to converge on their theories and beliefs. Obviously if (B) is the case,
the difference between the two groups cannot be a matter of theory or belief, because they will have
converged on both when they employ their coherentist methodology. As a result, if (B) is the best
construal of MTE, the thought experiment cannot conceivably produce H&T’s intuition. Thus MTE
can only conceivably produce H&T’s intuition on construal (C).
Here’s where strange things start happening: if this construal is the right one, then MTE
implies that true contradictions exist. After all, (C) is a case in which Tc and Td make contradictory
claims and it is in principle impossible for Earthlings and MT Earthlings to reason their way to a
86 I am assuming that meaning determines reference here. If this is not the case, then, in virtue of talking about different
functional essences, Earthlings and MT Earthlings might to fail to disagree even though they mean the same thing. If
H&T mean to commit themselves to reference not being determined by meaning, this itself would be a novel result.
This chapter will not follow up on this possibility, however.
87 H&T explicitly stipulate that whatever theories characterize the different functional essences are “discoverable through
moral inquiry employing coherentist methodology” (Horgan & Timmons, 1992b, p. 245). H&T give us no reason to
expect that members of either community would refuse to apply the coherentist methodology that led to their best
moral theory after they meet one another.
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shared theory via reflective equilibrium. Such a scenario means that theories Tc and Td will remain
contradictory even at the limit of inquiry, and even according to the best coherentist methodology.
But more importantly, because functional essences characterized by Tc and Td are stipulated to be
regulating the uses of ‘good’ by Earthlings and MT Earthlings, and because both theories must make
true claims in order for such causal regulation to occur, the contradictory claims of Tc and Td will be
equally true! Consider then one of the areas in which these two theories contradict one another.
Suppose Tc implies the statement: “A is right” (where A is some action like pulling the lever in classic
Trolley problems, for instance), and Td implies the statement: “A is wrong.” This would mean that,
without shifting the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ A would simultaneously be both right and wrong.88
The conclusion: when we spell out the conceptual requirements of MTE’s construction, MTE either
fails to generate H&T’s intuition, or implies that true contradictions exist.
H&T might respond by claiming that they are not committed to assuming that Tc and Td make
equally true and contradictory claims because they need not take any stance on whether residents of
either planet could maintain their apparent disagreements under the scrutiny of reflective equilibrium.
This would amount to claiming that they need not take any stance on whether (B) or (C) is the correct
construal of the intuition. But this would leave MTE underdescribed in a way that threatens H&T’s
intuition. Suppose, for comparison, that I propose a thought experiment aimed at eliciting a spatial
intuition. The thought experiment is this: suppose that I drop an object, 5 inches in width, toward the
exact center of a circular aperture 5.01 inches in diameter. Will the object fall through the aperture, or
not? I consult my spatial intuitions as to whether the object will pass through, and declare that it will.
The thought experiment, as given, is underdescribed, because I have not specified the shape of the
object, only the shape of the aperture. Going through some of the construals of this spatial thought
Of course, this argument assumes that both theories must mean the same thing by “wrong” and “right.” Given that
this is the very intuition H&T are trying to pump (that Earthlings and MT Earthlings have a difference of theory or
belief, not meaning), this should be an acceptable assumption.
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experiment, we can see that some possibilities can conceivably produce my preferred intuition, and
some cannot. If the object is, for example, (B*) a rectangular box, its passing through is not
conceivable without otherwise altering the thought experiment. If the object is (C*) a sphere, its
passing through is conceivable. If you challenge my intuition by claiming that the thought experiment
only elicits my preferred intuition if the object I’m imagining is a sphere, I cannot claim that I am
simply agnostic as to whether (B*) or (C*) is the best construal. For my intuition to be a conceivable
result of the thought experiment, I am in fact committed to the object being non-rectangular (that is,
~(B*)). Similarly, H&T are committed to (C) being the correct construal of MTE, because neither (A)
nor (B) can conceivably produce the intuition that Earthlings and MT Earthlings have a difference of
theory or beliefs.89
Obviously H&T do not take themselves to be assuming that true contradictions exist in
constructing MTE. I think that H&T do not notice this implication because there is a background
assumption which obscures it: perhaps H&T believe that moral facts, whatever they are, are not mindindependent. This would allow a construction of MTE which did not imply true contradictions. If
A’s being right or wrong ultimately depended on the theory or attitudes one has about A, then perhaps
both theories could make true and contradictory claims, but fail to imply true contradictions. Of
course, H&T do not (at least explicitly) build such an assumption into the construction of MTE for a
reason: the mind-independence of moral facts is one of NMR’s key claims. If moral facts are not
mind-independent, then NMR is false. If MTE only produces H&T’s intuition if we imagine that
NMR is false, then H&T’s argument—that moral terms do not have natural definitions—depends on
89 Alternatively, one might appeal to a different intuition altogether. Perhaps Earthlings and MT Earthlings would (on
first meeting) evaluate their differences as differences of theory and belief, rather than meaning, whether or not the two
communities would be correct in this assessment. This alternative intuition would not do any work for H&T, for it
leaves open the possibility that, despite first appearances, causal regulation is in fact determining the meaning and
reference of both communities. If the two communities were not correct in their assessment of their differences, they
would have different meanings, which would support the causal regulation thesis after all. It is only our judgment that
there really is a difference between the two communities’ beliefs and theories that counts as evidence for the claim that
causal regulation does not determine reference.
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the claim that NMR is false.
What all this means is that MTE cannot be used to motivate an independent argument to the
effect that moral terms do not have natural definitions.

When we spell out the conceptual

requirements of MTE, we come to the conclusion that either MTE fails to elicit H&T’s intuition,
implies that true contradictions exist, or presupposes that NMR is false. At best, then, MTE can be
used to argue that moral terms do not have natural definitions if NMR is false.
§A.4 CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM AND A MORAL ABOUT THE METAPHYSICS OF
MIND
As I argued in the previous section, MTE does not provide an independent argument against
NMR. However, H&T have another line of attack. Suppose we were to accept that, to the extent that
Earthlings and MT Earthlings cannot converge on a single theory, they simply use moral terms with
different meanings. If this were the case, H&T contend that NMRs would be licensing a conceptual
relativism that is incompatible with realism (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a, pp. 169–170). It seems to me
that this argument should not bother NMRs. Let me explain why.
H&T motivate their worry about conceptual relativism by comparing NMR to
psychofunctionalism in philosophy of mind.

Exploring H&T’s quite detailed critique of

psychofunctionalism would obviously take us too far afield, so this will be quite breezy. However, I
believe there is something to be learned by briefly exploring the connection between these two
theories. Psychofunctionalism claims that mental states are multiply realizable functional states, and
that these states are characterized by a mature empirical psychology. H&T’s objection to
psychofunctionalism brings out the force of their worry about NMR:
Consider the correct, ideally complete, total empirical psychological theory true of humans, a
theory comprising various psychological laws; call it Th. Assume that the generalizations of
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common-sense folk psychology are embedded in Th. Suppose there is a race of Martians who
differ from humans in the following ways. First, Martians too instantiate beliefs, desires, and
other folk-psychological state-types; the generalizations of folk psychology are true of
Martians. Second, these generalizations are embedded in the ideally complete, total empirical
psychological theory true of Martians, Tm. But third, in certain other respects, Martians are
psychologically different from humans; that is, the laws comprising Tm differ somewhat from
those comprising Th, even though the laws of folk psychology are contained within both Th
and Tm. According to pre-theoretic common sense, the scenario just described is perfectly
cogent, and is a genuine conceptual possibility. A psychofunctionalist, however, is forced to
deny this (Horgan & Timmons, 1996, pp. 18–19).
Psychofunctionalists must deny this because, according to psychofunctionalism, the functional
properties identified by a mature empirical psychological theory are what mental terms refer to. Both
planets have different psychological theories, so they must be referring to different functional
properties. As a result, psychofunctionalism must say that humans’ mental terms do not apply to
Martians and Martians’ mental terms do not apply to humans. But, H&T say, commonsense dictates
that they do apply: it will be obvious to humans that Martians have beliefs, desires, etc. because they
(Martians) instantiate all the same folk-psychological state types (see also Block, 1980).
H&T take this argument and apply it (mutatis mutandis) to NMR. They argue that because
NMR is committed to moral terms referring to those natural properties identified by the best moral
theory, NMR is “committed to claiming that actual or possible agents who have a mature folk morality
[i.e. a coherent and complete moral theory] different from that of humans would not possess the
concepts of goodness, rightness, etc. at all” (Horgan & Timmons, 2009, p. 10).

Both

psychofunctionalism and NMR would thus be committed to chauvinistic conceptual relativism, a
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thesis that “entails lack of genuine disagreement in cases where two speakers utter apparently
contradictory statements which really are contradictory” (Horgan & Timmons, 2006, p. 15).
I contend that both in the case of NMR and in the case of psychofunctionalism, this argument
has the same conceptual problem as MTE. That is, one cannot derive H&T’s intuition from the
thought experiment unless, in its construction, we imagine true contradictions are possible or assume
that psychofunctionalism is false. To see why, note that H&T stipulate that the generalizations of each
theory are “embedded in the ideally complete, total empirical psychological theory true of Martians,”
and similarly for humans (2006, emphasis added). Theories Th and Tm are complete, true, and make
contradictory claims about the functional properties to which their respective mental terms refer. By
those stipulations, we can infer that we must be imagining a case where the two theories could never
converge, even in principle. So what happens when these theories’ true claims diverge? Suppose that
Th implies the true claim that one of Kathleen’s desires caused her to weed her garden in the morning,
and Tm implies the true claim that Kathleen’s desires did not cause this. H&T want to derive the
conclusion that humans (using Th) and Martians (using Tm) mean the same thing, they just disagree in
their theories and beliefs about mental states. So on the assumption that they mean the same thing, it
appears as though the thought experiment implies that Kathleen’s desire both did and did not cause
her to weed her garden in the morning – another true contradiction.
H&T’s new argument does give them better ammunition in responding to this kind of
objection, at least as compared with their way of making the point using MTE. In particular, they
could respond by arguing that they are not presupposing that humans and Martians mean the same
thing by their uses of psychological or moral terms. They can make this claim because, in this newer
way of pushing the issue, H&T do not expressly stipulate that the functional properties identified by
relevant theories causally regulate human and Martian uses of psychological or moral terms.
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Both H&T’s newer argument from conceptual chauvinism and MTE suffer from the same
problem of methodology. Each argument purports to be merely a thought experiment aimed at
priming semantic intuitions, divorced from the way things might (in the real world) turn out. That is
all well and good in some cases, but not these. Consider psychofunctionalism. If it turns out (in the
real world) that mental states cannot be characterized by one complete psychological theory, isn’t this
precisely the situation in which we should reject psychofunctionalism?

Remember that

psychofunctionalists are realists about mental states. As a result, they are committed to the claim that
whether or not multiple psychological theories can converge at the end of inquiry, only one could be
true. Suppose we gather enough empirical evidence to give us good reason to believe that multiple
psychological theories are true – that’s just about the strongest argument against psychofunctionalism
there is! Whether psychofunctionalism is a good theory depends not just on semantic considerations,
but on global considerations that should be sensitive to the actual empirical layout of the world. But
notice that H&T’s argument against psychofunctionalism is predicated on this very situation obtaining.
After all, the aforementioned Martians appear to have all the same mental states as us, but have none
of the same underlying psychofunctional states. That situation itself, quite aside from any semantic
considerations, gives us a great reason to reject psychofunctionalism. What this means is that H&T’s
argument only really shows that psychofunctionalism is committed to chauvinistic relativism if realism
about mental states is false. But that’s not a very interesting result, and hardly merits all the conceptual
machinery we’ve been busy manufacturing.
All these points can be taken and applied (again, mutatis mutandis) to NMR. It is true that NMR
is committed to the claim that if (at the end of inquiry) there are multiple complete, contradictory, and
true moral theories, individuals that use different theories will mean different things by their moral
terms than we mean by ours. But if that comes to pass, it’s hard to imagine anybody finding NMR
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even remotely convincing in the first place.
If we are to determine whether moral terms will have natural definitions, we will need to do
more than consult our semantic intuitions. Instead, we need to determine whether or not there are
multiple complete and well-justified moral theories, and whether such a state of affairs, if it came to
pass, should lead us to think that all of them are true. This is a partly empirical project that cannot be
undertaken from the armchair. NMRs should admit that anti-realism might be well supported (if not
confirmed) when all the possible complete and justifiable moral theories are really determined, and
there are just too many of them. In such a situation, denying the mind-independence of moral facts
might be the best metaethical interpretation of the state of our normative theories. But the project of
determining all the possible complete moral theories hasn’t even been proposed, let alone begun.
APPENDIX CONCLUSION
As I have argued, the conceptual requirements of MTE imply that there is only one construal
of MTE which produces H&T’s semantic intuition. That construal has two possible implications:
either true contradictions are possible, or NMR is false. Though H&T have used this thought
experiment, and the intuition it elicits, to argue against NMR, it turns out that this thought experiment
assumes that NMR is false in the first place. This means that MTE gives us no independent reason to
believe that moral terms will not have natural definitions. As a result, NMRs can still appeal to the
claim that moral terms have natural definitions in responding to Moore, and they might even go as far
as Boyd in arguing that moral facts are identical with a certain set of natural facts. A realist treatment
of moral semantics will stand or fall with the metaphysics of moral facts. NMR, in its many forms,
remains a viable possibility.
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